

JPRS-UPA-90-035
25 JUNE 1990



JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-035

CONTENTS

25 June 1990

NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Stankyeich on Inter-Republic Relations /S.B. Stankyeich; SOYUZ No 14, Apr 90/	1
Komsomol Party Control Discussed /KOMMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 24 Apr 90/	4
Komsomol Resolution on Pioneer Organization /KOMMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 24 Apr 90/	6
21st Komsomol Congress Resolutions on Aral, Chernobyl Published /KOMMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 25 Apr 90/	7

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Kazakh CP Official Interviewed on Party Budget /KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 22 Mar 90/	10
Draft Kazakh CP Platform on Party Renewal, Republic Sovereignty /KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 25 Mar 90/	12
Kirghiz SSR Publishes Resolutions on Elections	16
Presidium on Repeat Elections /SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 7 Mar 90/	16
Election Commission on Results /SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 7 Mar 90/	17
Repeat Election Districts Listed /SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 7 Mar 90/	17
Nazarbayev on Presidential Power /N.A. Nazarbayev; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 14 Mar 90/	18
Nazarbayev Speaks at Kazakh CP Central Committee Plenum /N.A. Nazarbayev; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 22 Mar 90/	20
11 April Tajik CP CC Plenum Information Report /KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 12 Apr 90/	26
Tajik State Commission on Nationality Problems Formed /KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 12 Apr 90/	26
Tajik State Commission on Construction, Architecture Formed /KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 12 Apr 90/	26
12 April Tajik Supreme Soviet Information Report /KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 13 Apr 90/	26
Makhkamov Addresses Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet /K.M. Makhkamov; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 13 Apr 90/	27
13 April Tajik Supreme Soviet Information Report /KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 14 Apr 90/	30
Privileges Reinstated to Tajik Workers Returning After Political Unrest /KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 7 Apr 90/	31
Tajik Civil Defense Official Responds to Questions on Role /F.R. Niyazov; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 3 Apr 90/	31

NATIONALITY ISSUES

Delays in Changes to Azerbaijan's Constitutional, Electoral Laws /N. Fataliyev; KOMMUNIST, 5 Dec 89/	34
Decree, Resolutions of March Georgian National Movement Congress /AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 17 Mar 90/	35
Georgia's National Forum Outlines Its Program /AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI, 5 Apr 90/	37
"Georgian Falcons' Legion" Military Group Announces Aims /AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI, 7 Apr 90/	39
"Georgian Falcons Legion" Official Explains Group's Rationale /T. Mikautidze; AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI, 17 Apr 90/	39
Georgian Monarchist Party Quits National Forum /AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI, 28 Apr 90/	42
Kazakh Party Secretary on Language Issue /U. Dzhanibekov; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 Mar 90/	42
Kazakh Anti-Nuclear Paper Published /QAZAQ ADEBIYETI, 9 Mar 90/	46
Political Oppression of PRC Kazakhs Continues /Q. Zhumadilov; QAZAQ ADEBIYETI, 23 Mar 90/	46
Language Institute Meets On Orthography Changes /SOVETSKAYA KYRGYZSTAN, 14 Jan 90/	47
Talas Gorispolkom Demands Bilingual Signs /SOVETSKAYA KYRGYZSTAN, 10 Jan 90/	47
Origins of Dushanbe Informal Group 'Rastokhez' Explored /KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 25 Feb 90/	47

Turkmen CP CC Discusses Language Issues /M. Aydogdyev; <i>TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA</i> , 18 Feb 90/	48
Uzbek Commission Report on Results of 15 Apr Election / <i>PRAVDA VOSTOKA</i> , 21 Apr 90/	50
Researcher Analyzes Composition of First Uzbek Parliament /A. Ikhamov; <i>KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA</i> , 5 Apr 90/	51
New Party Discusses Uzbekistan Sovereignty / <i>EKHO LITVY</i> , 2 Jun 90/	53

HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

Historian Rejects Comparison of 1917 Events, Current Situation /V. Startsev; <i>POISK</i> No 10, 8-14 Mar 90/	54
'Anarchist' Bakunin's Criticism of Marxist Theory Reexamined /ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 12, 24-30 Mar 90/	56
'Cult of Lenin', Democracy Called 'Incompatible' /O. Velikanova; <i>LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 12 Apr 90/	58

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

Sea of Azov Pollution Study Findings Summarized /V. Ya. Nagalevskiy; <i>SELSKIYE ZORI</i> No 2, Feb 90/	62
Aquifer Exploitation Seen As Central Asian Water Crisis Solution /S. Fioletov; <i>POISK</i> No 11, 15-21 Mar 90/	65
Georgian Goskompriroda Deputy On Republic's Atmospheric Pollution /G. Kutateladze; <i>ZARYA VOSTOKA</i> , 27 Mar 90/	69

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Split in RSFSR Komsomol Viewed /V. Ulyanov; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 12 Apr 90/	72
Speeches from 21st Komsomol Congress Debate	73
Belorussia's Kudlash / <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 14 Apr 90/	73
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Editor Fronin / <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 14 Apr 90/	74
Kazakhstan's Tasmagambetov / <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 14 Apr 90/	76
Uzbekistan's Nasyrov / <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 14 Apr 90/	78
Mary Oblast's Kalinov / <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 14 Apr 90/	79
More Speeches From 21st Komsomol Congress Debates	81
Azerbaijan's Alekperov /S. Alekperov; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 17 Apr 90/	81
Tajikistan's Yakubov /A. Yakubov; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 17 Apr 90/	82
Latvia's Urbanovich /Ya. Urbanovich; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 17 Apr 90/	83
Kirgizia's Tabyldiyev /T. Tabyldiyev; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 17 Apr 90/	85
Lithuania's Secretary Ovdiyenko /V. Ovdiyenko; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 17 Apr 90/	86
Moldavia's Bragish /D. Bragish; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 17 Apr 90/	87
More Speeches From 21st Komsomol Congress Debates	89
Chechen-Ingush Oblast's Bugayev /Kh. Bugayev; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 18 Apr 90/	89
Karelian Oblast's Ponomarev /S. Ponomarev; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 18 Apr 90/	90
Estonia's Gogulan /N. Gogulan; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 18 Apr 90/	91

Stankyevech on Inter-Republic Relations

90UN1560A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 14, Apr 90
pp 11, 14

[Interview with Sergey Borisovich Stankyevech, USSR people's deputy, Moscow City Soviet deputy and candidate of historical sciences, conducted by Igor Korolkov, IZVESTIYA special correspondent: "Not an Older Sister, But Rather an Equal Among Equals"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Sergey Borisovich, several times during the course of a speech you gave at a rally in Moscow on 25 February you used the phrase: "Forgive us, Russia!" People in our state have been repenting much and often, but that has not made things any easier for Russia. It seems that we have always been good at self-debasing confessionals.

[Stankyevech] I would not say that we have repented either much or often. On the contrary, when it comes down to confession the number of people who are willing to pass through this absolutely essential stage of moral purging is actually quite small. Especially since repentance has proven too difficult a task for whole large groups of people. Take for instance political organizations. The point is not to repent about some specific unseemly actions, but rather to reassess one's past as a whole from a critical standpoint. To stop lying to oneself. That is very important. Repentance, which is inevitably in order when we consider the present state of Russia, should be followed by action. Action in several directions. Russia needs a supreme state authority of a non-imperial nature. It would be absurd to attempt to conceal the fact that Russia has enjoyed a special status within the Union. It was not "one of" a group of equal republics. Russia (or, more precisely, those who spoke on its behalf) to a large extent set the conditions under which the other republics would exist and served as their nucleus and their source of administrative guidelines. It was Russia that placed leadership cadres in key positions.

Consider the institution of second secretaries in all the republics. This is perhaps one of the most striking examples of this peculiar relationship with other republics. And there were many other things like this. The system of distributing industry throughout our country's territory, of building enterprises under so-called union jurisdiction and of having central agencies decide where they would be located, and of utilizing resources in the various republics' territories are all obvious characteristics of what is, to say the least, a rather peculiar ideology and psychology. Now the time has obviously come to renounce all this and to reassess critically both the results of the previous period and the policy of the people who held key posts during that period.

Very soon Russia will have a Supreme Soviet which will to a great extent consist of new members. In the near future Russia will apparently face the task of restoring many institutions of state power which it did not possess previously. It is not impossible that it might also create

an institution of the presidency. Most important of all the things that must be done is reassessment of our relations with the republics. Of how to become "one of" a group of equal, sovereign states. And clearly the Union will not consist of a single type of state, as is presently the case. For our state was a unitary state to a significant degree. That has now been acknowledged by everyone, including a recent CPSU Central Committee plenum. Now it will probably be a union of equal, sovereign states united by a system of treaties. By a system of treaties which will be advantageous to all parties and in which each republic will determine separately the powers it wishes to delegate to the all-union center.

Most likely there will not be any single, universal diagram governing the way in which these treaties will be concluded. I can even imagine the following scenario, even though many people will criticize me for this: the three Slavic republics—Russia, the Ukraine and Belorussia—could have an agreement between themselves providing for closer ties. Things weighing in favor of this are common features in their culture and language and a certain historical tradition of a kindred existence between our peoples. As for the other republics, if they prefer federative ties, then that could serve as a basis for negotiations, and that should be welcomed by all. If they prefer some other form of ties with the Union, then I would not see that as a great tragedy, either.

Today there is much talk about how our union is disintegrating. In fact the following is happening: the Union's present unitary structure is hopelessly outdated. It is coming apart at the seams. Our times and history itself are sweeping this structure away. The Union must make the transition to a new condition. But since this historical necessity was not recognized in a timely manner, and since the necessary negotiations have not begun and preparations have not been made, the transition to the new condition is taking place through spontaneous disintegration of previously existing ties rather than through an orderly, civilized transition.

[Correspondent] People have already come up with a formula for what is happening: "carving up the Union into ethnic quarters."

[Stankyevech] Well, if one needed any illustration of imperial thinking, then no better one could be found than this phrase about how the Union is being carved up into ethnic quarters. The republics are not regarded as sovereign state formations, but rather as some kind of quarters, and the claims of those republics' people as attempts to sew dissension in a "communal apartment." In actuality this is far from the truth.

I must say that among the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies there are a few people who feel that the Union is being torn apart. Well, the majority feels that the right to self-determination guaranteed by the Constitution should not be put in doubt. Debate centers on what will be the constitutional mechanism for exercising that right. The fact that we are presently trying to push

through a draft law on procedures by which a republic could secede from the Union is a response to today's needs. Yet once again it is a response which is coming much too late. And obviously it is going to be impossible to avoid the kind of collisions which have arisen in regard to the Baltic republics.

They represent a special case in our history. As an historian I have my own view of that case. I have no doubts whatsoever that the Baltic republics' 1940 decision in favor of the Soviet Union cannot be regarded as a completely free one. Yet at the same time it is a well-known fact that at that time a substantial portion of the Baltic republics' population was consciously striving to join the Union. And one can understand why. On the one hand there was the threat that they would be swallowed up by Germany. Incidentally, the conditions prevailing in Hitler's Germany were pretty much common knowledge in Europe. On the other was the Soviet Union, which had just promulgated the 1936 Constitution. A very favorable image as a democratic country had been created, as a country where people had the right to a job and where their political and civil rights were protected. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's whole propaganda machine of that time was striving to paint a positively shining picture. And all this came flooding in on the people of the Baltic republics. Thus was created a certain attraction to the USSR among a significant portion of those republics' citizens when faced with the choice.

Today our central press is emphasizing just one side, while the people of the Baltic republics are stressing the other. Indeed, there were people upon whom the propaganda I just mentioned had no effect, and who were categorically opposed to annexation. Today everyone is stressing just one part of the historical truth, depending on how much each part corresponds to his own political interests. In reality the situation was very complicated and, obviously, the solution to this situation now cannot be a simple one.

The thing that disturbs me about the Lithuanian situation... While acknowledging the legitimacy of their claims to state sovereignty, including complete independence as a state, I am not pleased with the principle by which those rights are being exercised: first a political decision, then negotiations. That is not the route that should be taken by people with democratic convictions. Things should be the other way around: first negotiations, then political decisions. I am getting the impression that the Estonians are closer to the second route, though there are people there as well who are striving for one-sided decisions which not only fail to take into consideration but actually ignore in a provocative manner the interests of the other side. This policy is extremely dangerous and is capable of provoking serious escalation of tensions and clashes. Therefore in my opinion the Lithuanian side has made serious mistakes.

Yet once again I must also address the mistakes made by the union government. They are plain to see. Unfortunately, the union government has still not demonstrated its ability to engage in political thinking which looks at the game many moves into the future. For a year ago the logic according to which events in the Baltics would soon develop was already clearly evident. It was quite clear to soberly thinking politicians that to resist the process by any means, even the most violent ones, would be the most ruinous route that could be taken. There was only one solution: to begin making preparations for something which it was impossible to prevent, smooth the way for the process and take into consideration and give voice to the interests of all parties concerned.

Unfortunately that was not done. If appropriate preparations had been begun just one year ago, if we had entered into multilateral negotiations with the various social forces operating within Lithuania, then by this time we could have had an agreement with the Lithuanian Government in several different forms. In that agreement we would have given considerations to the interests of Kaliningrad Oblast, which is in a rather unique situation. We would have cleared up the situation in regard to those territories ceded at one time by Belorussia to Lithuania, as well as the situation in regard to Klaipeda and the Vilnius region. Procedures for use of Baltic ports. Binding, workable guarantees for Lithuania's Russian-speaking population. We would have resolved the issue of whether the Armed Forces, military bases, etc. would remain in Lithuanian territory, as well as the issue of property which until recently belonged solely to the Union yet which is now being claimed unilaterally by Lithuania. As well as, of course, procedures for relations along Lithuania's border with other republics. All these things could have been incorporated in a draft agreement which would give full consideration both to the interests of the Union and of Lithuania; agreement could have been reached on forms of mutual compensation for the various physical losses which will inevitably arise in this sort of "divorce proceedings." Unfortunately we are now forced to react with firemen's methods to a blaze which is already raging.

Thus I see certain miscalculations and mistakes which have been made on both sides. At this time it is critically important that we prevent any development of events which could lead to violence. Regardless of which side starts it. Otherwise we are on a dead-end street leading to the abyss. In this situation we absolutely must sit down at the negotiating table.

[Correspondent] Lithuania has proposed the start of negotiations. Moscow is only consenting to a dialogue...

[Stankovich] Call it what you will, communications, dialogue, talks, discussion... I cannot comprehend why people must be so stubborn about words. Is that serious? Is that principled? If one could imagine the highly improbable scenario that the Lithuanian leadership would listen to advice from individual USSR deputies, then I would formulate my advice thus: rescind those

decisions which have already been made on a unilateral basis. Regard the present period as a transitional period in interpublic relations. And begin negotiations. It would be even better still if they would take the initiative themselves.

[Correspondent] The situation which presently exists in our country in the field of interethnic relations inclines one to seek out historical analogies. There is not a single colonial power left in the world. The national liberation movement has swept across every continent, and everyone has won their independence. As you can read in any Soviet textbook, Russia's outlying regions were its colonies. The things that are happening in the "borderlands" today could well be characterized as an awakening of ethnic self-awareness, as a national liberation movement. I realize that we do not like to apply to ourselves the same assessments which we give of events occurring somewhere else and involving someone else. But we have agreed that we will speak the truth.

[Stankyeich] A curious situation. We are trying to use terms which came into being in the outside world, in other situations: we are trying to cut them to fit our reality and finding out every time that they do not fit. What we have really is not a classical situation. It would be impossible, for example, to apply the term "empire" to us today in its fullest sense. Because this is not an empire. It is a distinctive type of state entity. Nevertheless, many people are attempting to use that term. But it is always done with certain reservations. It is equally impossible to use the term "colony" in its fullest sense. Empires with colonies existed and developed actively in the 19th century. What was it that characterized them? An empire—either intentionally or unintentionally—fostered significant progress in its colonies. Consider one classic empire, the British Empire. Look at what happened to its North American colonies, which later became the United States. What has happened to Canada, and Australia, and New Zealand? Great Britain's settlement colonies very quickly rose to a certain autonomous status, and when they claimed independence they received it. There was tremendous discussion about whether or not to grant independence, yet nevertheless it was granted in the end. And additional benefits were accrued from this. The same thing happened to the French Empire. The events are more recent: remember Algeria. The mid-20th century. An attempt to hang onto a colony at all costs, even by violent means. Dispatch of the army to the colony. So many Frenchmen killed! Then an attempt to cling to various interim solutions. They tried persuasion: you will be worse off economically, you will be poor, you will lose all your economic ties. Yet all these were merely stages on the road to an inevitable conclusion. The French Government spent so much money and energy, yet this could not prevent the final result. In the end France was forced to renounce pressure. Then relations normalized. In the end relations reached the point at which they have remained stable, i.e. quite close relations.

[Correspondent] But on a completely different basis now.

[Stankyeich] Yes. Thus, this is the first lesson which we learn from history. Relationships of an imperial nature are doomed to disintegrate under present-day conditions. The historical period which was favorable to empires is gone forever. In the present situation it is an anachronism. And an attempt to preserve empires by any means possible is historically doomed as well. It is a struggle against the flow of time itself. Therefore it would be much more reasonable to encourage the natural course of things. And make this process less painful. Take the interests of both sides into account. When relationships make the transition to a new condition then it will no longer be some fateful separation of countries and peoples at stake but simply relations, perhaps even closer relations, then existed previously.

A second serious lesson. If we artificially extend the period needed to make the transition to a new condition which conforms to the present state of civilization's development, then we will have to pay a serious price for that. Whereas, for instance, in the middle of the past century an empire, on the one hand, aided in the development of its colonies and, on the other hand, and most importantly, enriched its own metropolis and worked to create particularly favorable conditions for it, then today the semi-imperial ties which have become an anachronism are taking cruel vengeance for the struggle against the very flow of history. On the one hand, the so-called "colonies," which were in fact something like territories dependent on the center, did not enjoy normal development. Their development was slowed down. On the other hand, in order to hang onto their influence over the outlying areas and slow the march of time the "metropolis" squandered so much effort and so many resources that it went into a state of decline itself. Growing wealth is not even at issue here! We are talking about self-imposed decay. Impoverishment. That is time's cruel vengeance. For people's failure to heed its demands.

Those are the two lessons which, it seems to me, we would do well to bear in mind.

[Correspondent] Clearly the longer we drag out this process the more painful it will be later on.

[Stankyeich] Absolutely right. And that, by the way, applies to many of our changes, in economics and in politics. The price which we are obliged to pay will be higher and the risk which we will be forced to accept will be more serious and the chances of success less the longer we postpone solutions to our pressing problems. Because we will lose the confidence which is absolutely essential under those circumstances; we will provoke an additional wave of malice and intolerance, and restoring the ties which will thus be severed will be very difficult.

[Correspondent] The opponents of self-determination are very active in their use of this argument: integration of interests is occurring around the world, yet here we have disintegration of ties.

[Stankyeovich] That is actually an argument in favor of self-determination. Because why is integration occurring? For one reason only: it is advantageous to all the participants in integration. Both economically and politically advantageous, and advantageous in a cultural sense. Integration enriches them. They realize that the huge world market economy exists thanks to the fact that in New York and in London, or in a small town in Holland, one can find goods from all over the world. Both from Hong Kong and from Latin America. Because everywhere that there is a demand a supply appears. And therefore what arises is an incredibly flexible market-oriented economic system. To the extent that this type of relations are to the advantage of all the partners who participate in them integration will proceed as a natural process. In our case, when integration unfortunately is to a large extent forced in nature it does not rest on a healthy economic foundation, therefore everything works backwards. The argument you cited weighs in favor of each republic being able as soon as possible to develop its own strengths and resources and to enter into integration processes as a natural, equal partner.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Sergey Borisovich, for your frank viewpoint. I would like to ask you one more question, this one in connection with your election to the Moscow City Soviet. In the USSR Supreme Soviet it is difficult to implement many of the radically-inclined deputies' plans. There they are in the minority. Yet in the Moscow City Soviet elections the Democratic Russia bloc triumphed: deputies supporting the Democratic Russia platform now comprise 62 percent of the Moscow City Soviet. Obviously in this case it will be possible to implement many programs...

[Stankyeovich] The democratic breakthrough which occurred in Moscow, Leningrad and other industrial cities in Russia is of critical importance. Restructuring has been developing for five years now. To a large extent it has been losing ground in recent years. People are tired of the competition between programs. Tired of platforms and manifestos. They need to be shown the real difference between the former system of government and our new democratic system. They want to see changes not in the appearance of new faces on television, but instead in changes in the direction of a better everyday life for themselves. Laws are passed at the union or republic level, but they are supposed to function locally, at the level of enterprises, labor collectives and city microrayons. We have a chance to try to show this difference in practice. To show what a democratic government on a citywide scale can accomplish.

Of course we will not be able to build a modern market economy just in one city. That is utopian. But in areas like street cleaning, highway construction, housing construction and distribution and trade the new government

will probably be able, if only in terms of the volume of goods available and real concern for the most socially unprotected segments of the population, to show a convincing difference. We are already drawing up a number of urgent measures for the first session of the Moscow City Soviet...

[Correspondent] What kind of measures?

[Stankyeovich] We intend to turn over a number of buildings, which were built for various agencies and are currently closed to the public, for refitting as maternity centers, kindergartens and clinics. We intend to insist that they be accessible to the residents of the rayons where they are located. We will make decisions changing trade regulations. Decisions on the system for street cleaning and repairs. We hope to make decisions giving Muscovites greater opportunities to supply themselves with food products. There are plans to distribute parcels of land in the areas outside of Moscow. Store shelves keep getting barer, while there is land near Moscow which has lain fallow for years.

We do not promise miracles. We do not promise a boom. This crisis is a very serious one. We mainly promise to work. To work honestly, openly, publicly and responsibly, taking voters' mandates and experts' recommendations as our guide. This we promise. The result will depend on cooperation between the Moscow City Soviet, the people of Moscow and the government agencies. In our work with the agencies we intend to take a completely different tone than has been the case heretofore. I think that the heads of agencies, administrations and offices are going to be hearing the same phrase over and over from the city's new leaders: "You are located in Moscow. You do not have the right, and we will not allow you, to ignore Muscovites' interests." We will be able to back that phrase up with the power at the Moscow City Soviet's disposal. We will not be too embarrassed or too afraid to appeal directly to the people of Moscow for support if we encounter resistance or lack of understanding, or if we encounter efforts to ignore or infringe upon Muscovites' interests. That is the principal source of our strength today.

Komsomol Party Control Discussed

90US08564 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 90 p. 3

["21st VLKSM Congress Decree: On Control in the VLKSM and the Statute on the VLKSM Central Control Commission"]

[Text] 1. Agreement with the proposals on control in the VLKSM. Confirmation on the Statute on the VLKSM Central Control Commission [VLKSM TsKK].

2. Recommendation to the higher organs of subjects of the federation and Komsomol organizations to discuss and realize these proposals in practical activity and set

up control commissions and adopt statutes on these commissions on the basis of the Statute on the VLKSM TsKK.

3. The VLKSM Central Control Commission should focus efforts on monitoring the observance of charter norms in the activities of the central elected organs of the Komsomol, prevent the apparat taking over the functions of these organs and help strengthen collectivism and social principles in the work, monitoring the financial-economic activity of enterprises and organizations of the VLKSM Central Committee or those set up with its participation, and try to insure timely formulation of normative acts on issues of setting up, reorganizing, liquidating, and carrying out the activity of these formations.

On Control in the VLKSM

The 20th VLKSM Congress defined democratization of the internal life of organizations and the breakdown of the old administrative-command system of management which has become obsolete as the main direction of perestroika. However, attempts to bring the content of VLKSM activity into line with the real interests of Komsomol members without creating a mechanism which would subordinate the activities of elected organs to these interests did not change the situation and did not eliminate existing contradictions.

They were manifested especially sharply in the sphere of the VLKSM's financial-economic activity, where rapid and at times spontaneous growth is observed in economic formations under the Komsomol committees or created with their participation. The lack of a normative-legal base and a system of regulating and verifying the financial-economic activity of cost-accounting subdivisions made the situation difficult to manage and serious violations and abuses arose in this sphere.

The creation of a new model of the VLKSM, as a genuinely democratic organization constructed on the basis of delegating authority from the bottom up would provide Komsomol members with the opportunity to constantly verify the activity of Komsomol organs in order to bring it into line with the interests of the members of the union.

In the future model of the VLKSM the management functions of the Komsomol committees will give way to coordinating functions; and therefore a mechanism of democratic monitoring on the part of Komsomol members and Komsomol organizations over the observance of charter norms in the Komsomol committee activities must be set up to preserve the unity of the organization.

In this way, the real changes occurring in the Komsomol demand that monitoring on the part of Komsomol members of meetings and conferences of Komsomol organizations, Union republic congresses of communist unions of youth, and VLKSM congresses as well as the Komsomol committees and control commissions elected by them be linked into one system.

In this system the VLKSM members could implement the monitoring personally by verifying the execution of decisions of the higher organs of Komsomol organizations, of their youth unions, and of the VLKSM or by delegating it to the appropriate elected organs in the person of their representatives.

Komsomol members would implement personal monitoring by participating in checks and audits and by directly addressing Komsomol organs for information and by participating in meetings where reports of elected organs and their members are heard.

Just as now monitoring powers would be transferred to delegates of Komsomol conferences and congresses. The congresses and conferences of Komsomol organizations perform monitoring functions by hearing reports on the activities of the elected organs.

Elected Komsomol organs would also be endowed with monitoring powers.

Komsomol committees or other Komsomol organs, permanent conferences for example, would use the powers they have been given to verify the execution of decisions they adopted.

But control commissions would monitor the observance of charter norms in the activities of their own level of Komsomol committee; monitor the conformity of drafts of decrees and of decrees adopted by this committee to the decisions of the higher-ranking organ and the charter norms; and present their opinion to the Komsomol committee.

Control commissions must monitor the financial-economic activities of Komsomol committees and cost-accounting formations under them or those created with their participation.

In light of that, in regard to control over the activities of cost-accounting formations the functions of control commissions and Komsomol committees could be shared. The Komsomol committees would be involved primarily in gathering and analyzing monitoring information and on its basis correcting economic norms which would be used to monitor the activities of Komsomol enterprises and subdivisions. Control commissions would check the activities of these same subdivisions using the method of audits and on the basis of those results formulate proposals to improve the normative-legal base and take measures to unconditionally eliminate the shortcomings and violations identified.

After the audits and checks control commissions could obtain information from the organizations checked on eliminating the shortcomings and violations. At their own judgment the control commissions would make announcements on the results of the audits and checks at plenums of Komsomol committees (or organs equal to them) and inform the VLKSM members through the youth mass information media.

The control commissions could be formed on all levels from the primary organization to the center, based on the premise that they should be independent of the Komsomol committees (or organs equal to them), elected by meetings, conferences, and congresses and be subordinate only to them, and oriented to control on the horizontal rather than all-encompassing control from above over the activities of the Komsomol organs and cost-accounting subdivisions of their own level.

The activities of the commissions could be financed on the basis of individual estimates in the budgets of the appropriate Komsomol organizations on the basis of a norm determined by the higher-ranking organ.

The monitoring system in this way could help perform the following tasks in the transitional period from bureaucratic, uncontrolled centralism to self-management: stop the alienation of Komsomol members and youth from their union as a whole and its elected organs; insure glasnost in the work of Komsomol organs and organizations; eliminate appropriation of the functions of the elected organs by the apparat; guarantee the independence of primary Komsomol structures and the rights of the minority; strengthen collectivism and social principles in the work; and insure the creation of a system of self-financing or normative financing which would provide the necessary capital to all organs and links of the VLKSM structure in accordance with their rights and obligations.

At the present time a system for training cadres for control-audit work does not exist. In this connection it would be a good idea to organize the appropriate educational courses and organize the training and retraining of specialists for this sphere of activity: Komsomol scientific research subdivisions should conduct research on the theory and practice of Komsomol control; Komsomol publishing houses should provide special texts.

Komsomol Resolution on Pioneer Organization

90US0856B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 3

["21st VLKSM Congress Resolution: 'The Komsomol and the Pioneer Organization'"]

[Text] 1. From the moment the pioneer organization was set up and until our time its ties with the Communist Union of Youth have been defined as "leadership" on the part of the Komsomol carried out on behalf of the CPSU.

At first glance this principle provided a link between generations and continuity of revolutionary ideas. Over time the hierarchical coordination party—Komsomol—pioneers, taken literally, strengthened the centralistic, overorganized style of relations among these organizations.

The result of the existing approach was a deformed, inefficient children's organization without its own program, leadership organs, cadres, or financial and material base.

The 20th VLKSM Congress's attempt to draw each Komsomol member's attention to the work with pioneers and make it a charter demand was not realized. The future is inconceivable for the Komsomol without concern for the young replacements and their development, worldview, and spiritual values.

2. In supporting the main directions of perestroika of the pioneer organization, the Komsomol considers being the guarantor of the organization's renewal the Komsomol's duty and favors the following:—its organizational independence;—the right of the pioneer organization to determine its program of activities independently;—the creation in the pioneer organization of those conditions which would prepare children for life in a society of developed democracy and pluralism and for a broad political choice;—joining in the pioneer organization children, teenagers, and adults who work in it on a professional or social basis;—the status of legal person for councils of the pioneer organization;—existence in the pioneer organization of mass information media, propaganda, scientific and methodological instruments, and the right to publishing activity;—existence in the pioneer organization of property, monetary assets, buildings, structures, equipment, and cost-accounting enterprises and organizations, that is, everything that is necessary to realize its goals and programs;—the right of the pioneer organization to independent international activity.

3. The Komsomol cooperates with the pioneer organization and gives real aid in implementing the renewal program. In the transitional period it does the following:—tries to adopt a Law on Children's Rights and to bolster the status of the children's social organization in the USSR Law on Social Organizations;—defends the interests of the pioneer organization in legislative and executive organs;—promotes the formation of an in-house budget for the pioneer organization, helps it change to self-financing, and gives material-technical and financial support by allocating the capital necessary for the pioneer organization's activity out of its own budget;—offers the opportunity for study and advanced studies to pioneer employees in Komsomol educational institutions;—turns over money obtained from the publication of the newspaper PIONERSKAYA PRAVDA, republic and oblast pioneer papers, and central and local journals to the pioneer organization, itself retaining the obligation of material-technical support of these press organs;—sets up a special subdivision for publishing literature for pioneers and pioneer employees and propaganda of the activities of the pioneer organization in our country and abroad in the printing association Molodaya gvardiya;—helps set up pioneer camps and bases belonging to the pioneer organization's councils at all levels in republics, krais, and oblasts, in doing so relying on the help of the Soviet of People's Deputies,

trade unions, and state and cooperative institutions and organizations;—helps set up a center for the children's and teenagers' movement which does scientific research, methodological and informational work, and training and retraining of cadres;—grants the pioneer organization the right to establish direct contacts and conclude agreements with foreign partners.

The Komsomol has an interest in indoctrinating the coming generation in the spirit of human values, making it a generation able to live in a renewed law-governed socialist state; and therefore will help other children's and youth organizations, associations, and movements oriented to the ideals of humane democratic socialism.

The statute on the VLKSM Central Control Commission and other resolutions and decrees of the 21st VLKSM Congress will be published in the next issue.

21st Komsomol Congress Resolutions on Aral, Chernobyl Published

90US0860A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 3

["Resolutions of the 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress"]

[Text] On the Situation Which Has Taken Shape in the Aral Sea Region

The 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress expresses alarm in connection with the aggravation of the situation which has taken shape as a result of the ecological catastrophe—the shrinking of the Aral Sea.

The Aral Sea region has become an ecological disaster area for thousands of populated areas and a tragedy for the fate of hundreds of thousands of people.

Expressing concern that the set of measures adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers, the CPSU Central Committee, the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee and other organizations is being implemented slowly and only partially, resulting in the deterioration of the medical and epidemic situation, proceeding from the totality of the ecological misfortune and the large number of problems and taking into consideration the fact that aid is needed today and urgently, the 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress decrees that:

1. An appeal be made to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee demanding that:

- the monitoring of the implementation of Decree No 1110 of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on the Problems of the Aral Sea Region, dated 19 September, 1988, be ensured and intensified;
- the drawing up of a plan for saving the Aral Sea be accelerated;

—and an appeal be made to the world community requesting all possible aid.

2. A proposal be made to the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Ministry of Defense regarding examining the advisability of locating military installations in the Aral Sea region.

3. A proposal be made to the Council of Ministers regarding the allocation of resources for the construction of a rehabilitation center and a pioneer camp for the young children and teenagers of the Aral Sea region.

4. The newly elected All-Union Komsomol Central Committee be instructed:

—to allocate additional places in all-union pioneer camps for the rest, health improvement and treatment of children from the disaster area;

—and to render one-time financial aid to children's institutions in the Aral Sea area.

5. An appeal be made to the komsomol committees, pioneer organizations, youth centers and other self-supporting youth formations requesting that they:

—render assistance in raising funds to aid in saving the Aral Sea;

—establish republic, kray and oblast patronage ties with the city and rayon komsomol committees located in the Aral Sea region;

—and seek opportunities for organizing the rest and treatment of children and young families from the Aral Sea region in their own republics, krays and oblasts.

On the Attitude Toward the Problem of Invalids

The congress expresses special concern about the situation of invalids in our society. Needed are the most rapid promulgation of a state program on the problems of invalidism and the adoption of a USSR Law on Invalids.

The congress believes that state bodies, public organizations and charitable foundations should change their attitude toward invalids.

The existing intellectual, creative and spiritual potential of invalids should be used more effectively for the good of society and the person himself. Every possible kind of assistance and aid must be rendered to the development of charitable activities in society. The independent activities of young invalids and their associations must be stimulated.

The congress appeals to komsomol enterprises to take the interests of this social group into consideration in their own economic activities.

On the Matter of the Elimination of the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES

Expressing concern with regards to the untimeliness and low level of effectiveness of the measures adopted for the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and the concealment from the public of the true state of affairs in the areas of radioactive contamination and the lack of legislative norms regulating residing in these areas, the 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress decrees that

1. An appeal be made to the USSR Supreme Soviet demanding that:

—USSR Laws on an Ecological Disaster Area and on a Radioactively Contaminated Area, in which the protection of society and the rights of the populace living and residing in these areas are secured, be drawn up and adopted;

—the "Common Union-Republic Program for the Elimination of the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES" be considered and adopted in April of 1990;

—a commission be established from among the USSR People's Deputies to monitor the progress of the elimination of the accident's consequences, to ascertain its causes and to evaluate the actions of officials, party and soviet leaders and members of the government commission during the period from 1986 through 1989;

—a state program for the constant improvement of the health of the populace of the afflicted regions and, first and foremost, of the children be drawn up;

—an appeal be made to the international community and to our countrymen living abroad requesting that they render all possible aid and also accept residents, especially children, for examination and treatment;

—complete glasnost be ensured by law in matters associated with the results of the accident, its consequences and the progress of their elimination and all types of classification be removed from these reports;

—the USSR Council of Ministers be instructed:

—to send a team of qualified specialists without delay to give the populace a complete medical examination, to obtain statistical data on the area's radioactive contamination and to produce an integrated evaluation of the impact of radiation factors on man and the environment;

—to work out a concept of safe residence for the populace, which takes into consideration not only the degree of radioactive contamination, but also natural conditions, social and economic problems, the possibilities for engaging in private subsidiary farming and the providing of pure foodstuffs and the protection of the children's health;

—to establish a USSR Council of Ministers' Temporary Non-Departmental Executive Body for Matters Pertaining to the Elimination of the Consequences of the Accident;

—and to draw up a program for the step-by-step mothballing by 1995 of the Chernobyl AES' power units and the use of the released specialists.

2. The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee be instructed to draw up a program for long-term integrated aid to the komsomol organizations of the rayons afflicted by the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

3. The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee and the Central Council of the All-Union Pioneer Organization imeni V.I. Lenin allocate without delay, in agreement with the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee, the Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee and other All-Union Komsomol committees of the afflicted rayons, the maximum possible guaranteed number of sites in the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee's Artek, Orlenok and Okean pioneer camps.

The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee and the Sputnik International Youth Tourism Bureau ensure the allocation of a guaranteed number of places in their own health improvement institutions for students and also, in accordance with the degree of development of conditions, for mothers with children up to 5 years of age from the afflicted rayons.

4. A request be made to the AUCCTU regarding transferring the Yuniy Lenins Pioneer Camp in Yevpatoriya to the Children's Radiological Center; and regarding the allocation of an adequate number of places for the health improvement of children and teenagers from the afflicted rayons in the country's trade union camps, as well as in rest homes for mothers with children, having provided in them for the organization of a highly skilled diagnostic and medical service.

5. An appeal be made to the USSR Ministry of Health requesting the immediate allocation of the appropriate equipment and specialists for treating and improving the health of children and teenagers in the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee's pioneer camps.

A request be made that the USSR Council of Ministers allocate additional funds and appropriations for improving the upkeep, feeding and serving of these children and teenagers.

6. An appeal be made to the country's komsomol organizations and labor collectives requesting support of the numerous suggestions regarding transferring the assets earned on 21 April, 1990, to the "National Victims' Aid Fund." USSR Zhilsotsbank Account No 700183.

7. In support of the initiative of the group of USSR People's Deputies from the All-Union Komsomol, which was addressed to the 2d USSR Congress of People's

Deputies, a proposal be made to the country's komsomol organizations that they:

- accept school-age children from the afflicted rayons in the work and rest camps for senior students and the pioneer camps;
- investigate the feasibility of and organize the rest of children and young families from the afflicted rayons

in their own republics, krays and oblasts and invite them as guests into their own homes;

- and establish at the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, the komsomol committees and the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA a staff for rendering aid to young families which have expressed a desire to resettle in other areas.

Kazakh CP Official Interviewed on Party Budget

90US08741 Alma Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 22 Mar 90 p.3

[Interview with V.A. Brott, administrator of affairs, Kazakh CP Central Committee, nominated as candidate for deputy for the Mangystauskiy election okrug, Gurev Oblast, by KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA reporter V. Srybnykh: "The Republic's Party Budget"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, until recently, data on the party budget were a secret "under lock and key." The first few figures from this area were published in IZVESTIYA CC CPSU. And then, quite recently, an interview appeared in PRAVDA with the CPSU Central Committee Administrator of affairs N.Ye. Kurchina. It made public much data on the party budget on the scale of the country. Could you open a bit the curtain of secrecy on the republic party budget?

[Brott] If you please. For example, let us take last year, the total amount of dues was R81.75 million. That includes R65.4 million from membership dues, R12.57 million from publishing activity, and R3.750 million from the sale of property.

[Correspondent] Publishing activity—is this the activity of the Kazakh CP Central Committee Publishing House?

[Brott] Not only that. In our republic we have two other party publishing houses—those of the Karaganda and Tselinograd party obkoms. But of course, the Central Committee publishing house, which publishes all the republic newspapers and journals, yields the basic sum of the income for this item.

[Correspondent] Could you explain what kind of income this is from the sale of property?

[Brott] Well. For example, a portion of the cars from the garages of the party committees is being sold to reduce their number—and supplemental income emerges. It happens that other party committee property is sold the same way.

And, well, another small portion of the income comes, let us say, from the payment for forms while joining the party. On the whole, the income portion of the party budget is formed of all of these components.

[Correspondent] And for what items are funds expended?

[Brott] For the maintenance of the party apparatus. R52.25 million is spent, for party propaganda measures, R3.963 million, managerial expenses total R14.215 million, and the use of computer technology costs R136,000. In addition, last year, R900,000 was spent on acquiring new equipment, and it is only beginning to be assimilated in the party committees.

In total, the expenses of the republic party organization comprise R93.7 million.

[Correspondent] That is, expenses exceed income?

[Brott] Yes, by R11,950.

[Correspondent] At whose expense is the income shortfall portion of the budget covered?

[Brott] At the expense of donations from the CPSU Central Committee funds.

[Correspondent] Could you speak in more detail of certain expense items? This portion of the budget is of particular interest to our readers, judging by the letters we get...

[Brott] Naturally. There are no special secrets here, either. For example, I cited the figure of expenses of the maintenance of the apparatus. The figure is fairly large; it may seem excessive to some. But let us break it down into components. The salary of officials of party committees of all level is R21.58 million; the salary of technical workers, R3.78 million, of released staffers of primary party organizations, R12.525; the prize fund, R4.295 million; official travel expenses, R2.109 million; conducting plenums and party conferences, R90,000; aid to partypensioners and veterans, R202,000, and R3.177 million is spent on treatment measures. And perhaps we should also mention the office and mail-telephone expenses, R1.435 million.

[Correspondent] you cited a fairly hefty figure for the expenses for party propaganda. What does this concept include in the sense of finances?

[Brott] This includes expenses for maintaining political education houses, party offices, party educational institutions—Archives—Higher Party School and night universities of Marxism-Leninism; funds for conducting various measures, such as propagandists' seminars and the suchlike. This also includes expenses for political literature and visual materials.

[Correspondent] And the last question from the series on the general topic "income-expenditures": What "managerial expenses" are applicable to party work and what kind of computer equipment is it that you mentioned? Why does the party staffer need it?

[Brott] Expenses for maintaining the premises of party committees, the purchase of inventory and organizational equipment, and expenses for transport are included in managerial expenses. The salary of service personnel are included here.

[Correspondent] But aren't technical staffers and service personnel one and the same?

[Brott] Technical staffers are typists, correspondence workers, secretaries, and a number of other specialties. And service personnel are cleaning women, drivers, sanitation workers, etc.

As far as the second half of your question is concerned, the computer equipment, we started to introduce it

recently. For what purpose? Well, let us say, for counting letters and appeals from citizens and party committees. After all, it is no secret that very many people make the most disparate requests of the raykoms, obkoms, and finally the Central Committee. An enormous quantity of letters comes in. And, in order to work with them in a qualified manner, we had to introduce a computer. Its memory also has other data needed by the party—statistical information, other information.

[Correspondent] Now, if you have no objections, we will move from general figures and budget items to more private issues. Many of them are questioned in our readers' letters. The first question will be on privileges. There is a lot of talk about this topic now. Almost the entire population unanimously condemns privileges. As far as party and soviet workers are concerned, some admit to the existence of privileges, and others have a surprised expression: What privileges...?! What is your attitude toward this issue?

[Brott] The party-soviet apparatus probably has privileges. In my view, only unwise and not very honest people can deny this to the hilt. State dachas exist for a portion of the party apparatus workers. Personal cars are allocated for high leaders; certain categories of staffers have the right to call them. The level of health resort treatment among apparatus staffers is higher than in the country on the whole. There were times when special stores existed. Although when I came into the Central Committee in 1988, they were no longer there—the special stores were eliminated.

Our Central Committee has its own 94-bed rest home. We now grant many organizations the opportunity to use it. Of course, in summer, there are not enough vacation packages, like everywhere else, but during another season, certainly, we can allocate a package to staffers of other branches. True, there is one nuance here: Previously, the difference between the price of the vacation package and its actual cost was paid for from the party budget. We are now beginning to practice sale at full value.

[Correspondent] The opinion exists that within the territory of the rest home, there are separate cottages in which people in high positions are living almost entirely at state expense...

[Brott] There are indeed cottages there. However, all expenses for their upkeep are the full responsibility of their tenant. It is as if they rent these dachas for a certain payment. Incidentally, the condition of many cottages as present is such that substantial resources are needed for their repair and interior renovation. After renovation, we want to lease a portion of them to representatives of foreign firms for offices. We have such experience: At our "Dostyk" hotel, 20 rooms have been assigned to foreigners in an agreement with "Kazakhintorg."

[Correspondent] Apropos the hotel. The readers are interested, at whose expense was it built in its time?

[Brott] Solely at the expense of the party budget. The same thing with the "Alatau" health spa in Kamenka, about which questions are often asked. This is a CPSU Central Committee health spa. But it is not only party officials who vacation there. Fifty percent of the spaces are given to various ministries and departments. The health spa administration is permitted to sell to the local population from the village of Kamenka five vacation packages every season. Treatment assistance programs for the local population have been organized here.

[Correspondent] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, many of our readers are troubled by the issue of the recent salary increase for party staffers. Was that really so necessary at a time so difficult for the country?

[Brott] There was a need, in order to attract experienced specialists, and good cadres to party work. After all, in the national economy and in science, they received fairly hefty pay, and they lost salary in the switch to party work. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that 96 percent of the sum for raising labor compensation for party workers is at the expense of personnel reduction.

[Correspondent] By how much was the Central Committee apparatus reduced in 1988? What reduction is anticipated in the near future?

[Brott] In the first reduction in 1988, 81 of 268 senior officials were cut. In accordance with the CPSU Central Committee plenum, it is proposed that the apparatus be reduced in the near future by 30 percent—approximately 60 people.

[Correspondent] What categories of staffers will be cut?

[Brott] The local party committees themselves have the right to decide on that, but I think that it will be primarily workers of the so-called branch departments.

[Correspondent] There have already been several reports in the central press that individual party staffers in the provinces have voluntarily refused the salary increase, not considering it possible to receive an increment for themselves now, when the country is in a crisis. Have there been such cases in our republic?

[Correspondent] We have had no refusals of the salary increase. I think that those who did so in other locations are doing it purely for propaganda purposes.

[Correspondent] In many newspapers, including ours, there appeared some time ago regularly published information on the transfer of buildings of this or that party committee to the administration of social and cultural facilities. What is the overall picture of this like in the republic and what is recommended for the future?

[Brott] As you know, we had two oblasts abolished and 30 raykoms and gorkoms eliminated. As a result, basic funds (primarily buildings) were transferred without compensation to health care establishments, worth R3.348 million; to cultural establishments, R1.243 million, and to public educational establishments, R2.719

million. As far as the long term is concerned, there will be no more uncompensated transfers. The state of the party budget does not permit this to be done. Naturally, buildings and individual rooms will be vacated in the future as well with further apparatus cuts and reorganizations of the structures of the party organs. But these will already be leased out or even sold. Let us say, a part of the Central Committee building will be leased and vacated after the personnel cuts.

[Correspondent] Should it be understood that the party from now on is not going to avoid commercial activity?

[Brott] Exactly so. I already cited the examples of commercial activity of our rest home and hotel. We also plan to organize paid services in the Central Committee car garage. We will put into practice wide-scale leasing of premises of the political education houses and party committee hall for various undertakings. We will even reequip the stage in some of them in order to present, say, shows, concerts, etc.

[Correspondent] But, let us suppose that some sort of public organization not overly sympathetic to the CPSU asks to lease premises for a rally?

[Brott] If the organization is not an anti-constitutional one, we will grant it to them as well.

[Correspondent] How do you regard cases in which one party organization or another decides to hold 50 percent of party dues for its own needs? Have there been such cases in our republic?

[Brott] There are such cases here, but few. I would say that such decisions are of a warning nature. I have a dual attitude toward this. I consider such a decision incorrect for today. Until the new Charter is confirmed, we must live by the old standards. They may be criticized, reviewed, but it is not allowed to willfully violate them. Incidentally, in our republic even now, 33 percent of the party membership dues coming in are spent on the needs of the primary party organizations. As far as the future is concerned, we will have to approach it on a differentiated basis. Say, in a small party organization in which the collect 20-30 rubles in dues, it will be possible to leave all of this for the need of the party organization. But at enormous enterprises, where there are large amounts of dues, it will be possible to leave, say, 5-10 percent.

[Correspondent] For the end of the interview, according to the tradition now being formed in the press, some rapid-fire questions. Your attitude on the proposal expressed by many that party dues must be paid not from stated salary, but from pure income, from the money "on hand."

[Brott] My attitude is positive. Only before working that way, this must be reflected in the Charter.

[Correspondent] There is talk that party staffers are getting hefty bonuses...

[Brott] Well, if you call two rates a year a hefty bonus, then that is. And they used to be given on 1 May and 7 November. Now, according to the 6-month and year-end totals, and a concrete decision is handed down on each staffer—how he performed over the period indicated, that is what you get, 70, 80, 90 percent of the rate, sometimes even 60.

[Correspondent] And one more question from this series. They say that party workers have their round-trip fare paid for them while on vacation. In principle, this is correct; Kazakhstan is quite far from many all-union health spas and resort areas, the trip is not cheap. Residents of the European part of the country are in a more advantageous situation. But again, why are these not privileges for all Kazakhstan residents?

[Brott] But why do you think that this is only for party staffers? This is so in many branches of the republic's national economy. It just has a different name: material assistance, treatment funds, etc.

[Correspondent] Some time ago, the republic community was agitated by the publication in one of the youth publications of a menu from the Central Committee dining hall...

[Brott] There was such a publication. The problem was simply that as a result of this publication many decided that there are some sort of special products in our dining hall. We were recently able to prove that the whole thing is a matter of the labor of highly qualified chefs. Have you noticed that they have begun to cook differently at the dining hall of your publishing house?

[Correspondent] Yes, there have been striking changes lately.

[Brott] That is because we made your dining hall a branch of ours. Part of our staff was sent there. But the funds for food in your dining hall have remained the same, I emphasize this. Yet the changes in the menu, as you yourself said, are striking. That means that it is above all a matter of the chefs' expertise.

[Correspondent] Well, thank you for the conversation. I think that the readers will learn from it many things of interest to them.

Draft Kazakh CP Platform on Party Renewal, Republic Sovereignty

90US0874B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Mar 90 p 1

[Text of draft approved by 20th Kazakh CP Central Committee Plenum: "Toward the Renewal of the Kazakh CP and the Sovereignty of the Republic in the New Federation: The Kazakh CP Central Committee Platform for the 17th Republic Communist Party Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] Perestroika has proven the acute need for the transformations begun in the country, the lack of alternatives to the course chosen by the CPSU. Economic and political reforms, and the spiritual renewal of society are being implemented. Socialism suffused with genuine democracy and humanism is becoming the ideal of the Soviet people.

The Leninist content of the slogan, "All power to the soviets!" is being reborn. The soviets are taking responsibility for state administration and socioeconomic development. Freed from the direct economic functions, the party organs concentrate efforts on the preparation of social progress programs, on organizational and ideological work, and the affirmation of principles of social justice.

At the same time, the transformations in the economy and social and national relations are being implemented slowly and in a contradicting manner.

Inflation, the budget deficit, and the imbalance of the market are having their effect upon the processes of renewing the economy. Kazakhstan remains the country's raw material base; the dictatorship of the union ministries and departments is preserved; the consumer sector and social sphere are developing poorly, and the ecological situation is strained in a number of regions.

Political and legal reforms have not been completed, and the soviet organs have not begun to work in full force.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee feels that under the conditions of the formation of the new political thinking, a qualitative renewal of the theoretical baggage of the party and the acceleration of the understanding of the actual processes of the development of perestroika is required. The party's transition to political methods of work, consolidation, and elevation of civic responsibility of all society's healthy forces acquires enormous significance.

Considering the exceptional importance of the current election campaign, its influence on all spheres of the life of the republic, and in connection with the preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Kazakh CP Congress, the Central Committee feels it necessary to determine the principal bases of its activity.

Man at the Center of Social Development

The Kazakh CP Central Committee approved the program of comprehensive and spiritual flourishing of the individual expounded in the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress, and feels that the main task of the republic party organization is to actually put man and his problems at the center of social development.

For this purpose, the communists of Kazakhstan are breaking once and for all with the old thinking, the authoritarian-bureaucratic deformations of socialist

society, and express decisive rejection of Stalinism, and the socialism profoundly alien to the Leninist conception.

In regenerating the Leninist dialectical approach to the evaluation of our historical past, we are grateful to all generations of Kazakhstaners who have contributed to the republic's socioeconomic development.

On the eve of the 120th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin, we declare our profound adherence to the Leninist theoretical legacy and the ideals of Great October. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is for the honest and righteous analysis of the natural law and uniqueness of socialist construction in the republic.

We are for humane and democratic socialism, founded on free labor, cultural and scientific and technological progress, and social justice.

Our strategic line is the radical turnaround of the economy toward human needs. The priority spheres here are the development of the agro-industrial complex, production of foodstuffs, consumer goods, services, housing construction; strengthening the population's health, protecting the environment, the social reconstruction of the village, and immediate measure for improving labor and living conditions of work, the status of pensioners, the handicapped, war and labor veterans, and children. For this purpose, the Kazakh CP Central Committee promotes the improvement of the structure of industry, the sensible reduction of expenses for the maintenance of the organs of administration, defense, and the elimination of illegal privileges and benefits.

The republic's communists are deeply convinced that perestroika will prevail only when a sharp turn toward the problems of raising the young generation has been ensured in society. We favor the adoption of the corresponding law and the consecutive execution of an integrated youth policy in Kazakhstan. Youth's formation of a scientific world view, educating expertise, patriotism, internationalism, and collectivism, a love of labor, philanthropy, and compassion remain at the center of the republic's party organizations.

We favor uninterrupted education, the improvement of the moral-esthetic upbringing of youth, increased responsibility of the family and society for raising children and teenagers. We consider it advisable to develop a program in which would be determined the trends of scientific research, perestroika of teaching in secondary and higher schools, cadre training, and creation of new teaching literature. We assign important meaning to raising the theoretical level of the social sciences, their humanization, participation in determining the prospects and trends of the republic's development, and forecasting the socioeconomic and sociopolitical processes.

We favor the elimination of the residual principle and the priority allocation of resources for the development

of the social infrastructure. The party organizations must consistently conduct a course for the preservation of the uniqueness of the cultures of the republic's peoples, the development of art and literature, the preservation, restoration, and utilization of monuments of history and culture, and to oppose the commercialization of culture, and the manifestation of nihilism with regard to the national cultural legacy.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee declares the impermissibility of discrediting the role of the Soviet Army in society, and we consider it our priority responsibility to preserve the heroic traditions of the people, to raise the prestige of serving in the army, to fortify the patronage connection with military units, and concern for the living conditions of army and navy veterans, and internationalist troops.

The republic's communists favor the inalienable right of every person to have access to all information that is not a state secret, the further democratization of the organs of the press, television, and radio. In recognizing this, we are for strict observance of legality, against the propaganda of anti-human views. Communists working in the mass information media are called upon to ensure that the CPSU political line is conducted, that responsibility for objectivity, the constructiveness of publications and broadcasts is raised.

While promoting and propagandizing the scientific materialism world view, the Central Committee also supports freedom of conscience and religious confession, and views religion as a part of the culture of peoples, and it is prepared to hold a dialogue with the faithful in the name of affirming compassion, mutual understanding, and common human values.

Toward the Republic's Economic Independence.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee considers active participation in overcoming the crisis tendencies in the economy to be the immediate task of the party committees and all communists. The republic has at its disposal sufficient labor and intellectual potential, and very rich natural resources for this.

In the name of the communists of Kazakhstan, we decisively declare the necessity of accelerating the process of the republic's transition to self-management and self-financing, to the expansion of independence in the utilization of natural, labor and financial resources, and the elimination of departmental arbitrary rule. The development of economic relations with union republics on the basis of mutual interest, equivalent exchange, and stability of contractual obligations is creating conditions for the resolution of accumulated social problems.

We view the prospects for the long-term development of Kazakhstan in the body of a renewed federation on the basis of a precise delimitation of the competence of the Union and republic in planning, the financial-credit sphere, and price formation.

At the same time, we note that Kazakhstan has its own republic interests which are not contradictory to common union interests. We decisively favor the republic's property right to the land, its mineral wealth, waters, forests, and other natural resources, with the right of their ownership, use, and command by the soviets of people's deputies. We are for the development of various forms of property based upon workers' self-management, economic accountability, and widescale assimilation of leasing and contracting relations, and cooperatives. The decisive factor in this is the exclusion of exploitation of man by man.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee will direct efforts toward the elimination of excessive centralization and a transition to economic methods of management, the development of planned and market relations, and the creation of various sorts of associations, concerns, consortiums, the broad development of small businesses and cooperatives. It reserves a significant role for mutually advantageous foreign economic relations, joint enterprises, and the creation of free trade zones.

We are for accelerated development of the base of construction and the construction industry, the processing branches in the agro-industrial complex, the reduction of low-yield, capital-intensive production, for the organization of science-intensive production, the expansion of application of the latest resource conservation and environmental protection technologies, for strengthening state, labor, and production discipline, for the creation of a reliable legal impediment on the path of the shadow economy, corrupt elements and speculators, against mismanagement, group egoism, and seniority, and unfounded price increases.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee is for the rapid development and realization of republic programs: the formation of a national brigade of the industrial working class, and the occupation of the population capable of working at the cost of locating to the provinces new enterprises and production lines. Particular attention must be paid to the most remote, backward, in the socioeconomic sense, rural regions of the republic.

The communists of Kazakhstan consider it their duty to head the public's movement for the preservation and improvement of the living environment, the prevention of ecological catastrophe, the accelerated resolution of the problems of the Aral Sea area, the Caspian Sea area, Lake Balkhash, and a test ban in the Semipalatinsk atomic testing area.

Toward the Democratization in Public Life in the Republic

The Kazakh CP Central Committee confirms its adherence to the Leninist principle of the right of nations to self-determination, and aspires to the achievement of the republic's genuine sovereignty. The future of the Kazakh SSR is in the composition of the voluntary union of free state. We are for the accelerated development and

signing of a new union agreement and the delimitation of authorities among the Union of SSRs and the union republics.

All absolute authority is concentrated in the soviets of people's deputies. The party organizations will exercise their political influence over their activity by democratic means through the communists working in them. The struggle for delegation in the soviets of all levels of competent and politically trained communists occupying an active live position, and capable of working effectively in the interests of comprehensive democratization of our society is a most important political task of the party.

We favor a strong Kazakh Supreme Soviet allocated the genuine authority of the highest organ of state sovereignty, the voluntary delegation of a portion of their rights to federal institutions—to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR President. The priorities of public progress insistently demand the development of work in the preparation of a new Kazakh SSR Constitution. It is necessary to accelerate the development and adoption of republic laws on property, the land, local self-management, taxation, and other matters.

In the interests of establishing equal rights interrelations between the Union and the republic, strengthening the political-legal status of the Kazakh SSR, ensuring the balanced and effective activity of the entire state mechanism, we consider the confirmation of the presidential form of administration in the republic to be advisable. The republic president is the embodiment and the guarantor of national statehood, territorial integrity, the observance of the union treaty, a factor in the consolidation of the peoples living in Kazakhstan, and of all healthy forces supporting perestroika.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee is for the expansion and fortification of the authorities of the republic government as the highest executive-administrative organ of power.

We favor the formation of a socialist rule-of-law state guaranteeing the supremacy of the law in all spheres of public life, the functioning of all state and public institutions within the strict framework of legality, and reliable defense of citizens' interests. For these purposes, the Central Committee considers one of the priority tasks to be the improvement of the activity of the law enforcement organs; the strengthening of the independence of the court, the improvement of the work of the procuracy, and the organs internal affairs state security, arbitration, and advocacy.

Communists support the sociopolitical organizations favoring perestroika, the renewal of public life on a socialist basis, and will actively collaborate with them. At the same time, on positions of principle, the Central Committee opposes extremist, separatist, and confrontational moods, attempts to cause social tension, and to destabilize the situation.

The democratization of public life is inevitably leading to the the formation of new sociopolitical citizens' organizations. The procedure of their formation must be specified by the law and reflected in the Kazakh SSR Constitution. At the same time, organizations and associations of an anti-constitutional nature must be prohibited.

Toward the Harmonization of Interethnic Relations

The Kazakh CP stands firmly on internationalist positions and is for increasing the culture of the interethnic communication, for the preservation and development of the uniqueness of the peoples residing in the republic. We are for the consolidation and friendship of all people for whom the Kazakh land is or has become the homeland.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee supports the aspiration of all national groups for representation in the organs of state power and administration, and the right of each national community to the formation of cultural centers, religious, and other associations.

The Central Committee assigns particular significance to the realization of the state program on languages. A course for the confirmation of the Kazakh language as the state language, the expansion of the sphere of its use, an intensified study of the Russian language as a means of interethnic communication functioning on an equal level with the state language within the territory of Kazakhstan will be consistently followed. We are for the free use of the native language by representatives of national groups residing compactly in the republic.

The Central Committee is for the full and consistent implementation of the constitutional principle of citizens' equal rights in the development and introduction of a mechanism of legal defense of their national honor and dignity.

We declare in the name of the republic's communists that the substitution of the national right and freedom of peoples to self-determination by self-will ruled and separatism, violence and anarchy is impermissible. The party organizations will decisively counteract the forces attempting to destabilize interethnic relations in Kazakhstan, and all those who, by speculating in the ideas and slogans of perestroika, are following not national, but self-serving groups interests.

Toward a Renewed Kazakh Communist Party

The communists of Kazakhstan support the statutes of the draft platform of the Kazakh CP Central Committee and the CPSU Charter on the functions, place, and role of the party in society under renewal, the forms and methods of its work, the fundamental trends of the democratization of intra-party life.

We favor reforming the CPSU as the party of socialist choice founded upon the principles of the creative development of Marxism-Leninism. Under conditions of

democratic pluralism, it is fighting for the role of the democratically recognized political leader. We favor a new version of articles 6 and 7 of the Kazakh SSR Constitution with consideration for the amendment introduced in the the USSR Constitution. The Kazakh CP introduces this proposal to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet in the procedure for legislative initiative.

In the course of the transformation of the Soviet federation, of the genuine suffusion of the republic with sovereignty, we support the statutes of the CPSU Charter on the independence of the Communist Parties of the union republics. The Kazakh CP must have the right to direct participation in the resolution of the principle issues of life of our entire party, to develop on the basis of the Platform and the CPSU Charter our own documents, to resolve independently organizational, cadre, and financial issues.

The communists of Kazakhstan favor the independence of the trade unions, the organizational-political strengthening of the republic Komsomol, and the further improvement of the organs of state control.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee strives to actually ensure the power of the party masses, the expansion of the rights of primary party organizations, an increase in the role and authority of the elected organs, the creation of conditions for the free juxtaposition of views, collegial discussion and adoption of decisions, respect for the opinions of the minority and of each communist. In the democratization of party life, an important role is assigned the created republic council of secretaries of primary party organizations and the analogous councils in the provinces.

The Communist Party considers the observance of democracy and discipline in the party, the further development of the principles of democratic centralism and party comradely relations to be necessary.

During the course of the reports and elections, the system of formation of the election organs must change in the party organizations. We are against their formation by the functionary principle. A rule should be introduced according to which a communist cannot be a member of more than two election party organs simultaneously.

The new status of the republic Communist Party also presents new demands to its Central Committee as the political and ideological organ, the organ of collective leadership. The creation of a politburo and the appropriate committees headed by the Central Committee secretaries and members, and the election at the congress by direct and secret voting of a first secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee; at the plenum, Central Committee secretaries, Kazakh CP Central Committee Politburo members. Between congresses it is possible to conduct republic party conferences, and, at the decision of communists, referenda.

Under the conditions of the change of the party's functions, the apparatus of party organizations needs improvement of structures, a qualitative renewal, a radical change in style, form and methods of work.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee considers it necessary to review the current system of training and retraining of cadres. Party committee cadre decisions should be adopted in recommendation form with subsequent conduct of democratic procedures; a rejection of the formal-nomenklatura approach in cadre policy is needed, and seniority and protectionism are impermissible in it.

We favor the expansion of glasnost in intra-party work, saving it from outmoded positions and norms; we are for the persistent struggle against bureaucratism, and increasing the responsibility of party committees and organizations in work with letters and statements of workers.

1990 is the year of the 70th anniversary of the formation of the Kazakh SSR and the Kazakh Communist Party. The Central Committee is certain that the reports, elections, and pre-congress discussions will be a most important condition of the renewal of the republic party organization, and of the elevation of its role in the cause of implementing the revolutionary transformation of society.

Kirghiz SSR Publishes Resolutions on Elections

Presidium on Repeat Elections

90US07194 *Erinze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian* 7 Mar 90 p 1

[Resolution of Presidium of Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet on Arrangements for Repeat Elections of People's Deputies of Local Soviets of People's Deputies of Kirghiz SSR in Certain Electoral Districts]

[Text] Due to the fact that in a number of districts candidates for people's deputies of local soviets of the Kirghiz SSR were not elected on election day, 25 February, and the repeat elections held on 4 March 1990 did not result in the election of candidates, the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To recommend to those territorial electoral commissions that repeat elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR be held on Saturday, 7 April 1990;

The voting will be conducted in those same electoral precincts and with the same lists of electors compiled for conducting the general elections.

2. To approve target dates for the main measures involved in preparing for and conducting the repeat elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR. T. Akmatov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet A. Myrzaliyev, Secretary of the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet

Election Commission on Results

90US0719B *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 1*

[Resolution of Republic Electoral Commission for Elections of People's Deputies of Kirghiz SSR on Results of Elections of People's Deputies of Kirghiz SSR on 25 February 1991]

[Text] After reviewing the reports from the district electoral commissions on the results of elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR on 25 February 1990, the Republic Electoral Commission reports that the lists of electors of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR contained 2,290,202 names and that 2,106,040 people, or 91.95 per cent, voted.

Voter turnout by region: Issyk-Kul Oblast, 92.8 per cent; Osh Oblast, 98.4 per cent; Frunze, 76.6 per cent; Kara-Balta, 85.9 per cent; Talas, 96.6 per cent; Tokmak, 79.2 per cent. Turnout by rayon: Alamedinskiy, 91.0 per cent; Issyk-Altinskiy, 87.6 per cent; Kalininskiy, 89.4 per cent; Kantakiy, 87.6 per cent; Keminskiy, 92.5 per cent; Kirovskiy, 98.1 per cent; Leninpolskiy, 98.8 per cent; Manasskiy, 92.9 per cent; Moskovskiy, 92.5 per cent; Panfilovskiy, 91.4 per cent; Sokulukskiy, 95.3 per cent; Talasskiy, 97.1 per cent; Chuyskiy, 84.6 per cent.

A total of 350 electoral districts were designated in the republic for conducting the elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR. There were 878 candidates running for deputy in them. There was one candidate on the ticket in 86 districts, two in 127 districts and three or more in 137 districts.

Elections were held in all 350 electoral districts. People's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR were elected in 250 districts. In 84 districts in which more than two candidates ran but no one was elected, a repeat vote was conducted on 4 March in accordance with the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Kirghiz SSR.

In 16 electoral districts in which one or two candidates ran, none of them received the necessary number of votes and no deputies were elected. Repeat elections will be held in those districts in accordance with Article 54 of the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Kirghiz SSR.

The Republic Electoral Commission on Elections of People's Deputies of the Kirghiz SSR resolves:

1. To take into consideration the information on the results of the elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR on 25 February 1990;

2. That the Secretariat of the Republic Electoral Commission (Comrade Dzh.A. Abakirov) will see to it that the report on the results of the elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and the list of elected people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR are published in the

press. M. Ibrayev, Chairman of the Republic Electoral Commission V. Sennik, Secretary of the Republic Electoral Commission

Repeat Election Districts Listed

90US0719C *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 1*

[Decree of Republic Electoral Commission for Elections of People's Deputies of Kirghiz SSR on Scheduling of Repeat Elections of People's Deputies of Kirghiz SSR in Individual Districts]

[Text] Due to the fact that in certain electoral districts no more than two candidates ran for people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and neither of them was elected, in accordance with articles 21 and 5 of the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Kirghiz SSR, the Republic Electoral Commission resolves:

1. To schedule repeat elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR on Saturday, 7 April 1990, for the following electoral districts:

Seryabinskiy Electoral District 34 in the city of Frunze,

Nizhne-Alarchinskiy Electoral District 64 in Alamedinskiy Rayon.

Lebedinovskiy Electoral District 60 in Alamedinskiy Rayon.

Beyshekinskiy Electoral District 97 in Leninpolskiy Rayon.

Kashka-Suukskiy Electoral District 126 in Sokulukskiy Rayon.

Frunzenskiy Electoral District 129 in Sokulukskiy Rayon.

Chat-Kelskiy Electoral District 130 in Sokulukskiy Rayon.

Krupskiy Electoral District 149 in Przhevalsk.

Bokonbayevskiy Electoral District 194 in Tonskiy Rayon.

Oktyabrskiy Electoral District 213 in Osh.

Stroitelnyy Electoral District 232 in Kyzyl-Kiya.

Sary-Buinskiy Electoral District 236 in Mayli-Say.

Bazar-Korgonskiy Electoral District 256 in Bazar-Korgonskiy Rayon.

Kyzyl-Kyshtanskiy Electoral District 273 in Kara-Suyskiy Rayon.

Sarayskiy Electoral District 282 in Kara-Suyskiy Rayon.

2. To conduct the repeat elections with the former makeup of district electoral commissions for elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and precinct electoral commissions.

3. To approve a plan of basic measures for preparing for and conducting the repeat elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR for these electoral districts. M. Ibrayev, Chairman of the Republic Electoral Commission V. Sennik, Secretary of the Republic Electoral Commission

Nazarbayev on Presidential Power

90US0869A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 90 p 1

[Speech by Deputy N.A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee and deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet; the speech was given in Alma-Ata in the Ilyyskiy Territorial Electoral District, Alma-Ata Oblast]

[Text] Respected comrade deputies! The debates over the question of establishing the post of President has clearly defined a division of opinions over this question. Ultimately, as they say, it would have been possible to patch up the rents without establishing this post just in the same manner as with its founding it will be difficult to meet our pressing tasks. I feel that we should put the new mechanism of power to work not just for the sake of eliminating the problems which have currently arisen of personal and social security and the eliminating of the arising social tension, although these in and of themselves are extremely important. What is much more important to see behind the presidential form of rule is the image of the nation's future, the outlines of a reasonable combination of legislative and executive power. The search for a just, humane, democratic organization of society (and the numerous innovations in all spheres of life even now are appearing primarily in their democratic essence) inevitably pose the question of the guarantees for their defense.

Presidential power we are convinced, can be such a guarantee, for at its basis it contains regulating principles capable of giving a harmonious integrity to all types of state power. As for the specific candidate for this post, we favor Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the authority and political leadership of whom does not cause any doubt.

At present, about certain debated aspects of the draft law on establishing the post of USSR President and which has been submitted for our review. Let me say openly that it is not quite clear why, in the event when the president is unable to perform his duties, his powers shift to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, in essence, the speaker. It would be much more logical, in our view, to establish the post of the nation's vice president. The deputies from the Union republics certainly view the

questions related to establishing the post of USSR President through the prism of local problems and the state of the sociopolitical situation in the regions. From this viewpoint, much assumes completely different traits than it does from the standpoint of the center. Yes, we see in presidential power an important guarantee for the unity of our federation, particularly in the present tense times. But the crisis phenomena will not continue eternally. Sooner or later we will without fail go through the difficult stage and then different problems will arise. And I have in mind first of all the sovereignty of the republics.

I would like to emphasize that we do not see ourselves outside a Soviet federation. The self-administration and self-financing for which we are working will serve not only the socioeconomic development of the republic but also the interests of the entire Soviet Union. However, under these conditions presidential power in the nation should assume a somewhat different nature which would take into account the obligatory presence of such a presidential power in each republic. Here, naturally, it is not a question of the blind copying of the social structures and not imitating or a desire to share power with someone, but rather the very essence of the nature of state sovereignty, the essence of the USSR Constitution which interprets our union as an association of sovereign Soviet socialist states. Along with the general tasks, each of them will certainly be forced to solve its own specific ones, which at times are completely the opposite of the neighbors. And in this instance a region also will need a mechanism for the strengthening of state order, for defending perestroyka which provides the carrying out of the laws. It would be ineffective as well as unreasonable to use national presidential power for solving numerous local problems and diverting him from the general Union strategic questions.

On the other hand, establishing the institution of presidential power in the republics would make it possible to eliminate the already noticeable contradictions between the idea of a presidency and the desire of the republics to expand their independence. Otherwise, it will be difficult to link the sharp strengthening of centralism with the trends toward the broadening of republic sovereignty. Moreover, it would make good sense to establish a Presidential Council the functions of which in the presented draft are completely eroded, like, incidentally, the Council of the Federation. The strictly consultative role of these superstructure bodies can scarcely justify the facts of their appearance. If the Presidential Council will consist of persons given real authority and represent real state formations, then the tasks confronting them will be completely different. In this context, it seems to us, there is a need for a special law which would govern the activities of the Presidential Council proposed to us.

Undoubtedly, the establishing of the post of USSR President requires a serious strengthening of legislative power. In reflecting on the results of the two previous Congress of USSR People's Deputies, one is more and more convinced that the Congress, whether we like it or

not, is assuming a substantial portion of the responsibility of the USSR Supreme Soviet. You will agree, comrades, the deputies, particularly in complicated situations, have shown the possibility of avoiding the taking of fundamental decisions. Some of them justify this by reasoning that if we do not settle the question in the USSR Supreme Soviet, we will turn it over to the Congress. As a result, a certain double-tiered power has arisen, or more accurately, a vicious circle which delays any concrete, presently essential undertaking. A persuasive example of this is the work of the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the draft Law Governing Property in the USSR, the corrections for which we are intending to adopt at present. So much time has been wasted, how many copies have been scrapped, but, in our view, no basic decision has been taken! As a result, the law proposed for approval by the current Congress contains proposals with which we can scarcely agree.

Of crucial significance for Kazakhstan is the question of the ownership of land and natural riches, since one-half of the republic's gross social product is obtained from the use of land and underground wealth. Naturally, in working out the republic general plan for self-administration and self-financing, we cannot help but consider this and have proposed declaring the land and natural riches as the exclusive property of Kazakhstan. What do you think? Virtually all the Union ministries have come out against this. This shows that the underpinnings of the administrative-departmental diktat remain true to themselves even 5 years after the start of perestroika.

Incidentally, if one turns to history, then according to the Declaration on the Formation of the USSR adopted in 1922, the republic turned over to no one the right of ownership of its territory and it merely voluntarily delegated certain of its rights to the center. But what did such legal fine points mean to the administrative system! This again shows the urgent need for a new treaty of union. But what does the law adopted at the session offer? It states that the land and the other natural resources should belong to all the Soviet people and simultaneously to the peoples residing on the territory of the Union republic. Does the author of this provision consider the specific features, the multinational nature, for example, of Kazakhstan? Certainly, in following the dual logic set out in the draft law, on the one hand, all nations and nationalities residing in our country have the right to own land. On the other, only that people after whom the republic is named (since such an interpretation is completely valid) has the right to own the land and all the remaining nationalities would only work it. Let us reflect here whether we would not provide grounds for the development of mistrust, national suspicion and with our own hands would we not be laying the basis for future interethnic conflicts?

But this is not yet all. The central departments are endeavoring to conceal their own interests behind the seemingly noble but absolutely eroded concept of "public ownership." Too much is disadvantageous for

them in the sovereign policy of the republic. In order not to fall again into departmental clutches, we should recognize that the principal of the right to land and natural resources must be not the peoples, but rather the republic as a sovereign state formation expressing the will of all its citizens, regardless of nationality and capable of defending their interests when confronted with the diktat of the central departments.

As for the use of the land and underground wealth for defense and other general Union purposes, this should be carried out on a contractual and compensatory basis, with the agreement of the republics which are the sole owners of their territory. The right of a republic in the sphere of foreign economic operations naturally stems from a recognition of the right of ownership. The situation here, it must be said directly, is still changing slowly. The government at one moment makes it easier and then closes down. With all respect for the USSR Council of Ministers, I cannot help but note the half-heartedness of the decisions being adopted by it. In endeavoring to carry out reforms, the government at the same time remains under the heel of the departments, it is forced to defend their interests and impede the normal course of transformations. It is time for the government to firmly determine what god it will worship and which it will serve—the departmental ambitions or the Soviet people.

It is essential to lift the fetters in the area of foreign ties, otherwise Kazakhstan will remain a public of frozen opportunities and will never overcome the catastrophic lag in socioeconomic development. This is too high a price for the egoistic policy of the center which has demanded the focusing of attention solely on the raw material sources and has not been concerned with such minor details as consumer goods and sociocultural conditions. The center, supposedly, will not leave you in problems! But that is no longer the point for us. The discipline of interrepublic deliveries is not being observed and executive power has been impotent. And the people are disgruntled as the old strategic faults have not been theirs! Incidentally, we even now are not ensured against errors in the economy. All world practice has long shown that there is no development without participation in the international division of labor and without extensive cooperation. Nevertheless, our economic policy as before is clearly stuck in the rut of exclusiveness and the autarky of the regions. In this manner we are led into a blind alley.

The slowness of the USSR Supreme Soviet has forced the republic Supreme Soviet at the recently held session to state that it is keeping the right of declaring as republic property the land, its underground mineral wealth, water, forests and other natural resources, having delegated the right of the possession and use of them to the local soviets. Comrades, we want least of all that this statement be viewed by someone as an ultimatum or an attempt at self-rule. No, the situation at present is such that either we do this or we lose substantially in the people's confidence

But do we have the right to bring things to such a pitch? Would it not be better to state frankly that the USSR Supreme Soviet has remained deaf to the opinion of many republics, it has not handled the problem, and the Property Law must be returned to it for additional work? At present, we can no longer limit ourselves, as we did a year or two ago, to just a valid but completely unproductive criticism of a sluggish center. Other, more decisive measures are essential. Let us not miss the chance offered to us to radically strengthen executive power which the President embodies. We are very hopeful that the primary actions of the President will be aimed at an updating of the treaty of union, at strengthening the sovereignty of the republic, since as before we are profoundly convinced of the truthfulness of the well-known formula: strong republics are a strong state, a strong Union! (Applause)

Nazarbayev Speaks at Kazakh CP Central Committee Plenum

90US0869B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Speech by N.A. Nazarbayev at the 20th Plenum of the Kazakh CP Central Committee]

[Text] Comrades! In summing up the results of today's discussion, I would like to point out that it rather clearly expressed that diverse spectrum of opinions which has emerged in the course of a broad discussion on the draft Platform of the Central Committee for the 17th Kazakh CP Congress and the 28th Party Congress. Certainly for the first time in many years, the republic communists have so openly and honestly spoken of the painful problems of internal party life, they have expressed their position about them and have set out the primary tasks for a fundamental restructuring of party work.

The just ended historic 3d Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the March (1990) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee have become special activating factors which have given the debates on the place and role of the party in the perestroika processes additional intensity and dynamism.

We are right to state that the members of the republic party organization basically approve and support the new general plan of socialism proposed by the CPSU Central Committee and based upon the principles of humanism and democracy. At the same time, in recognizing the need for the greatest possible concretization of this very important party document, the Kazakhstan communists have correctly raised the question of the advisability of working out and adopting a republic party platform. Such a proposal makes profound sense, as we have our own specific problems and a solution to them is impossible without considering the degree of economic development in the various republic regions and the historical national, political, social, cultural and other particular features inherent to them.

I should say that the presented draft Platform of the Kazakh CP Central Committee is not the fruit of strictly office work. In preparing it, the most recent scientific and practical studies on the questions of party construction were generalized, and the most interesting ideas from the participants of the party conference for secretaries of the primary party organizations were taken into account. It incorporated numerous proposals from the communists and nonparty persons voiced in the course of the meetings of the secretaries and heads of the Central Committee departments with the labor collectives of the republics. Prominent scientists from Kazakhstan and the commissions of the Central Committee made a major contribution to preparing the document.

The chief core of our platform, like the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee, is a program for the all-round development of the individual, and a desire to place man and his problems actually at the center of social attention. This is a diverse political, economic, moral and ideological task requiring not only a complete analysis of our prospects but also historical analysis and a clear understanding of the route traveled by society.

We state that the communists of Kazakhstan have broken once and for all with the former authoritarian-bureaucratic deformations which caused the greatest harm to the idea of socialism and they express a decisive rejection of Stalinism as an ideology and practice. At the same time, in restoring the Leninist dialectical approach to assessing our historical heritage and in no way idealizing the processes of building a new society, we remain grateful in our memory to those who stood at the sources of Soviet Kazakhstan, who laid the foundation of public education, science and culture, who built Karaganda, Balkhash and the Turkestan-Siberian Railroad, who defended the motherland on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and who forged the victory in the rear, and who plowed up the virgin lands. This is an honest and just analysis of the patterns and uniqueness of socialist development in Kazakhstan and without fail this should hold a suitable place among the ideological values of perestroika.

However, we cannot help but point out that at present some are not against speculating on the historical markers which are dear to the heart of each Kazakhstani. More and more frequently the immediate "creators" of the period of stagnation and the former leaders who were able to promote themselves precisely during the times of rapidly flourishing paper shuffling and outright sham have endeavored to show their involvement in these. At present, they would very much like to persuade everyone that they, as they say, did their bit. I can state unambiguously that these people had no bearing on the self-sacrificing work of millions of honest workers and we do not intend in any manner to revise the political and moral assessment already given to them.

As for the material aspect of the humanistic program, even now we can see its real embodiment. Just recently

decisions have been adopted to raise old-age and disability pensions. The scholarships have increased to students with families in VUZes and students in specialized secondary schools. New additional payments and surpayments have been introduced on the salaries of individual categories of cultural workers as well as additional benefits for large families. A total of 17 million rubles has been allocated for these purposes from the republic budget.

A fundamental swing of the economy toward the needs of man means the priority development of the sectors producing food, industrial goods and which ensure the accelerated construction of housing, schools and children's preschool institutions and the development of the service sphere. There are immediate measures to protect the health of the people and the environment. There are also such specific measures as reducing industrial construction and expenditures on the support of administrative bodies as well as eliminating any illegal privileges and benefits. We are profoundly convinced that the victory of perestroika is impossible without resolving urgent problems of culture, education, the moral and aesthetic upbringing of the younger generation. For this reason, the republic communists favor a specific increase in the funds being allocated for the development of education, culture and art, for working out and implementing an integrated general plan of a youth policy essential for shaping a well-rounded individual.

The second section of the draft Platform states as a separate line the provision of the converting of Kazakhstan and its regions to self-administration and self-financing. In this context, I would like to draw your attention to the underlying principle which states that economic sovereignty and the independence of the republic are realized within the context of the Soviet federation, in closely combining the interests of Kazakhstan with the general state ones and as part of the unified national economic complex of our country. This is an axiom on the basis of which we will resolve our urgent problems.

What is their essence? As is known, the republic which possesses unique mineral raw material resources and plays a major role in the all-Union division of labor in producing the most important types of industrial and agricultural products, has been on a subsidized basis, with an insufficiently developed social infrastructure. The existing mechanism to a definite degree impedes the development of interrepublic exchange. As before, it is based on centralization in resolving economic problems and rigidly impedes local initiative.

Moreover, the development of the extracting sectors and the lag in the production of end types of product have severely warped the ratio between the consumption and accumulation funds. Under the conditions of the absence of any legal mechanism for the interaction of the local soviets and the enterprises, a narrow departmental approach to the development of natural resources without considering any environmental conservation

measures has caused a breakdown of the ecological system. A number of the republic's regions is on the brink of ecological disaster.

The negative aspects of the departmental management mechanism have been intensified by the "residual principle" in allocating funds for the development of the social sphere which has lagged substantially behind the average Union indicators. Particularly intolerable conditions have arisen in the remote rural regions, where basically the indigenous population resides and they are often deprived of elementary conditions.

Such a situation naturally poses at the focal point the matter of a radical improvement in the system of territorial management based upon modern concepts of economic independence of an Union republic.

This is why we require sovereignty and the right to freely use our land and its underground wealth and independently operate our republic economy and resist the dictating of terms from the center.

As is known, the 3d Congress of USSR People's Deputies approved the Law on Property adopted by the nation's Supreme Soviet. Now our task is on the basis of this to work out a republic law which would clearly indicate that precisely the republic, as a sovereign state formation, is the principal in the right to land and natural resources.

The radical economic reform which is the heart of perestroika is gradually picking up its pace. Allow me to take up certain results in the work of the republic economy.

At present, the enterprises and organizations in the sphere of material production and services operate under conditions of cost accounting and self-financing and this has told substantially on the end results of production. What do we have in mind?

First of all, the trend has been halted for a drop in the growth rate for the most important indicators of economic development and the average annual increase in produced national income over the current five-year plan was 2.1 percent, while over the analogous period of the past it did not exceed 0.7 of a percent.

There has been a stronger focusing of the economy on the needs and requests of people. While during the previous five-year plan, as an annual average we put into operation 6.3 million m² of housing, in the current one it is almost 8 million m². Production resources have risen, the procurement of meat and milk has increased by 25 percent, and grain production by 16 percent. During these years, the output of consumer goods has risen by 1.3-fold and the volume of paid services by 1.7-fold.

The principle of the republic's economic independence must be viewed in close relation to the converting of the enterprises to full cost accounting. At present, we have over 330 industrial enterprises operating under the second cost accounting model based upon the normed distribution of income.

In agriculture, on 901 sovkhozes and kolkhozes, lease relations are being applied on a level of the production subdivisions and the first 91 peasant farms have been organized. This is not bad.

At the same time, cost accounting has not become the connecting link in the entire production cycle in ensuring efficient and high-quality labor at each workplace. A portion of the party committees has still not ensured the transition of political, ideological and organizational work to the new economic mechanism and has been unable to overcome all sorts of distortion and deformation in the idea of the reform, and has not been able to carry it out in depth and breadth.

In the republic, as throughout the nation, there is a growing imbalance of the consumer market and a disruption of monetary circulation. The carrying out of the plans to produce consumer goods has not had a substantial impact on improving the situation on the consumer market. In terms of the level of their production per inhabitant, the republic is only in 12th place in the nation. At present, some 20,000 types of goods totaling 6 billion rubles are being shipped out of the republic. This is some 40 percent of the market stocks. According to preliminary data, last year per ruble of the wage fund, only 79 kopecks of consumer goods were produced (not including alcoholic beverages).

The gap has not been reduced between the increased monetary income of the population and its commodity cover. The exhaustion of the consumer goods market and the growing shortages encourage a concealed increase in retail prices with a decline in the quality of the articles. Many enterprises have received up to two-thirds of the above-planned product solely by increasing prices. In such a situation precisely the party organizations should become the initiators of the struggle against manifestations of group egoism.

In concluding the commentary on the given section of the draft Platform, it is essential to say that there are positive shifts where the party committees are working hard to carry out the perspective, long-term principles of the economic reform and on a daily basis are settling vital questions of raising the prosperity of the people. But where the party committees and primary party organizations consider the reform to be a "economic" matter not of concern to them, the economic situation is deteriorating, social tension is rising and correspondingly party authority is dropping.

In a word, as was pointed out in the draft Platform, economic independence for Kazakhstan is not only the goal but also the means for achieving a higher standard of living and higher quality of life of the population. We must show a careful approach to working out the development plan for the 13th Five-Year Plan and give up the "ceiling" figures and promises, strictly verify the soundness of the program for economic growth on the basis of new quality, optimize expenditures on accumulation and

channel more funds into social needs. This imposes enormous responsibility on all the republic communists.

In the section of the draft Platform "On Democratizing Social Life," the central place has been given to the reform of the political system.

The thesis that Kazakhstan is a free, sovereign and equal republic in a modernizing USSR means primarily "no" to a splitting of the USSR. On the other hand, there is also a "no" for ossification and conservatism in the forms of national state construction. In terms of us this means that the right to national self-determination does not end with the creation of national statehood and voluntary incorporation of the republic in the Union. It continues to operate, being manifested in the free expression of the people's will in resolving the general questions of federation, in the development of culture, language, in asserting national dignity and in strengthening political and economic independence.

At the same time, the new political, economic and social realities in the life of our society require new approaches to certain sections of the USSR Constitution. Some of them require a substantial revision and others a real filling out. The Communist Party, the bodies of state power and administration and any social organizations should always operate in accord with the Basic Law or Constitution.

The republic communists see one of their main tasks in further improving the electoral system and providing each voter with the possibility of directly and equally electing his representatives on a democratic, alternative basis. The past elections to the local soviets have shown that basically the voters made the correct choice. The local soviets include representatives of virtually all nationalities residing in the republic. Over one-half of the deputies is communists. And most importantly, here they have selected enterprising, active persons. Relying on them it is possible to set boldly to implementing the most complicated plans. We would like it that the elections of the republic people's deputies be carried out on the same high level. This will provide us with an opportunity to organize an effective, thoughtful, competent higher body in order to move perestroika forward along constructive lines.

We are in favor of a strong Kazakh Supreme Soviet which will be given real powers as the superior body of power of a sovereign national state and which voluntarily turns over only a certain portion of its rights to the federal institutions, to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the President and the Constitutional Oversight Committee.

The Kazakhstan CP is in favor of accelerating the elaboration of draft laws which would broaden the powers of the republic state bodies in all spheres of social life, strengthen their material and financial base and they favor establishing close and mutually advantageous relations of the soviets with all enterprises and organizations located on their territory.

Along with the Property Law, the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a very important draft law on land and is discussing a Law on Local Self-Administration, and we express confidence that our proposals for these will be supported and considered in adopting the responsible, crucial decisions for Kazakhstan.

We must set to preparing the republic's draft laws. The Council of Ministers and the Gosplan should already be at work along with the Union bodies on transferring a certain portion of the enterprises to republic jurisdiction and on the conditions for the operation of the Union economy. These conditions, in our view, should be based on contracts between the republic and the Union departments.

Particular attention must be paid to instituting self-management principles in the organization and activities of the soviets and to developing as a whole the system of self-administration headed by them. Here the functions of the representative bodies of state power should be strictly delimited with the competence of the executive bodies.

People welcome the measures which are being adopted in the aim of delimiting the functions of the party and state bodies. At the same time, clear dissatisfaction has been voiced over the lack of decisive actions where these are essential.

I would particularly like to take up the thesis in the draft Program concerning the establishing of the institution of a presidency in the republic. In speaking at the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, I set out our position on this question rather clearly. I am hopeful, comrades, that you share it. It is a question not of a mirror image of the general Union structures but rather of the very nature of republic sovereignty requiring an effective mechanism for strengthening state order. It is no secret that the problem of the shortage of executive power which is acutely felt in the nation has not passed us by either. We also feel the necessity of strengthening the functions of authority aimed at defending perestroika and ensuring the unswerving execution of the laws. On the other hand, and this I emphasize at the Congress, establishing the institution of a presidency in the republic would make it possible to reinforce republic independence and establish in the republic a reasonable balance of legislative and executive power.

I feel that our proposal will gain understanding in the Kazakh Supreme Soviet. I am profoundly convinced that the election of a republic president must be carried out immediately, as is imposed by the acutely dynamic situation which does not permit delay. The situation at present is such that with all understanding of the fundamental need for republic-wide elections, we all the same are in favor that for the first time the election of the head of the republic be carried out at a session of the Supreme Soviet.

In replying to our possible opponents, let me say that such an approach is caused by the realities of today. Our

democracy is still too young and fragile to leave it alone with the enormous power concentrated in some hands. It is very important to create a counterweight to this power and the Supreme Soviet can become such a counterweight and from its hands the president will receive his powers. This is essential now. The future, undoubtedly, will be with universal elections.

I feel that along with creating the post of a president, we must also settle the questions along the entire vertical line of power. We should see to it that the necessary power functions be also extended to the chairman of the oblast, city and rayon soviets. As of now they, let us look the truth in the eyes, are completely without any rights, regardless of the seeming high powers. They do not even have the right to appoint or dismiss a responsible worker from the position held. We are speaking about the necessity of separating the functions of the party and state bodies but as before all cadre questions are settled at sessions of the party committee bureaus. In this instance, what reality can we inject into the slogan "all power to the soviets"?

For a fundamental improvement in the economic situation, for overcoming the crisis phenomena and for creating an effective planned-market economy, in our view, it is essential to broaden and strengthen the powers of the republic government as the higher executive-administrative body of power.

The draft Platform formulates the fundamental approaches of the Kazakh CP Central Committee to the questions of military organizational development and states the need to give to the Kazakh Supreme Soviet the right of supervising the organizational development and functioning of military facilities on the territory of Kazakhstan. In particular, the Kazakh CP Central Committee in every possible way supports the just demands of the republic workers to close down the nuclear testing range in Semipalatinsk Oblast.

As is pointed out in the draft Platform, the republic communists support the sociopolitical organizations working for perestroika and for the renewal of life on a socialist basis. We are in favor of dialogue and debate, constructive collaboration and partnership with them in carrying out the economic and political reforms, in the sociocharitable and cultural educational work and improving the ecological situation.

At the same time, it is essential for us to take measures so that the chauvinistically, nationalistically and antisocialistically inclined politicized independent associations do not undergo further development and, moreover, be banned. The party committees must engage in a constant dialogue with the social organizations favoring the platform of perestroika, in working for their support for the party organizations. The forming of new organizations of citizens as well as parties must be provided for in the law and reflected in the Kazakh Constitution.

Comrades! The questions of the sovereignty of Kazakhstan is closely tied not only to the renewal of the entire

Soviet federation but also to the renewal of the party itself. At present, this question is being widely discussed in the republic party organizations, it is being actively worked on in the Central Committee and will be one of the main ones at the forthcoming 17th Kazakh CP Congress.

In considering the situation which has come into being in the Lithuanian CP, there is the fundamental question of the unity of the party, its organizational and ideological solidarity. How should we move further in carrying out perestroika: as part of the CPSU or outside of it, as a unified detachment or broken up into "national currents"?

However, every rationally thinking person at present realizes that the CPSU is the sole integrating force of society. At present, there simply is no other one. From our viewpoint, the March Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a somewhat delayed but correct decision, in coming out with a legislative initiative on amending in the Basic Law those articles concerning the party, having put it under equal conditions with other sociopolitical forces. The appropriate amendments must also be incorporated in the Kazakh Constitution.

Nevertheless, the party should by its deeds, by its policy, activeness and the unstintingness of the communists and by their ability to express the interests of the people and defend them, win the confidence and right to lead society and the state by parliamentary means. This will be one of the main functions both of the CPSU as a whole and the Kazakh CP, as is expressed in our Platform.

In the same regard, the communists are acutely aware of the need for profound democratization of internal life, of incorporating substantial amendments in the CPSU Bylaws and ensuring maximum independence of the Kazakh CP and its primary party organizations in resolving organizational, cadre and financial questions and the party press and are decisively against excessive regulation and interference by the CPSU Central Committee.

In a speech at the March (1990) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, I set out the position of the Kazakh CP Central Committee on a majority of these problems. In particular, our decisive opposition to the ongoing attempts to put the communist parties in rigid controlling limits, and to dictate how they should live and work, what bodies they should establish and so forth. In our opinion, the new CPSU Bylaws must set out only the main principles in accord with which the republic communist parties will create their own specific documents.

I feel that we must voice the same decisive attitude toward the attempts to weaken the party and the desire of the destructive forces to deny any actions aimed at rallying the communists in a political struggle. In particular, would it not be to the benefit of certain militant radicals for us to abandon the truly Leninist principle of democratic centralism. Voices are heard that this is supposedly "out of date" and has discredited itself. We

do not deny that change which has occurred in it and there is actually little democracy with only naked centralism and outright dictatorship remaining. But why, as they say, should we throw the baby out with the bath water? In and of itself the principle can become better or worse. Everything depends upon who employs it and how! Clearly it should be a question of giving democratic centralism the sense initially invested in it, of sharply limiting the centralist principles and move things toward broad party democracy in accord with the demands of today. This would be a healthy approach. Otherwise, the party will inevitably be turned into a spineless, amorphous organization incapable of fighting for its own goals and ideals.

As you know, the abandoning of a political monopoly and the obsolete party-state structure of power has now been stated in the Basic Law by a decision of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies. For the CPSU and other political social organizations, equal opportunities have been provided to participate in legal, democratic forms of involvement in sociopolitical life and to struggle for realizing their program goals. This assumes a fundamental change in the relations with the state and economic bodies, the trade unions, the Komsomol and with all sociopolitical organizations defending socialist positions. The main thing here is relations of dialogue, debate, cooperation and partnership. One of the most important tasks of the party is establishing the full power of the soviets which possess the corresponding rights and economic independence based upon a competent deputy corps.

We see in the trade unions an independent social organization and will support its efforts in the interests of the workers, particularly in the area of defending their rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Relations with the Komsomol will be based on ideological unity, comradely mutual aid, and involvement in its direct participation in working out and implementing an effective youth policy. At the same time, we feel that the party organizations should view the Komsomol as their reserve and actively influence its activities through the communists working in it.

Now, several words about work with the cadres. In all the bodies of state and social administration, their appointment at present is basically determined by the results of elections and, as a rule, on an alternative basis. Under these conditions the nomenklatura principle in work and particularly the procedure for confirmation in the party committees, including the Central Committee, can be perceived as a bureaucratic formality. Clearly, it is time to give up these obsolete forms, leaving the existing procedure only for individual party workers.

It has been proposed that the nomenklatura of the Central Committee in the Kazakh CP be reduced. The accounting and control nomenklatura is to be completely excluded. In abandoning the formal nomenklatura approach, the party bodies clearly should not eliminate

their responsibility for the placement of the leading cadres; they are obliged to influence the make-up of the cadre corps. But this influence must be exercised through the form of recommendation and by struggling for their candidates in conducting the election campaigns, in focusing on carrying out the cadre line through the communists who are members of the soviets, the elective bodies of the social organizations and the administrative bodies.

The current political situation has caused increased activeness on the part of the communists and has impelled them to seek out ways for the party to emerge from the crisis state. The process has begun of overcoming the alienation of the rank-and-file communist from real involvement in internal party life. For this reason, at present it is important to develop a mechanism making it possible for each party member to fully realize his opportunities in preparing and carrying out decisions and in forming and assessing the activities of the elective bodies and their leaders.

In line with this it is essential to increase the role of the inferior party levels by overcoming their passivity and inertia. This will be aided by debates on the role and place of the primary party organizations and which are underway in the republic. Important decisions were adopted at the republic meeting of party organization secretaries. For precisely this reason, the Platform of the Kazakh CP Central Committee provides a substantial broadening of rights and independence of the obkoms, gorkoms, raykoms and primary party organizations, and the granting to them of the opportunity to really influence the activities of the party and its leading bodies. The primary organizations should independently define their structure, program of actions, the periodicity of the communist meetings, have the last say on the questions of the admission and dismissal of CPSU members and have the use of a portion of the membership dues.

We have defined our attitude on the very practice of creating primary party cells according to territorial or functional principles and the formation of horizontal structures in the form of secretary councils.

As you know, on the republic level, considering your proposals, such a council has been established. At present, we must approve the regulation governing it. The goals, tasks, forms and methods of work for the council are set out in the draft regulation which has been issued to you. Its powers, as you see, are rather broad, although this is not a parallel structure but rather a form of party work. We are hopeful that the council will make it possible to strengthen significantly ties along the entire chain from the party group to the Kazakh CP Central Committee. Analogous councils clearly must be established on all levels.

The work of preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Kazakh CP Congress should be subordinate to the task of reforming and profoundly restructuring the party, as well as raising the militancy and aggressiveness

of the actions of the party organizations and each communist. In line with this, our Platform sets out specific forms for the immediate participation of the communists in the report-election campaign and in settling all questions of our party's activities. We state again that we are in favor of the power of the party masses and for the ubiquitous establishing of an atmosphere of Leninistically understood party comradeship.

The draft Platform of the Kazakh CP Central Committee sets out our attitude toward the party apparatus. The necessity of this is obvious but also there is no doubt as to the necessity of its strict subordination to the elective body, bringing it up to the optimum size, renewing the membership and improving the structure. Half-heartedness and inconsistency in reorganizing the apparatus and the copying of the structure on all levels do not provide the proper effect. Using fundamentally new positions we must revise its functions and decisively move away from the order-giving to political, organizational and ideological. And a qualitative renewal anticipates that on a competitive base the apparatus will be filled out with competent, freely thinking authoritative persons who are capable of becoming reliable assistants of the elective bodies.

In the aim of improving and optimizing the apparatus of the party committees, we consider it advisable to have an across-the-board cutback in it by an average of 25-30 percent.

In concluding my speech, I would like to point out that no matter how good the Platform might be, no matter how many problems it may cover, the main thing is in organizing practical deeds and achieving positive end results.

For this reason, it is important, without delaying a single day, to begin to carry out the basic ideas of the Platform, particularly as many of them are a component part of the program for the economic and social development of Kazakhstan. In order to consider all the comments and proposals on the draft, it is essential that the elected editorial commission work on the Platform additionally. We feel it advisable that the commission work on a permanent basis, right up until the 17th Kazakh CP Congress.

The 120th anniversary of the birthday of V.I. Lenin is approaching. But this anniversary should not be grounds for organizing pompous measures; rather, as Lenin felt, the anniversaries should give rise to an analysis of the distance covered and to a focusing of attention on unsolved problems. At present, in the pre-Congress period, the noteworthy Leninist date should encourage a qualitative renewal of the party and a qualitative restructuring in the activities of all its elements.

For this it is essential to initiate the corresponding political and organizational work in an organic link with the forthcoming reports and elections. On what level this campaign is carried out will determine the future of the party organization of Kazakhstan, because in the course

of this the cadre questions will be settled and the strategic and tactical directions of activity will be defined.

In the ideological, mass political work among the workers, particularly the youth, it is essential to focus on explaining the tasks of revolutionary perestroika. Its ideals, in opening up new prospects under the conditions of a sovereign republic, renew and raise our spirits, they summon us to active political activity and to creative and effective work. We will be worthy of our times and those great tasks which our people are placing on us. We will devote all our forces to the noble cause of affirming a democratic, humane socialism in life!

11 April Tajik CP CC Plenum Information Report

90US0861A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 1

[“Information Report on the 19th Tajik Communist Party Central Committee Plenum”]

[Text] The 19th Tajik Communist Party Central Committee Plenum took place on 11 April 1990 in Dushanbe.

Participating in the work of the plenum were first and second secretaries of party obkoms, first secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms not in the body of the Central Committee, as well as representatives of the executive committees of oblast soviets of people's deputies, secretaries of the Tajik Council of Trade Unions, the Tajik Komsomol, and mass information media staffers.

Members of the working commission from among the number of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet deputies were invited to participate in the plenum's work in preparing for the first session of the republic Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation.

The plenum discussed the issues:

1. Of the introduction at the first session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation proposals on articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Tajik SSR Constitution.
2. Of the issues of the first session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation.

The plenum adopted a decision to introduce in the order of a legislative initiative for the consideration of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation the draft Tajik SSR Law on amendments and supplements to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Tajik SSR on issues of the political system (articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Tajik SSR Constitution).

The plenum also adopted the corresponding resolution on the second issue on the agenda.

N.K. Dolgushin, senior staffer of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, participated in the work of the plenum.

With this, the plenum completed its work.

Tajik State Commission on Nationality Problems Formed

90US0861B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 1

[Tajik Supreme Soviet report: “Ukase of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Formation of the Tajik SSR Union-Republic State Committee for National Issues”]

[Text] For the purpose of improving state administration in the area of national development and interethnic relations, the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

To form the Tajik SSR Union-republic State Committee for National Issues.

G. Pallayev, chairman, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

A. Kasymova, secretary, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

10 April 1990, Dushanbe

Tajik State Commission on Construction, Architecture Formed

90US0861C Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 1

[Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium report: “Ukase of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Formation of the Tajik SSR Union-republic State Committee for Construction and Architectural Affairs”]

[Text] The Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

To form the Tajik SSR Union-republic State Committee for Construction and Architectural Affairs (Tajik SSR Gosstroy).

G. Pallayev, chairman, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

A. Kasymova, secretary, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

10 April 1990, Dushanbe

12 April Tajik Supreme Soviet Information Report

90US0875A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 1

[Information report on meeting of First Session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet in Dushanbe on 12 April]

[Text] The First Session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, began work in Dushanbe on 12 April.

At the request of the republic election commission and on behalf of its chairman, commission member Sh.D. Makhmudov called the session to order.

A minute of silence was observed in memory of those who had died during the tragic events of 12-14 February in Dushanbe.

The deputies had to approve the session procedures and agenda, including the following items:

Election of Mandate Commission of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet;

Election of chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet;

Election of first deputy and deputies of chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet;

Appointment of chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers;

Election of standing commissions of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet;

Election of chairman of Tajik SSR People's Control Committee;

Formation of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;

Election of chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Court;

Appointment of Tajik SSR chief state arbiter;

Discussion of amendments and additions to Constitution (Basic Law) of Tajik SSR;

Discussion of draft law on status of people's deputies in Tajik SSR;

Formation of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers;

Election of Tajik SSR People's Control Committee;

Election of Tajik SSR Supreme Court, judges of oblast courts and Dushanbe Municipal Court, and people's judges of rayon and city people's courts in rayons and cities of republic jurisdiction;

Discussion of dates on which certain articles of Tajik SSR Language Law will go into force;

Ratification of temporary rules of order in Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet and discussion of draft laws of Tajik SSR and legislative proposals of Tajik SSR in standing commissions;

Ratification of ukases of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;

Discussion of draft law of Tajik SSR "On the Responsibility for Destabilizing the Sociopolitical Situation in the Republic."

The report of the Mandate Commission was presented by its chairman, Tajik SSR People's Deputy A. Mirzoyev.

In line with the report of the Mandate Commission, the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution confirming the official status of the 225 people's deputies of the Tajik SSR elected on 25 February and on 4 and 9 March this year.

The people's deputies of the republic then moved on to the election of the secretariat of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet session.

After this the deputies moved on to the election of the chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

The participants in the discussion were Tajik SSR people's deputies G. Savriddinova, Yu.M. Bulanov, O. Berdiyev, B. Oripov, A.G. Kopyltsov, B. Sobir, S.G. Safarov, N.G. Savchenkov, A. Abdushakhidov, G. Oripov, Dzh. Nabyev, S. Khayrullayev, M. Rasulov, A. Sokhibnazarov, I. Bilo'iyev, R. Avezov, M. Makhmadaliyev, K.M. Makhkamov, Kh. Saidmuradov, N. Dustov, S. Kendzhayev, T. Dzhabborov, Kh. Nasredinov, S. Ganiyev, Sh. Sultanov and others, and USSR people's deputies G.V. Koshlakov, D. Khudonazarov, and V. Giro.

After heated debates, the names of two candidates were recorded on the ballot for the secret vote: First Secretary K.M. Makhkamov of the Tajik CP Central Committee and Chairman G.P. Pallayev of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium.

According to the results of the vote, K.M. Makhkamov was elected chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. He won the votes of 162 of the 225 people's deputies of the Tajik SSR who cast a ballot, and G.P. Pallayev won 62 votes.

The Supreme Soviet passed a resolution on the election of the chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

A speech was presented at the session by Chairman K.M. Makhkamov of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Supreme Soviet will continue its work on 13 April.

Makhkamov Addresses Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet

*90US0875B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 13 Apr 90 pp 1, 3*

[Speech presented by K.M. Makhkamov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, at First Session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, in Dushanbe on 12 April]

[Text] Dear Comrade Deputies! First of all, I would like to convey my sincere gratitude for the confidence you have shown in me by electing me the chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet—the highest democratic organ in the republic.

I want to assure you in all sincerity that I am fully aware of the responsibilities with which I have been entrusted

and of my duty to the Tajik people, to the entire population of the republic—its working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia, its women and youth, to all of the nationalities living in Tajikistan.

As I see it, it is my duty to ensure that all of the constitutional rights and liberties of citizens can be exercised fully and unconditionally in the republic and to secure the stepped-up advancement of Soviet Tajikistan along the road of economic, social, and cultural progress in the united family of Soviet peoples in the renewed federation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Tajik SSR, like the other union republics making up the USSR, must become a sovereign socialist state with full authority within its own territory, with the exception of the powers and rights it voluntarily turns over to the appropriate government and administrative bodies of the USSR.

I will not go into all of the specific aspects of this matter in detail. All of them should be reflected in the draft Concept of Republic Economic Autonomy. After extensive discussion, this policy document is to be ratified by the next session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet of the new 12th convocation.

In connection with this, I would like to stress that much will depend on our approach to it and on the maturity and competence of the newly elected corps of republic people's deputies.

In any case, the work ahead will be of crucial importance, and the quality of this work will decide the future of the republic. I would like to express my certainty that the people's deputies will be fully aware of this and will display the highest degree of responsibility in the discussion of all of these matters.

Dear Comrades! Along with the rest of the country, our republic has entered an extremely difficult and crucial period, the turning point of perestroika. The problems which accumulated over many years in economic, social, spiritual, and cultural development were exacerbated to the point of crisis, and this naturally had a negative effect on the state of inter-ethnic relations.

I must repeat once again that all of this, as the events in February demonstrated, is being put to vigorous use by destructive forces for their own purposes, having nothing in common with the real public interest. Today it is impossible to overlook the fact that the future of the republic and the hopes and expectations of its people will depend largely on the work of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

For this reason, our primary duty to our own people and to the country is to do everything possible to make its work businesslike and constructive from the very beginning and to secure the resolution of our urgent problems by legislative means. I think this is why the voters cast their ballots for us in the elections.

I also feel that I and the newly elected Supreme Soviet must take resolute and consistent action to promote the development, reinforcement, and protection of democratic processes in the political and socioeconomic sphere and in the area of inter-ethnic relations. This will necessitate the drafting and passage of several legislative acts with a view to the changes in our society, its increased political activity, and its stronger sense of national identity.

I would like to discuss this matter in greater detail. We must reach a qualitatively new level in legislation. Today we must honestly and frankly admit that some of the legislative acts which were adopted in the recent past did not take rapidly changing political and socioeconomic realities into consideration, were not accompanied by sufficient material guarantees, were not thoroughly considered, and did not take public opinion fully into account.

These were the characteristics of some of them. They were closer to wishes or declarations than to real laws. What we need today, however, are laws with an active and constructive impact. This necessarily presupposes energetic action, competence, and responsibility on the part of the standing commissions which will be formed in the Supreme Soviet and on the part of each deputy. The Supreme Soviet must build its relations with organizations under its jurisdiction on a new basis and must establish effective control over their observance of the laws. We must admit that the unsatisfactory organization of these relations is the reason why the laws do not work at the precise point at which their enforcement begins. I could cite more than enough examples of this.

In specific terms, the main and, consequently, primary legislative priorities of the republic Supreme Soviet should be the following: in the economic sphere, the reinforcement of republic economic autonomy within the renewed federation by means of the appropriate legislation, and the precise and specific definition of the contracted relations and mutual obligations of the republic and the center. This is directly related to the need for improvement in the structure of the national economic complex to eliminate the emphasis on raw materials and agriculture and to turn it into a complex manufacturing finished products. This will be an extremely important factor in the growth of national income and employment and in the elevation of the standard of living.

Other aspects of the same matter include, in particular, the need for cardinal measures to train skilled engineering and technical personnel and workers for the production units manufacturing the finished products and the need for a comprehensive and sound republic-wide program for the establishment of small and medium-sized production units in the locations with the highest concentration of manpower.

There is another extremely important side of the matter. We frequently hear the opinion that the shortage of land

in the republic could result in problems if the present rate of natural population growth should be maintained. There are valid reasons for these worries. According to preliminary estimates, the population of the republic will increase to 8.2 million by 2005. Furthermore, our experience with forecasts of this kind suggests that the real figure might be much higher. This means that it is already time to start looking for solutions.

Obviously, this is not a job just for legislators, but also for economists, sociologists, and medical experts, and also for economic managers and local government agencies—in short, for anyone having any connection with this issue. We must work in close cooperation with them.

The Supreme Soviet and the people's deputies cannot ignore the need for legislative support for the radical economic reform, the introduction and development of new forms of proprietorship and property ownership, the elimination of signs of crisis in the economy, and the radical perestroika of national economic management, particularly in the agroindustrial and construction complex. Priority should be assigned to the republic food-producing complex, presupposing the specialization of production units, the efficient and effective use of our natural and climatic conditions, and the implementation of the Land Law. Difficulties and friction have already arisen in this sphere.

We must begin looking for practical and specific answers to questions connected with the equalization of socioeconomic conditions in all parts of the republic and with the social development of rural areas.

We must face the facts: The inhabitants of our rural communities are not getting their fair share of many things—utilities, consumer, medical, and trade services, and educational and cultural facilities. I will not even go into the content or quality of their work. The group of questions connected with the organization and development of inter-regional and foreign economic contacts and the creation of the necessary stable currency base require thorough and earnest legislative investigation. Some steps have been taken in this direction, but they have been taken sporadically and without any precise legal regulation. This is an extremely crucial matter, however, and inexperience or rash decisions could cause irrevocable harm.

In the field of sociocultural policy, we probably need laws to secure the principle of social justice, optimal living and working conditions, and the thorough development of the individual. This will entail scientific forecasts of the demographic situation in the republic and the analysis and consideration of new tendencies in this sphere.

The first laws we draft should include those connected with the stronger social support of women, especially mothers of large families, the protection of motherhood and childhood, the improvement of working, living, and educational conditions for youth, and concern for labor and war veterans and the disabled.

All of this should include, as a major component, the improvement of the system of social security, quicker solutions to the housing shortage, the augmentation of the output and improvement of the quality of consumer goods, the expansion of their assortment, and the dramatic improvement of medical services for the population.

It is impossible to overlook the fact that the republic has virtually no effectual laws on environmental protection and the intelligent use of natural resources. The same can be said about the preservation of our cultural and spiritual heritage, historical monuments, and folk traditions.

The Supreme Soviet will have a great deal of extremely important work to do in the sphere of governmental and ethnic concerns. This will entail the improvement of inter-ethnic relations and the actual, rather than verbal, guarantee of the constitutional rights and liberties of citizens, regardless of their national origin, language, and religion.

All of this should stem from the objective need to preserve and strengthen respect and goodwill among members of all nationalities and ethnic groups in our country in the present and future.

We have no right to ignore the fact that the tragic events in February alarmed many citizens of Tajikistan and made them feel unprotected and insecure. This is not an unsubstantiated statement. The republic has already lost and will continue to lose specialists, highly skilled engineering and technical personnel, and workers. We must do everything within our power to stop this process. Appeals and assurances cannot help much. We need concrete guarantees. They are being drafted by the republic government at the suggestion of Communists and the public.

The legislative work should also be aimed at expanding the autonomy and responsibility of local government agencies. They make most of the decisions connected with the satisfaction of the population's daily needs, the social protection of people, the establishment of democracy, etc.

Finally, we feel that the Supreme Soviet is obligated to consider the need for dialogue with progressive social groups and strive to cooperate with them in the development of perestroika processes. In a multi-party system, which is already becoming a reality, this is essential.

Dear Comrade Deputies! In summation, I would like to repeat that all of us—the Supreme Soviet as a whole, its standing commissions, and the people's deputies—must adhere firmly and resolutely to the policy line of a rule-of-law state, respect for the law, and submission to it. This will necessitate resolute and uncompromising measures. All people should be equal under the law, regardless of their official status, past services, personal connections, etc.

One of our main objectives should be the further development and intensification of democracy. The resolutions of the February and March CPSU Central Committee plenums, the amendments ratified by the Third Special Congress of People's Deputies to articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution of the USSR, and the similar changes which are to be made in the Constitution of the Tajik SSR will create great opportunities in this sphere.

I must say quite emphatically, however, that democracy, glasnost, and the pluralism of opinions have nothing in common with excessive lenience, irresponsibility, anti-governmental, nationalistic, or chauvinistic behavior, or any kind of unlawful actions. Here we must take a firm and principled stand.

I must tell you that these demands were made in the overwhelming majority of letters, telegrams, and oral statements from citizens to party and government establishments and to the news media of the republic after the events in February. This was also the topic of much discussion during the election campaign.

The solution is clear: We must resolutely continue strengthening discipline and order and put an end to all kinds of antisocial behavior jeopardizing the political foundations of the society and the life, honor, and dignity of citizens. As the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, I feel it is my duty to make the following announcement. Today the republic needs the consolidation of all of its healthy forces more than ever before. This must be done for the sake of the future, for the sake of the welfare and happiness of the population, and of our children. The Communist Party of Tajikistan, its Central Committee, local party committees, and the majority of primary party organizations have always been and will continue to be the ideological core and organizing center of this consolidation.

The elections of people's deputies of the Tajik SSR proved that the Communist Party of Tajikistan is still the most influential force in the republic. The overwhelming majority of voters expressed confidence in the party in the elections to the Supreme Soviet and local soviets.

The Communists of the republic appreciate this confidence greatly and regard it as something like a credit, obligating them, from the members of the Central Committee to the members of the primary party organizations, to surmount past errors and deformities as quickly as possible by radically reorganizing the style and methods of their activity and to seek new ways of strengthening ties with the population and with all of its social organizations—trade unions, the Komsomol, the councils of labor collectives, artists' unions, and other social groups, including informal ones.

The Communist Party of Tajikistan will soon meet for its 21st regular congress. A program of preparations for the congress has been drawn up, and the draft platform the party will set forth at its congress is being completed.

Soon the draft will be published for discussion by all the people, and I therefore see no need to go over its contents here.

I will point out just one feature. After this draft has been discussed and finalized, it will become the Communist Party of Tajikistan's program of action for the next few years.

In conclusion, I hope that the mutual understanding and joint constructive efforts of the republic Supreme Soviet and Tajik CP Central Committee will provide active assistance in the search for effective solutions to our many problems.

Dear Comrade Deputies! Allow me to take this opportunity to express my gratitude and yours to Comrade Gaibnazar Pallayevich Pallayev for his many years of productive work in party and soviet organs in the republic and wish him good health, a long life, and happiness.

I think we will continue working closely with Comrade Pallayev and using his rich personal experience and work experience in party and soviet organs.

13 April Tajik Supreme Soviet Information Report

90US0864A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 14 April 90 p 1

[Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet report: "Information Report on the Meeting of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The first session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet 12th convocation continued its work in Dushanbe on 13 April.

K.M. Makhkamov, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, opened the morning session.

The people's deputies turned to the examination of the third agenda issue—the election of the first deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. In accordance with Article 110 of the republic Constitution, K.M. Makhkamov proposed that Deputy K.A. Aslonov, secretary of the Tajik CP, be elected to this post.

Participating in the discussion of the presented candidacy were deputies: P. Solikhov, K. Imomov, U. Shokirov, M. Mirzobadalov, Sh.B. Usmanova, A.A. Shishkin, A. Radzhabov, A. Khabibov, S. Ganiyev, F. Gurezov, G. Fazylov, and others.

As the result of open balloting, K.A. Aslonov receives a mandate of the trust of the majority of deputies (out of 216 deputies participating in the voting, 177 for, 26 against, and 13 abstained).

Then, at the nomination by the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, the deputies discussed the candidacy of Ye.I. Turgunov, chairman of the ispolkom of people's

deputies of the GBAO [Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast] to the post of deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

Deputies A. Oripov, B. Barotov, M. Mamadzhonov, A. Dostnev, Yu.F. Ponomov and a number of others spoke on this candidacy.

Ye.I. Turgunov is elected to this office by open ballot, having received the votes of 186 deputies of the 208 registered.

The deputies considered and gave notice of the declaration of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers on the relinquishing by them of their powers to the the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. The Council of Ministers was instructed to fulfill the responsibilities entrusted to it until the election of the new composition of the government.

In accordance with Article 106 of the Tajik SSR Constitution, A. Iskandarov, chairman of the soviet of people's deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, is elected to the post of deputy chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet.

In accordance with Article 110 of the Tajik SSR Constitution, K.M. Makhkamov introduced the recommendation for naming I.Kh. Khayeev to this post.

Deputies Dzh. Shakirov, O. Berdiyev, M. Islomidinov, P. Avezov, S. Sharipov, K. Konmdodov, A. Akhmedov, Kh. Sharipov, Z. Davletaliyeva, and a number of others expressed their opinion on this candidacy.

As the result of open balloting, I.Kh. Khayeev was named to the position of head of government (210 for, 2 against, 3 abstentions).

The deputies turn to the examination of the issue of the formation of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet permanent commissions, and the election of chairmen and the confirmation of the bodies of these commissions.

First Deputy Chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, K.A. Aslonov, spoke with the proposal on this issue.

With consideration for the proposals and comments of the deputies who spoke, the composition is confirmed for 13 permanent commissions, other than the Mandate Commission, which was elected previously. The proposed candidacies for the posts of the chairmen of these commissions are also confirmed.

The corresponding resolutions on the issues discussed on the second day of the session's work are adopted.

The republic Chief of State, I.Kh. Khayeev, spoke with information on the structure of the future Council of Ministers.

The next meeting of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet will open on 19 April. The permanent commissions of the republic Supreme Soviet will begin work on 14 April.

Privileges Reinstated to Tajik Workers Returning After Political Unrest

90US0864B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 7 Apr 90 p 1

[Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet report: "In the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and the Tajik Council of Trade Unions"]

[Text] The Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and the Tajik republic Council of Trade Unions adopted a resolution which establishes that uninterrupted labor probation is preserved for those citizens who left their places of permanent residence in the city of Dushanbe, Leninskiy, Gissarskiy, and Ordzhonikidzeyabadskiy rayons in connection with the tragic events that occurred in Dushanbe from 12 February to 14 February 1990 in the event of their return to and preparedness for work within one month of the lifting of the state of emergency in the city of Dushanbe.

During the indicated period, places of study are preserved for students of higher and matriculants of specialized secondary educational institutions and professional-technical colleges, as well as places for enrollees at children's preschool institutions who had left for this reason. In doing so, the students and matriculants of the educational institutions indicated are subject to being reinstated for the subsequent course in the event of passing the corresponding examinations and quizzes.

The resolution enters into effect on 7 April 1990.

Tajik Civil Defense Official Responds to Questions on Role

90US0785A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 2

[Article written in response to readers' letters by the Chief of Staff of Tajik Civil Defense, Maj Gen F.R. Niyazov: "The Civil Defense Forces Must Operate in an Extreme Situation"]

[Text] [Readers' Letters] "The Civil Defense aides say a great deal about the procedure for preparing and employing its forces to eliminate the consequences of an enemy attack, emergencies, catastrophies and natural disasters. But all of this is on paper. And life often throws us 'practical tasks' such as Armenia, Tajikistan, Arzamas and Bashkiria.... And we do not know how they were actually carried out. Were the nonmilitarized formations employed and to what degree?"

"I would like to obtain reliable information on the actions of the troop units and the various CD [Civil Defense] subunits in the course of eliminating the consequences of the earthquakes in Tajikistan."

"It has been very difficult to watch the broadcasts and reports on the use of working dogs from foreign countries to locate victims. Where are our four-footed rescuers?"

What conclusions and lessons, even preliminary ones, have been made and drawn by the CD bodies?" [End of Reader Letters]

Readers have turned frequently to the editors with these and similar questions. We have asked that the Chief of Staff of the Tajik Civil Defense, Maj Gen F.R. Niyazov, reply to the readers.

[Niyazov comments] Tajikistan is an area of high mountains and deep gorges. Here there are frequent earthquakes, avalanches, rockfalls, the strong movement of glaciers, mudflows which wipe from the face of the earth entire villages and fertile fields. This is why in our republic the constant readiness of the nonmilitarized CD formations plays a crucial role.

The Dzhirgatal earthquake is fresh in our memory and here on 27 October 1985, late at night the people felt a strong underground jolt. It was precisely calmness and organization which contributed to the fact that the harm caused by it was not so great. On the eve of the 7-point underground conflagration in Dzhirgatal'skiy Rayon a planned integrated exercise had been conducted. Extraordinary commissions, staffs at the national economic installations, the administrative bodies and the CD forces had worked through the questions of eliminating the consequences of nature's arbitrariness. This is why the CD forces of the rayon and the sovkhozes acted precisely and courageously. The work was carried out according to the designated plan which at one time had been worked out for the eventuality of natural disasters, emergencies and catastrophies.

The earthquake in Kayrakkum...the rescue teams, the medical teams, the representatives of the CD technical service demonstrated true examples of valor, heroism and self-sacrifice in rescuing persons from under the ruins of the first stage of the carpet combine.

Also proving themselves positively were the nonmilitarized CD formations in Dangarinskiy Rayon in eliminating the natural disaster in Sargazon.

The CD forces were effectively deployed within a few minutes after receiving the alert on the earthquake in Gissar and obtaining precise data on its epicenter last year. The republic CD Staff grouped them in the crucial sectors. They cleared rubble, removed victims from destroyed houses, provided medical aid, evacuated the population, pushed roads through the collapsed earth, rebuilt power transmission and communications lines and set up temporary housing. The CD soldiers in a short period of time set up tent schools, bathhouses, stores and public dining enterprises for the inhabitants of the villages of Sharora, Okulibolo and Okulipoyen.

Literally within 2 hours after the disaster, the medical service formations from the republic CD arrived at the site of the tragedy. All the ambulances from nearby rayons and the city of Dushanbe were mobilized in a few minutes. Some 36 specialized ambulance medical brigades were dispatched immediately to the site of the

disaster. Night and day the medics fought for the life of each man removed from under the rubble or carried out from a destroyed house at the site of the tragedy. The most severely wounded were taken to medical facilities in Gissarskiy and Leninskiy Rayons and to the capital clinics.

The warm gratitude of the residents was won by soldiers and officers from the CD units who from the very first day of the earthquake worked in the most difficult areas. They removed 77 persons who had perished from under the rubble. Pvts V. Dedushkin and V. Kayumov in disassembling a destroyed home saved a 6-year-old boy who miraculously remained alive. Pvts Nikolay Marshalko, Aleksey Gerasimovich and Yuriy Dudko found 50,000 rubles and returned them to the victims. The CD formations together with the military eliminated the danger of a breakthrough of water at a place where an irrigation canal had been blocked by mudflows, and where a lake had formed threatening one of the nearby settlements.

In line with this it must be pointed out that the systematic natural disasters which have occurred annually in the republic and particularly the Gissar earthquake have taught us instructive lessons. The most important of these is that CD should be ready for skillful, effective actions in any suddenly occurring extreme conditions. The consequences of a disaster can be significantly reduced, and in a number of instances even prevented, if the necessary preventive and emergency warning measures are carried out ahead of time.

In being developed upon the initiative and under the leadership of the CPSU, perestroyka in all spheres of our society's life has become a reality. Being organically linked with the life of the people and serving their interests, USSR Civil Defense takes an active part in this process and is carrying out measures to radically restructure its activities.

The shortcomings of the period of stagnation did not bypass CD. To them were added our own oversights both on the strategic questions of construction as well as on the questions of the tactics of carrying out its tasks and measures.

We must not go to extremes and deny everything achieved in the previous years. However, a more constructive approach is a sober assessment and even a reassessment of everything done previously, proceeding from the demands of the times and the new conditions of life in the nation and society.

The accelerated pace and expanded scale of scientific-technical and production activity under present-day conditions are inseparably linked with the ever-growing use of complicated technical systems, increased risk in their operation and, consequently, a real threat to the health and life of people, to the environment and the normal functioning of production.

Let us recall what enormous amounts of money and effort were required to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. For long months, the customary pace was disrupted in the economic activities of large regions of our country and many elements of state administration. A large number of leaders, scientists, construction workers, medical personnel and other specialists had to be diverted from their customary jobs and unplanned materials, equipment and transport had to be used.

These circumstances also necessitate new approaches to the questions of Civil Defense and to carrying out the tasks of ensuring a reliable defense of the population and the clear functioning of the administrative systems under any extraordinary circumstances.

The new tasks of protecting the populace against the destructive action of emergencies, catastrophies and natural disasters, the carrying out of rescue and other immediate work in the course of eliminating their consequences have increased the demands placed upon the readiness of the CD body and forces and increased the responsibility of the leaders for the correctness and promptness of the decisions taken and should be considered among the most important social measures to ensure the life and activities of the citizens. All of this at present is being put down in legislative, directive and normative documents. These should more concretely reflect the duties, rights and responsibility of the officials and all citizens for carrying out defense measures.

It is our duty to overcome the forces of inertia in solving the urgent problems. This will be a concrete contribution to the restructuring of Civil Defense and to increasing the readiness of its forces for action in any situation.

Delays in Changes to Azerbaijan's Constitutional, Electoral Laws*90US0621F Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri 5 Dec 89 p 3*

[Interview with N. Fataliyev, deputy chairman of the presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet: "Broad Legal Privileges"]

[Text][Editorial Introduction] The proposed laws "On Changes and Additions to the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution (Basic Law)," "On Elections of Azerbaijan SSR People's Deputies" and "On the Elections of Deputies to Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Azerbaijan SSR" have been printed in the press recently. Every citizen in our republic has won the possibility to express his own ideas and proposals on these laws. One must make use of this possibility intelligently and maturely.

In some union republics similar laws have been discussed and even passed by sessions of Supreme Soviets. But why is this process proceeding so slowly among us, what is the cause? We began our conversation with N. Fataliyev, deputy chairman of the presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, with this question.

[Fataliyev] There are objective reasons. The decrees of the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet "On Changes and Additions to the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution (Basic Law)," "On Elections of Azerbaijan SSR People's Deputies," "On the Election of Deputies to Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Azerbaijan SSR" and "On Preparing the Draft of the Law of the Azerbaijan SSR" were passed on 23 May 1989. A special commission was created to prepare the drafts and working groups were formed. Legal scholars and other specialists as well as Soviet workers were included in the commission and the working groups.

It is natural that we were not able to repeat the theses of the Union laws on elections, as had been done earlier. During the period of stagnation, in most cases union republics accommodated normative acts of the USSR to local conditions or simply transferred them as they were. This caused a distortion in the state-legal and socio-economic development of the union republics.

In the process of working on the new drafts the characteristics of our republic and the way in which every fixed norm would "operate" was considered to an extent greater than in the past.

In addition to this, it became clear after the elections of the USSR people's deputies that there was a need to perfect the 1 December 1988 Law on Changes and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law). When defining the structure of the electoral system, including the organization and holding of elections, at the recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the need to make changes in a number of articles of the USSR Constitution with the goal of allowing greater possibilities to take into consideration the specific characteristics of union republics was recognized. Union republics which had

hastened to pass corresponding laws now were compelled to make the necessary changes in these documents.

[Question] What are the basic differences between the new draft law and the earlier ones?

[Fataliyev] There are many difference. First I have to note that the Supreme Soviet will remain as the highest organ of government in our republic. In other words, we will have no republic congress of people's deputies. This will make it possible to resolve a number of problems operationally.

Public organizations in the Azerbaijan SSR will not have special representation in the Supreme Soviet. But this is not to say that they will not take part in the work of the republic Supreme Soviet. Public organizations, like labor collectives, have the right to submit deputy candidates with common bases. All candidates for deputy will be voted for on a basis of equality in the electoral districts.

We have refused to establish district electoral commissions for deputy elections to city Soviets under rayon subordination. On the basis of the law in force, such commissions have not been organized during elections to village and precinct Soviets. In this instance, corresponding territorial and zonal commissions will fulfill the functions of district electoral commissions.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the new draft laws on elections is the fact that a three-month period has been designated for election campaigns for the elections of deputies. A four-month period has been planned in some union republics. But, taking into consideration the experience of past election campaigns, we think that we have designated a more optimal period of time.

[Question] When preparing the draft, were the provisions of the Constitutional Law on the Sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR taken into consideration?

[Fataliyev] Such questions have been addressed to us. First, talks are going on about changes and additions to the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution in connection with a new electoral system, and the provisions of the Law with regard to the Supreme Soviet's authority could not find their reflection in the draft laws. Second, the Constitution of a sovereign socialist state like the Azerbaijan SSR is an extremely serious document. We cannot permit haste in making changes to it. Now the discussion is about making needed changes to the Constitution in connection to the elections. Without these, we cannot establish a new, democratic state government organ. When taking into consideration the changes occurring in the country, the expansion of the rights of union republics and the strengthening of their sovereignty, the need for a draft of a new Azerbaijan SSR Constitution becomes obvious. I wish to recall that work on preparing a new Fundamental Law of the SSR Union is now in process.

[Question] The discussion on the drafts has given rise to many proposals and opinions. How has the consideration of them and their grouping been organized?

[Fataliyev] One can say that recently the opinion of our republic's citizens is being considered when the draft laws are being prepared. There is no other way to do it. In the final analysis, the drafts which have been demonstrated have been directed at defining the pure democratic foundations of the organization of the organs of people's government, and it would have been meaningless to work on them without the people's participation. What forms of the organization of the pre-election campaigns and activity of the Soviets will take—these must be decided by the people themselves.

Two working groups have been created in the Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet in order to generalize the proposals coming from citizens. Prominent specialists and able workers have been included in these groups. I want to assure readers that those in the Presidium will not sidestep any proposal or note, and that the will of the citizens will find its reflection in its entirety in the final edition of the drafts.

[Question] It is known that the current term of authority of local Soviets ends this month. How will their functions be implemented up until the completion of our republic's local Soviet elections? According to a rough estimate, the forthcoming elections will not take place sooner than spring of the coming year.

[Fataliyev] An appropriate question. The term of deputies of local Soviets is, in fact, over. Thus, in the Decree of the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet "On the Convening of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet," the question of extending the authorized terms of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and local Soviets of people's deputies has been included in paragraph six of the session's agenda.

Decree, Resolutions of March Georgian National Movement Congress

90US0913A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 17 Mar 90 pp 2-3

[Decree and Resolutions of a Special Conference of the Georgian National-Liberation Movement, dated 15 March 1990]

[Text] Decree

Having heard the position of representatives of Georgia's unreconciled and democratic organization with regard to attitudes toward the election of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet and with regard to the election of a transitional coalition opposition government by Georgia's lawful population through universal, democratic, direct, and equal secret ballot, a position which was formulated as theses in the Appeal of the Georgian National Independence Party, the Georgian Monarchist Party, the Saint Ilia the Righteous Society, the Georgian

Helsinki Alliance, the Tetri Giorgi Alliance, and the Merab Kostava Society, the Special Conference of the Georgian National Liberation Movement has, by a decisive majority of votes, decreed:

1. That Georgia be declared a country that is occupied, annexed, deprived of its sovereignty, and is under the armed aggression of a foreign country.

2. That the Georgian so-called SSR's juridical status as a sovereign union Soviet socialist state be deemed a fiction and that said official status be qualified as a criminal falsification designed to conceal the aggressor's actual position in Georgia.

3. That the legislative, executive, and judicial structures in present-day Georgia, the *de facto* Soviet Government and state system, be deemed criminal entities, inasmuch as they have resulted directly from armed aggression and are therefore unlawful, that all treaties be revoked which were entered into with the metropolitan country [metropoliya], under coercion on the part of the aggressor, by the local puppet leadership of an occupied and annexed Georgia, and that the local Communist Party be dissolved.

4. That the so-called Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet in no way be deemed a juridical organ or entity expressing the will of the Georgian nation and the lawful population of Georgia; that the forthcoming election to the so-called Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet on 25 March 1990 be totally boycotted by the lawful population.

5. That broad efforts be undertaken to enable the lawful population of Georgia to elect, by universal, democratic, direct, and equal secret ballot, a Georgian transitional coalition opposition government/body, constituting an official legal entity directly reflecting the will of Georgia's lawful population, which shall raise before the court of international law at the appropriate level, with full urgency, the question of the restoration of Georgia's state independence.

6. That a National Forum be created on a parity basis to serve as a leadership coordinating center of the Georgian National Liberation Movement and to convene a universal National Congress and the universal democratic election of a transitional coalition opposition government/body.

Resolutions of the 1990 special conference of the Georgian National Liberation Movement, adopted on 15 March 1990

Resolution I

Whereas Georgia's present social-political situation and, in particular, its annexed status within the Soviet Empire, ultimately rests on the existence of Soviet occupation forces on Georgian territory,

Whereas the local puppet government, the unlawfully established Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Georgian SSR Government, and its actual ruler—the Georgian Communist Party, which is an inseparable part of the Russian Communist Party and serves to impose its political will upon the population of Georgia, in no way represent an expression of the will of the Georgian nation, and the duration of their existence and functioning depends solely on the duration of the stationing of Soviet occupation troops on Georgian territory and they would, under conditions of peace, be unable to retain power without the aid of the occupation forces, as was attested by the situation of 9 April 1989,

Whereas the Soviet Army represents an institution which discriminates against Georgians on political and ethnic grounds, **THEREFORE** the 1990 Special Conference of the Georgian National Liberation Movement hereby resolves:

a) that the occupation forces of the Soviet Empire—troops of the so-called Transcaucasian Military District, internal troops of the Soviet Union, troops of the Soviet Union Military District, and border troops of the USSR KGB [Committee for State Security]—depart from Georgian territory.

b) that even under conditions of Georgia's continuing occupied status:

1) conscription of the Georgian population into the ranks of the Soviet Occupation Army must cease,

2) the Georgian population should provide broad support to the political and economic sabotage of occupation forces stationed on Georgian territory,

3) the general thrust of the national-liberation struggle must be defined explicitly as a peaceful struggle to remove Soviet occupation forces from the territory of Georgia.

God protect us!

Resolution II

Whereas the Conference, having expressed the desire of the Georgian nation and the majority of Georgia's lawful population to declare a **boycott** of the election to the so-called Georgian Supreme Soviet, **HEREBY DECREES:**

1) that every candidate for deputy to the Supreme Soviet is morally obligated to withdraw his candidacy.

2) that on election day scheduled for 25 March, every honorable citizen should report to the election precinct, remove his name from the election roster, and register a statement, to be left there, declaring that said voter (name, surname), on political grounds, is boycotting the Soviet elections.

3) in the event that the Georgian puppet government does proceed with the scheduled elections on 25 March, such elections, just as in the case of any Soviet elections, must be boycotted.

Resolution III

The Special Conference of the National Movement has declared no confidence with regard to that portion of the Georgian emigre community which has done nothing for its homeland through the years and, in many cases, has directly collaborated with the puppet government of Georgia.

Today that portion of the Georgian emigre community is presuming to admonish us, arrogating to itself the right from so far away, thousands of kilometers from the Motherland, to offer certain recipes to the National Movement which is fighting the occupation regime in Georgia.

It is time for that portion of the emigre community to respond promptly to this Resolution of the Conference and place itself at the service of the National Movement.

Resolution IV: On the Creation of a Georgian National Military School

The Special Conference of the Georgian National Liberation Movement believes that in order to ensure the defensive capability of a future independent Georgia it is essential to create a national military school in which the heroic traditions of the Georgian Junkers will be restored.

In this connection we believe:

1. That the Georgian National Forum should immediately be given the necessary territory and building for the establishment of a Junkers' Military School.

2. That the National Forum must conduct explanatory work to ensure that worthy candidates are enrolled in and staff the school.

3. That a bank account must be set up to finance the Junkers' School.

4. That the National Forum should set up a competent commission to be in charge of carrying out this decision and to be accountable to the National Forum.

5. The Conference of the Georgian National Movement calls upon all political, social, and state organizations and representatives of the Georgian public, intelligentsia, workers, school and college students, and the Georgian Orthodox Church to express their endorsement of and support for the idea of restoring the Georgian Junkers' school with its heroic traditions.

God be our protector!

Resolution V: On Demographic Expansionism

Present-day Georgia's National Movement and unreconciled democratic opposition have taken an explicit position with regard to demographic expansionism. As we have noted repeatedly, the Kremlin's occupation and annexation of Georgia, and the oppression of its national rights, is reflected not only in the introduction of occupation troops, the creation of an anti-Georgian puppet regime, and anti-Georgian cadre policies, but also in the bloodless invasion of Georgia by non-Georgian populations, the violation of Georgia's territorial integrity through the creation of unlawful autonomous formations, the preaching of pseudo-internationalist ideas, and oppression of and discrimination against Georgia's lawful population. The occupation regime has fostered the artificial growth and privileged status of non-Georgian communities, and the creation of non-Georgian enclaves in Georgia, and the corruption of the bureaucratic apparatus has abetted the stealing of land from the Georgian nation by alien elements and illegal building of homes, which has brought us to the brink of unprecedented demographic catastrophe in a number of regions of Georgia.

Encouraged by Moscow's pseudo-internationalist policies, non-Georgian populations on Georgian territory have been creating illegal, anti-Georgian organizations designed to reinforce illegal non-Georgian ethnocracies, take over Georgian lands, drive the Georgians off their own lands, falsify Georgia's history, and absorb Georgia demographically. These organizations include the Abkhazians' Aidgilara, the Ossetians' Adamon Nikhas, the Armenians' Dzhavakhhk, Krunk, Miutsun, and others, and the Azeris' Kairat, Shah Abaz II, and also organizations of the so-called Meskhetian Turks. Accordingly, we, the participants in the Conference, hereby declare:

1. All the above organizations must be condemned by our Movement, declared to be anti-Georgian, criminal groups, and implacable struggle must be waged against them.
2. That portion of Georgia's non-Georgian population whose ancestors did not live in Georgia, which gained a foothold on our territory by means of force, unlawful seizure of lands, unlawful building of homes, and unlawful registration or fictitious marriage, and which engages in criminal, anti-Georgian activities, must be declared to be an unlawful population, and the appropriate measures must be taken against it.
3. A special mechanism must be created to control migration and immigration, to ban uncontrolled immigration into Georgia by non-Georgian populations, and to encourage migration from Georgia by the unlawful population.
4. That portion of the non-Georgian population whose ancestors did live in Georgia, who know and respect the Georgian language, and who support the Georgian National Liberation Movement, shall be guaranteed every protection.

5. Negotiations with non-Georgian political parties or organizations and the holding of joint rallies and conferences with them shall be conducted only with the consent of the National Forum.

Resolution VI

Whereas the existence of the Komsomol in Georgia derives from Bolshevik Russia's annexation of Georgia and the installation of Communist dictatorship here on 25 February 1921; whereas the Komsomol has constituted a collaborationist organization from the day of its inception; whereas the ideology of the Communist Party and the Komsomol are fundamentally in opposition to everything that is sacred and national; whereas the Komsomol, along with the Communist Party, is actually the executor of the ideas of Lenin, Stalin, and their fellow-thinkers who were visited like Satans upon mankind; whereas the Komsomol has robbed and enslaved Georgia's young people for 68 years; whereas the Communist Party and the Komsomol have caused a certain number of Georgians to lose their sense of patriotism, to sell off their country's lands, to destroy churches and monasteries, and to become spies, traitors, and violent disruptors of rallies, we therefore declare that the Komsomol has no right to exist, and we demand:

1. That the Georgian Komsomol organization be declared dissolved at the Komsomol Congress scheduled for 20-21 March of this year (postponement or temporary cessation of the Congress is totally unacceptable).
2. That the journals and newspapers under the organization's control be turned into independent and free youth press organs.
3. That the real estate and chattel property on the all-union and republic books be declared the property of Georgia's young people.
4. That the Komsomol's material-technical and monetary resources be used for the benefit of Georgia's young people.
5. In the event that some political or social-political organization should be created on the base of the present Komsomol, its membership recruitment and creation of a material-financial base must start from zero.

Our main task today is to liberate Georgia's young people from the disease of communism!

God be the Georgian nation's protector in this great patriotic endeavor!

Georgia's National Forum Outlines Its Program

90US0974A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI in
Georgian 5 Apr 90 p 4

[Item under the rubric: "Alternative Page": "Appeal From the Georgian National Forum to the Georgian Nation and the World Community"]

[Text] The Georgian National Liberation Movement has reached a stage which requires the full consolidation of the forces of the unreconciled, radical and democratic opposition in the struggle to restore the nation's statehood and independence. From this standpoint, great importance attaches to the National Movement's Special Conference on 13-15 March of this year, which elected the National Forum. The National Forum is a provisional organ designed to undertake the leadership and coordination of the National Liberation Movement and prepare for the election, by universal, direct, and secret ballot, of a National Congress which will reflect the interests of the Georgian nation and the lawful population of Georgia. The Congress must be defined as a legal subject which is invested with the mandate of the people's trust in order to carry out negotiations on the restoration of Georgia's independence and statehood at any level, since the present occupation government and its stage-prop so-called Supreme Soviet, which was undemocratically "elected," does not and cannot reflect the will and desires of the Georgian nation or speak in its name.

As a result of the boycott that was announced by the unreconciled and democratic opposition, as we know, elections to the so-called Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet have been postponed. The National Forum will also call a boycott of Soviet elections in the event that they are conducted in a pseudo-multiparty form permitted by the authorities and regulated by the Soviet Constitution and legislation, because no parties which correlate their programs, charters, and strategies with the imperial, "Soviet" Constitution and legislation can be considered to be in opposition.

The National Forum states that despite Soviet Russia's occupation and annexation of Georgia in February 1921, the Georgian Act of Independence, which was promulgated by the National Council on 26 May 1918 and by the Constituent Assembly on 12 March 1919, is still in force; it has not lost its juridical power but represents the constitutional basis of the independent State of Georgia. The territory of Georgia is still juridically unified and undivided, and no foreign state's constitution is in force within it. That includes the so-called USSR constitutions of 1936 and 1978. Because the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia never did sign an act of capitulation, the independent State of Georgia continues to exist *de jure* to this day, and its Constitution is still in force, although it has been temporarily stopped as a result of the annexation, and the Russian-Georgian treaty of 7 May 1920 has been unilaterally violated by Soviet Russia. Georgia has never in fact joined the so-called USSR, because after Georgia was annexed the so-called Transcaucasian Federation was created, and Georgia was brought into it by force on 12 March 1922, after which the Transcaucasian Federation itself was joined to the so-called USSR without any consideration of the will or desires of the Georgian nation, without any referendum or plebiscite, at the initiative of the puppet occupation government that was created by undemocratic means, and the Treaty of Union was concluded

with it in December 1922. The so-called Transcaucasian Federation now no longer exists, the Treaty of Union that was concluded with it is null and void and is no longer in force. It could not be in force with the so-called Georgian SSR itself, moreover, since the latter was not originally a separate entity within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it was first created and detached from the Transcaucasian Federation on 5 December 1936 and brought into the so-called USSR without any treaty whatsoever. It was only the 1936 Constitution that acknowledged Georgia to be a member of the USSR and conferred the formalistic, nominal right of secession from the Union.

Inasmuch as the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Agreement acknowledges the firmness and inviolability of state borders and the inviolability of nations' sovereignty and their right to direct their own fate, Soviet Russia's violation of Georgia's state borders, destruction of its sovereignty, and annexation, as well as the presence of occupation forces on the territory of Georgia, must be considered to be in violation of all acknowledged norms of international law, a violation of the Helsinki Agreement, and an international crime.

Accordingly, the Georgian National Liberation Movement and its vanguard, the National Forum, do not recognize the so-called Georgian SSR that was created against the Georgian nation's will, nor do they recognize within Georgia the unlawful so-called South Ossetian, Abkhazian, and Adjarian autonomous entities, being fictitious anti-national administrative-political formations, inasmuch as they are the direct result of the annexation.

The strategy of civil and national disobedience remains the chief form of our national liberation struggle. A major stage of this disobedience is the boycott of the Soviet elections that were scheduled for 25 March of this year. Now, moreover, we must carry out a total boycott of compulsory service in the Soviet military, the total unlawfulness of which is defined by international law in the 1949 Geneva Convention. The boycott must be reflected in an actual shutdown of the functioning of the military commissariats in Georgia and total disruption of the spring and autumn drafts. The National Forum will plan the next stages of disobedience in the future. In this connection, every significant political or local demonstration in Georgia will have to be coordinated with the National Forum in order to avert chaos and high-handedness in the national and social movement. The National Forum absolves itself of any responsibility for the consequences of self-initiated demonstrations.

It is true that our struggle is a peaceful one; it does not envision the violent overthrow of the *de facto* Soviet government, but we will do everything we can to fight all legislative acts or measures stemming from the metropolitan country which are directed against the interests of Georgia and the Georgian nation and which do harm to our country. From this standpoint, a National Congress which is elected by universal, direct, and secret

ballot will not only constitute the leader and coordinator of the national movement but also function to monitor the *de facto* government and subordinate it to the Georgian nation's will during the transition period until such time as peaceful political struggle and the intervention of international law shall result in the removal of Soviet occupation forces from Georgia and the restoration of independent statehood, after which a Georgian Constituent Assembly and National Government will be elected.

As has been mentioned, the aim of the Georgian National Forum is to consolidate the nation on a sound national and moral basis and to wage the universal struggle to restore Georgia's state independence in such a manner as to avert chaos in the social-political movement during the transition period. And, most important, to prevent anyone's usurpation of political power.

In order to consolidate the nation, the Georgian National Forum will cooperate on a number of questions with those political forces which have taken a fundamentally different position in regard to the question of restoring Georgia's state independence.

The Georgian National Forum is divided into the following sectorial organizations and commissions:

- a) An Electoral Commission responsible for preparing for the election of a National Congress on the basis of the universal, democratic, direct, equal, and secret ballot of the lawful population of Georgia.
- b) A Demographic Commission responsible for halting and preventing the demographic expansion of non-Georgian populations in Georgia against the vital interests of the Georgian nation, and for restoring the demographic balance which has been artificially disrupted to the detriment of the Georgian nation.
- c) A National Forum Fund, responsible for making financial transactions designed to support all actions carried out by the National Forum.
- d) An Interethnic Relations Commission.
- e) An Organizing Commission.
- f) An Ecology Commission.
- g) An Editorial Commission.
- h) A Coordinating Council responsible for coordination and contacts with all organizations and forces which are active in Georgia.

The Georgian National Forum must be allotted time on television two or three times a week, and it must regularly make use of the official press as needed.

The Georgian National Forum has its own headquarters and staff. The National Forum shall exist until such time

as the lawful population of Georgia has elected a Georgian National Congress designed to lay the foundations for Georgia's political, social, cultural, and economic revival.

God is with us!

Long live independent, democratic, Christian Georgia!

The Georgian National Forum. March 1990.

"Georgian Falcons' Legion" Military Group Announces Aims

90US0974B Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI in Georgian 7 Apr 90 p 2

[Letter to the editors from the Military Council of the "Georgian Falcons" All-Georgia Military-Type Patriotic-Sports Society]

[Text] On 22 February of this year under the title "Let Us Create a National Military School" your newspaper published Vano Beridziashvili's article, prefaced by an editorial introduction, expressing the hope that readers would respond.

We are obliged to state that the article must have been written by someone who has been sitting in a barrel, who has heard nothing about the Georgian Falcons' Legion, because every one of the proposals he offered is nothing other than material copied from our Charter and Program of Action.

It seems to us that the article was directed against the authority and further progress and development of our Society, and we categorically demand that our statement be published as soon as possible.

Our Society has been in operation for over half a year now and has its own press organ, the newspaper LEGIONERI. The Society's activities are directed toward training a national corps of officers. In this sacred cause, the Society is supported by all patriots who are not afflicted with the Solomon Medzhganuashvili Complex ("But what will happen to me?"). We are also supported by retired Georgian officers who have been driven out of the Soviet Army for the love of their nation.

'Georgian Falcons Legion' Official Explains Group's Rationale

90US0975B Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI in Georgian 17 Apr pp 4-5

[Article by Georgian Falcons Legion Chief of Staff Temur Mikautidze: "Meet the Georgian Falcons Legion"]

[Text] I took a careful look at Vano Beridziashvili's article "Let Us Create a National Military School" (AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI, 22 Feb). Certainly, Georgians have always had to give a good account of

themselves in battle. There must indeed have been an original merger of our ancestor fighters and laborers, to be able to come through our historical turmoils and troubles all right. The Great Ilia used to say, "This little handful of people has survived because the Georgian has always held a sword in one hand and a plow in the other." Ilia believed that we would "continue to do so if we can hold on to these two ancient implements of the nation's might."

That's the way it was "then." Every lofty epithet or dithyramb applies to our forefathers. Yes, they were able to work better than we. Yes, they were better fighters. And, yes, in their veins ran blood that was more noble and knightly. I am also convinced, sad to say, that the Georgians' moral values have never been so diminished and degraded as now. The fact that Georgians are less industrious and have less fighting spirit is something we try to blame on others, seeking to place the blame elsewhere. But it is we who are to blame. What we have lost, we lost of our own will. This is what we must come to understand first; it is here that we must seek the causes, and only then denounce the empires which have supposedly robbed us of our freedom. It is not easy to be robbed of one's freedom unless it is given up voluntarily. We have lacked the ability to fight. We have failed (for we did not wish) to fight for freedom. We have talked big and then meekly submitted our necks to the yoke. It is not that our enemy has brought down the apparatus of our oppression from the sky. He has appointed functionaries of our own blood to serve as the levers of that apparatus. Nor has Georgia ever lacked for Korganashvilis, Makashvilis, Shadimanis, Ordzhonikidzes, and all the other turncoats. And they are still among us.

Fortunately for us, Georgian genes are finally beginning to stir and pulse again. Georgians have tasted the idea of freedom and are striving toward it. Our life is indeed worth something, contrasted with the life of our fathers. There is probably not a single Georgian who does not dream of freedom. Many, perhaps, don't even know what non-freedom is. Many, perhaps, have no idea why we should be captives, just what is meant by "Georgia is captive," by whom or what. But everyone wants to be free. This is good, this is fortunate.

Mr. Vano Beridziashvili rightly comments on the need to form a Georgian military institute. I have to say, however, that we ought not to be so quick to place all the blame on someone else for the fact that Georgian young people hate military service. A large portion of Georgian young people serve very well outside of Georgia. Generally speaking, young Georgians are distinguished in their units by their quick thinking. As for those Georgian boys serving within Georgia, however paradoxical it may seem, they give the completely opposite impression. Many of them lack endurance, stamina, and mental toughness. Mr. V. Beridziashvili says, "Many a young man has tried suicide as a way to escape punishment." Let's not be hasty in saying something like that; after all, people read that article. But that's not the whole story. A Georgian is not by nature a coward. It's not all that easy

to make him kill himself. But if it does occasionally happen, it is not always the fault of some "detestable officer" or the result of hatred for the service. And let us not be so soft-hearted (we should always be judicious in these things). A real man does not kill himself, and if we think that a boy of 17 or 18 is not a man but a child, we are taking the wrong stance. A Georgian of 17 or 18 is a man, not a child.

Treating him like that (like a child) will do us Georgians more harm than good.

I served the Soviet Union for 15 years, and then I retired in August of 1989. I served and fought alongside men of many nationalities. I too have to admit that boys from the Baltic republics stand two heads higher in terms of their stamina, tenacity, endurance, and their unique ability to stand by one another. I have often wondered whether *they* are constantly being told, "Resist not evil."

For our part, unfortunately, we have all too often manifested the arrogance, discourtesy, conceitedness, pride, and superciliousness described so pointedly by Davit Kldiashvili rather than other, more positive qualities characteristic of Georgians generally.

Nevertheless, our nation is striving for independence.

Bravo! It's about time.

As we are now, and what we are, we want independence. It is our right, and we are worthy of it. But the desire for freedom is one thing; winning it is another, and defending it is yet another, no less important thing.

We do need our own army. But what kind?

Where are we coming from?

Turkey has an army of over 500,000 men. Iran has about the same. That's one million right there. The Russians, who can always provide us with "unselfish help" (the way they "helped" Afghanistan, for example), will still have three or four million even after troop reductions. Now let's think about what we should do.

At this point, readers will probably divide into two groups. The first group might be thinking something along these lines: "No country is about to start a war today." That may be so (it is devoutly to be wished!), but that's no guarantee for us. We have to have our own capability. The second group may be more skeptically inclined: "My God, man, if we're faced with that kind of forces and can't match them, it makes no sense to fight." But it does: it always makes sense to fight. Especially when it is a fight for freedom. In any battle the one who wins is the one who wants most to win, who thinks and strives the most, who is the most resourceful. Victory, even if it should take a war, is entirely possible. I will not go into the theoretical, strategic, and tactical substantiation for this here. But the fact that self-determination and self-government must always be accompanied by military might is perfectly clear.

Today we suffer from a catastrophic shortage of officers necessary to form a national army. And the latest figures show that there are a little more than 1700 Georgian officers in the Soviet Army now. Many among them, moreover, are "Georgians" only on their passports. The majority of these officers are artillery men. In addition, 60 to 70 percent of that entire corps are either working in the commissariats or trying to get a job there. Well, everybody's human. There's no way you can force anyone to serve his country. And I wouldn't trust that kind of service.

To my knowledge, only a very small number of Georgian officers on active duty now have expressed a positive opinion about the creation of a Georgian national army. But it is a historical necessity. You can't hide a spear under your shirt, as the saying goes, and what is there to hide anyway. If we are fighting for full economic and political independence, we're going to have to defend that independence too—we ourselves, as best we can, whatever it takes.

Is anyone thinking about this?

Many, probably. I believe that all of the parties in Georgia have raised this question, from various angles. I think the Georgian Communist Party must also have considered the issue when it was working on the Concept of Georgian Economic and Political Development.

So far, however, no one has done anything about it. Except—one man, a Tbilisian, who has set everything else aside and given up the microphone and demonstrations (and I have to admit that he didn't choose that line of struggle before either) and has got up and done something about it. Quietly, calmly, diligently, with Georgian dedication, he has thoughtfully spearheaded the effort to form a Georgian national army. And he has done it.

The Georgian Falcons Legion is an organization of the military-sports type. It is not political. Its purpose is to defend an independent Georgia from outside enemies. It is not subservient to the interests of any party today. It will only be subservient to the government of an independent homeland. And until we do have an independent Georgia, the Georgian Falcons Legion will be administered by a Military Council.

Let no one think that the Legion is a gang of terrorists. God protect us from that kind of action. If anyone entertains doubts about this, these doubts are easily dispelled. All it takes is to read the Charter and spend maybe one day in the Legion.

The starting point for a member of the Society is man's moral values. According to the Charter, his activity must aim primarily toward that.

As I mentioned above, the Georgian Falcons Legion is governed by a Military Council. It has its own work plan as well as its own views concerning the formation of a national army and radical restructuring of the military

system in Georgia. But it has never imposed anything on anyone and does not intend to now.

The structure of a Georgian national army must be fundamentally different from that of the present Soviet Army. The Georgian Falcons Legion has created chapters in the rayons, or has plans to do so. The Legion believes that this kind of military unit is the best kind to form. It is more economical and more effective.

The Georgian Falcons Legion believes that it is essential to radically restructure military instruction in the schools and to totally reject the bulk of the present program. The schools should provide in-depth, qualified instruction in the history of the Georgian military arts. The level of proficiency in the use of firearms needs to be raised, and more attention must be paid to military physical training (not at the expense of physical education, which, incidentally, also needs some changes). One day a month should be devoted entirely to military subjects in a military training camp, where youngsters can work directly with equipment.

The Telavi Military-Physical Culture Institute should be made the base for a real military school. Most of the instructors should be Georgian officers. The school should turn out military personnel. Teachers of military subjects should be officers. They should be paid a salary from the military budget. They should be subject to assignment to a military unit at any time, and any officer in such a unit should be subject to appointment as a military instructor at any time. Boys in school ought first to be in the reserves of a military unit or chapter. In other words, a unit should train its own school students for itself and select its own officer candidates in accordance with youngsters' wishes.

The Georgian Falcons Legion also has its own ideas about the work of the Commissariat. It's easy to see that if the army is formed with the new structure, the Commissariat will lose most of its functions, and its remaining functions should all be turned over to the Council; the Commissariat should cease to exist.

Departments of DOSAAF will also lose their functions. They should be converted into military training camps, which will also be subordinate to the rayon chapter commander.

Tbilisi's present higher military schools ought to be closed down and converted into a base for the formation of a multi-profile Georgian Military Academy.

Some readers may think that the Georgian Falcons Legion has decided to turn Georgia into a military camp. That's not so. First of all, the process of military instruction and training would go on without disrupting processes of schooling and production. Secondly, a youngster in service at his place of residence, despite strict discipline and a certain amount of restrictions during the period of compulsory service, would still be at home, and thus the state would incur less expenses. In the third

place, the formation of an army according to this structural formula would still be a temporary measure until Georgia had the strength to form a volunteer army (known as a mercenary army).

Meanwhile, the Georgian Falcons Legion is doing what it can, with activities four days a week in gymnasiums; people work out whenever they can, mainly during the evening from 21:00 to 23:00. The other three days are spent in the woods, in the mountains, and on marches, with full simulation of military games.

Thank God there are still many young men in Georgia who are able to overcome temptation, get out of their warm beds, leave their VCRs and TVs, and go out in the rain and snow, subject their bodies to hardship, and toughen their spirit—without shunning adversity or grumbling.

Finances? Nothing except for 10 rubles apiece which they collect themselves or solicit from sympathetic Georgians, pooling the money to buy sports and military gear. The main thing is, no one complains or grumbles. They work. You know the old saying, "He who wants to work will find a way; he who does not want to work will find excuses."

If you see a young man in the streets of Tbilisi wearing green camouflage clothing, stop him and ask why he's wearing that armband which reads KShL [Kartvel Shevardenta Legioni = Georgian Falcons Legion]. He will answer that soon an independent Georgia will need to be defended, and he's getting ready for that. These boys won't accost anyone and demand why they haven't joined. In fact, they will do other people's work and never begrudge them. That's how these boys practice love for their people and for Georgia. This is as it should be. They were Georgians Georgia's own—before they were born, and they will still be after they die. Truly, they act with a fervent heart and cool reason.

You won't see any of them indulging in immoral behavior. You can see the nobility in their eyes. They are handsome boys, genuine knights of their homeland.

P.S. Let no one think that the purpose of this article is to call upon anyone to join. We are not doing that, because we don't promise anything except tough labor [chernoye delo] and difficult, serious service. But we do hopefully await dedicated, noble, and honest young men who are truly devoted to their country.

Georgian Monarchist Party Quits National Forum

90US0976A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI in Georgian 28 Apr 90 p 2

["Statement of the Georgian Monarchist (Conservative) Party"]

[Text] The Georgian Monarchist (Conservative) Party believes that the incident that took place on 24 April

1990 on Rustaveli Prospekt, near the temporary residence of the Georgian National Forum, constitutes an intolerable provocation against the Georgian National Forum, the National Liberation Movement, and our homeland's freedom. Unless incidents of this sort are nipped in the bud, we will face disaster tomorrow, and no commissions or loyalty [loyalnost] of any kind will help matters.

In this connection, the Georgian Monarchist (Conservative) Party hereby states:

Whereas the situation that has presently developed in the Georgian National Forum does not permit the Forum to work normally and carry out its main purpose, the Georgian Monarchist (Conservative) Party is compelled to leave the Georgian National Forum.

Please recognize this Statement as having the force of a document.

[signed] The Georgian Monarchist (Conservative) Party (read at a meeting of the Georgian National Forum at 21:00 on 24 April 1990).

REMARKS: The Georgian Monarchist (Conservative) Party states that its withdrawal from the Georgian National Forum by no means indicates that it is opposed to sound forces and individuals in the National Forum. The Georgian Monarchist (Conservative) Party will remain a loyal soldier in the National Liberation Movement, and, because it places the supreme interests of our homeland above any and all particularism or ambitions, it will take active part in the process of preparing and holding the elections of the Georgian National Congress. The Georgian Monarchist (Conservative) Party emphasizes that it will continue to remain in close political and moral alliance and fraternal interaction with the Georgian National Independence Party, with which it will take part in the election of the National Congress on the basis of a joint platform.

THE GEORGIAN MONARCHIST (CONSERVATIVE) PARTY

Kazakh Party Secretary on Language Issue

90US0862A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Uzbekali Dzhaniybekov, secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party CC: "A Matter For One and All"]

[Text] The greatness of a nation and its degree of its ethnic integrity are defined by the language. It plays an immeasurable role in the shaping of the nation's way of life and its thinking, the development of the people's original culture, the preservation of their customs, morals and traditions. Performing not only a communicative function but also the nominative, cognitive, emotional, esthetic and indoctrinational functions without which neither the society as a whole, nor the people or

the individual could get along, it is the carrier of the experience and knowledge of the generations. This makes it also the preserver of the people's historical memory, on the one hand, and a means of moral and esthetic education on the other.

This is why concern with preserving and developing the language, which is, in the words of Magzhan Zhumbayev, "the main legacy left us by our forefathers, personifying the national uniqueness, kinship, unity, well-being, honor and dignity" passed on from one generation to another, should be the cause of one and all of us.

Only with a high level of development of the language and literature can a people count on contributing its mite to world civilization. In this respect the Kazakh language could be compared to a mountain climber who, now falling back, now clambering up steep cliffs, now bypassing inaccessible peaks, makes his way persistently toward the summit, if we liken the latter to world civilization.

Yes, the language has experienced everything which has fallen to the lot of its creators and carriers throughout their history. Without going into a detailed discourse on history, I can say that in 70 years Soviet Kazakhstan has traveled an enormous path of socioeconomic and cultural development. The route was not straight or smooth, however. It abounded in accomplishments and failures, successes and errors, attainments and tragedies.... All of this occurred also in the history of the Kazakh language, which, during all those years, was unable to rise to the level of a state language of science and technology in the full sense of the word.

Naturally, when we speak of this we cannot forget about those large changes which have occurred in the life of the Kazakh and other peoples of the republic during the post-October period. The results of the socialist reforms in Kazakhstan would have been far greater, however, if the system of administration by decree had not become established in the nation following the death of Lenin, a system which usurped all power and established a dictatorship of the Center. In this situation the republic, which was not the master of its own land, its minerals and other natural resources, was unable to fully realize its economic and spiritual potential and fell behind in many areas of its development.

The departure from Leninist principles in national and language policy led to a curtailment of the Kazakh language's functions and a drop in the number of Kazakh schools in the republic. Great harm was done by Stalin's theory of the "merging" of nations and languages, according to which one large nation and one language were to form in the nation in the future. Its proponents worked to get the languages of the small peoples to disappear as rapidly as possible, to close schools with instruction in the national languages.... One book on the national language problem, for example, stated the following: "A considerable portion of the school children

study not in the language of the ethnic group to which they belong. This 'divergence' is a historically essential, progressive step in the development of nationalities and ethnic groups and an essential condition for their continued prospering and voluntary coming together and unification on the path to communism." Naturally, this approach to problems of language policy ruled out any kind of all-around development of nations, even though equality of nations and their languages was officially declared. It is not surprising that language problems have become acute in the present, already complicated national and international relations. After all, the language influences not only the spiritual area but also such important aspects of life as social development, the economy and ecology, which are themselves presently experiencing an acute crisis.

Naturally, the republic's party and soviet organs are doing everything possible to overcome the crisis as rapidly and painlessly as possible. I can boldly say that some things have already been accomplished in this area. Under the Law on Languages passed by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the Kazakh language has been made the republic's state language. Russian has been given the status of the language of international communication and will function freely throughout Kazakhstan, on an equal footing with the state language. And there will be no "language chauvinism" or dictation by the authorities. All the provisions in our Law on Languages are based on the principles of the party's contemporary national policy, which is designed to protect the interests of every people. This is demonstrated also by the fact that the languages of ethnic groups residing in concentrations in the republic have been given the status of local official languages and will function in the areas of their distribution alongside the state and Russian languages.

There is obviously no need to deal with the figures and other indices here, since they have been published repeatedly in our press and discussed in official reports at plenums of the Kazakh Communist Party CC and sessions of the republic's Supreme Soviet. We will apply our efforts in this area mainly to organizing the teaching of languages in schools, courses and groups in the labor collectives. Suffice it to say that children are taught in Kazakhstan's schools today not just in Kazakh and Russian, but also in Uzbek, Uygur and Tajik. The languages of nine other ethnic groups are taught as native languages. At the present time we have more than a thousand classes and elective courses in German, Korean, Meskhet Turkish, Crimean Tatar, Chechen, Dungan and other languages. A center for the study of the ethnic languages will be set up in Alma-Ata. Several ethnic cultural centers have been established, which, one would expect, will also deal with language problems.

In this article, however, we want to discuss something else: problems of the Kazakh language, the social and moral consequences of the drop in prestige of the language of a nation which comprises the ethnic foundation

of an enormous territory and which gave the republic its name, and ways to make it the republic's real state language.

Since ancient times all peoples have held sacred respect for older people, mercy, commiseration and sympathy for others in trouble, respect for family, loyalty to friendship, devotion to one's native area and so forth. The native language unquestionably plays an inestimable role in the development of such qualities from babyhood. Certain experts propose early bilingualism—that is, teaching the native and Russian languages simultaneously at pre-school facilities. Perhaps there is something to this. At the same time, however, we should not forget that the child acquires the fundamentals of language within the family, prior to kindergarten. Because of this it is desirable for the child first to master his native language. This not only provides him with knowledge but also enables him rapidly to assimilate the human and moral values of his people, which are generally common human values.

We know that the foundation of the moral and esthetic education of the upcoming generation is laid in the family, and we have not given proper attention to enhancing the latter's prestige. The program of education and training in the school is set up the same practically throughout the Union, without considering the specific features of the given republic. Nor does it take into account the national and local conditions under which the student's personality is shaped, and like it or not, we make the youth a consumer of the so-called "mass culture," which is neutral and not responsible. Perhaps this has to be the reason for the significant drop in interest in learning, in the national history and culture in a significant portion of the youth. Today one sees many boys and girls who do not know how to sing in Kazakh, to dance, to express their thoughts in the language of their parents. And the Kazakh has always been distinguished by his eloquence, his ability to speak fluidly, without stumbling or halting in the formulation of his thoughts, enjoying the elegance and refinement of speech of the one he is talking with.

We have only begun thinking about these matters today, in the situation of enormous cultural and ideological expansion, which has broken down the society's ideals and esthetic values, the folk basis for music, dance and the world of finer things as a whole. A draft comprehensive program for the moral and esthetic education of the upcoming generation has been worked out at the initiative of the Kazakh Communist Party CC. It will soon be submitted to the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers for approval. It covers the entire education cycle, from kindergarten to the end of the 11-year school, and its purpose is to provide children in school and out with a knowledge of their ethnic culture, ethics, folk music and dance, creative and applied folk art. In connection with this the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Education is developing new programs and producing new textbooks, visual training aids and technical equipment. The VUZs are beginning the training of teachers in these subjects. I

believe that this also provides a broad field of action for the newly formed Kazakh Tili society and for public amateur groups with a desire to work in the field of culture.

The Kazakh SSR Law on Languages will take effect on 1 July of this year. As that date approaches, various opinions and thoughts are being expressed by the public. Some people say in a state of obvious euphoria: "How good things are! New schools and kindergartens have been opened." (In fact, 83 schools, 290 kindergartens and 656 groups with Kazakh as the language of instruction and indoctrination have been opened this year alone, and there are now 700 Kazakh classes in the mixed schools.) "Stops are announced in Kazakh on buses and trolleys. It is now possible to speak the native language without any feeling of awkwardness." Others say just the opposite, that "very few advances have been made, and even the Kazakh Tili society is incapable of changing anything. We should form a people's front."

I believe that we have no justification either for tossing our caps into the air or for being pessimistic. Nor should we console ourselves with the belief that a people's front could solve all the problems of the Kazakh language. For the sake of objectivity, we can say that following passage of the Kazakh SSR Law on Languages, all passions which had flared up during its discussion died down. The groups and courses set up universally 2 years ago at industrial enterprises, on kolkhozes and sovkhoses, at state and scientific establishments have been consigned to oblivion. There is less and less talk about conducting our business in the Kazakh language. The situation is especially bad at public health facilities, at transport and communication establishments and in the field of public services. The ministries and departments in charge of these branches appear strangely indifferent to this particularly important matter. The oblast, city and rayon soviets of people's deputies and public organizations also remain uninvolved.

Even worse, shameful to say, the issues of conducting affairs in the Kazakh language, providing for bilingualism and a number of others have not yet been considered in the Kazakh SSR ministries of internal affairs and local industry or the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. In the meantime, personnel for conducting business in Kazakh are being trained right now at 16 vocational and technical schools, and 134 girls are learning Kazakh shorthand. The latter will be able to help considerably with the organization of this entire undertaking. However, the heads of ministries and departments are using the excuse of various difficulties (and when did we not have these!) to avoid resolving the problems involved in conducting business in Kazakh, most of them have not provided for correspondence in the language of communication, and advertisements, instructions and recommendations have not been translated into the Kazakh. Except for the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, not a single state establishment has set up a simultaneous translation system.

I believe that the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers will take all of this into account for approving measures to implement the Kazakh SSR Law on Languages and will increase the responsibility of officials for the absolute observance of these extremely important provisions of the law. We are forced to point out these aspects of the matter also because the Kazakh language was declared to be the state language also in the '20s, but the action was not made vital and irreversible. There was more than enough lack of understanding and responsibility and of impunity on the part of officials, however. At that time only a small group of supporters headed by A'hmety Baytursynov and Zhusupbek Aytmautov made an effort to implement the decrees passed by the Kazakh Central Executive Committee giving the Kazakh language state status, translating the main textbooks and certain scientific works into the Kazakh language and enriching it significantly with new terms and concepts. This worthwhile project was not taken any further in the '30s, however, and gradually fell through. No literature other than textbooks and works of literature and poetry was published in Kazakh. Few people concerned themselves with publishing scientific and technical and agricultural literature or books on industry, trade, medicine and other fields in the Kazakh language. The small body of literature published on literary criticism, linguistics and art could not satisfy the linguistic needs of the developing society. Conducting business in the language was out of the question.

Frankly speaking, the scientists bear some responsibility for the fact that the Kazakh language is in such a sad state. We know that there is still very little being published in the Kazakh language in many technical and natural fields, specifically mathematics, biology, physics and chemistry. In this situation how can we blame the boys and girls, particularly those in the rural area, who are familiar with the natural and technical sciences only to the extent that these are covered in their textbooks, for their poor technical knowledge and for the fact that they frequently devote themselves to something they have known since childhood, crop cultivation and animal husbandry? And a careful look will show that this has a negative effect on the people's spiritual potential and the shaping of a national industrial working class, the existence of which determines the visage of any modern nation today.

It is also important to understand that a status is not a goal in and of itself. Giving it state status certainly does not mean that the Kazakh language will now automatically become the language of all official activities or for the conduct of business and correspondence, science and technology, that it will immediately begin functioning in trade, transport, communications and the service field and will have an opportunity to develop abundantly. It is essential to establish the conditions, the linguistic environment, for this. And the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences did the right thing by specially studying problems involved in the development and functioning of the Kazakh language in various areas of life at its recent,

general meeting. I want to stress the fact that the matter of turning Kazakh into a real state language depends not just upon the authorities, but also to a significant degree upon the teachers and scientists, writers and artists and upon the efforts of the broad public. The family, kindergartens and schools have a large role.

We also need to make it possible to acquire a secondary and higher specialized education in the Kazakh language. The Kazakh SSR Ministry of Education has issued an order under which the secondary and higher specialized educational institutions may themselves decide on the language of instruction. Sections and groups for the study of 17 specialties in the Kazakh language were opened last year at republic universities and teachers' institutes. At the Alma-Ata Politechnic, Power Engineering, Medical and Architecture and Construction institutes, the Karaganda Politechnic Institute and the Ust-Kamenogorsk Road Construction Institute not only are entrance exams taken in Kazakh but studies are conducted in Kazakh in groups specially set up for this purpose. And this is not done to the detriment of the students' mastery of the Russian language. It goes without saying that all of this requires a considerable effort on the part of the VUZ staffs of professors and instructors with respect to enhancing the skills of the teachers, perfecting and organizing the translation of textbooks and visual aids and improving the use of technical equipment and scientific literature.

A great deal of attention also needs to be given to the quality with which the Kazakh language and literature are taught at schools with Russian as the language of instruction, at *tekhnikums* and VUZs. We need to see that the Russian-speaking pupil and student master the skills required for verbal communication in Kazakh. It is especially important to train bilingual specialists with a higher education in the medical and legal fields, because those who do not know the language will be unable to work in areas with a predominantly Kazakh population.

"Eloquence is the pinnacle of art," goes a Kazakh folk saying. Since ancient times the people have known the miraculous power of words and attributed a magical quality to them, because they have seen that only words can inspire a person to love or to perform a feat, only they can ignite powerful passions and hatred in people, only words have the power to uplift the spirit and elevate people, only they can wound the soul and crush people. One can understand why the people say: "A word can crush a stone and deprive the mind of reason"! The people have therefore never been indifferent to the fate of the language, and the society has always shown concern for the language and its development. The people should obviously be taught the conversational language, because our task is not one of training all of the students as linguists. Along with other measures, we need to publish orthoepic dictionaries, handbooks and other aids which present the patterns of literary pronunciation in popular form. The "Govori Pravilno" [Speak Correctly] dictionaries are regularly printed in Moscow, for example, and the programs "In the World of Words" and

"Showcase of the Russian Language" are heard on the radio. We should perhaps do this kind of thing, since the standards of pronunciation of the Kazakh language need to be taught not only to the children, but also to the adults.

The rich vocabulary of the Kazakh language truly deserves to be publicized. The time has come to use computers in Kazakh lexicography. This is needed in order to make use of fine examples of poetic words, figurative expressions and word combinations illustrating the richness and great diversity of the Kazakh language, modern terms, scientific and technological concepts for compiling a new explanatory dictionary in the near future, in the next 8-10 years.

It is also important for us to write original textbooks and write up scientific studies in the Kazakh language. We cannot reconcile ourselves to the fact that extremely little scientific and technical literature is published in Kazakh. We see only one way out of the impasse: for the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, together with the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Education and the Kazakh SSR State Committee for the Press (Goskompechat), to set up a scientific coordinating center which would seriously engage in the production and publication of new Kazakh-language textbooks, visual aids, training methods and popular science literature for schools and higher educational institutions, as well as dictionaries and phrase-books. It would also be sensible to begin training specialists in simultaneous translation at academy scientific institutes of linguistics, literature and art.

The enactment of the Law on Languages also calls for critically rethinking and concretizing the work of the terminology commission. In order to improve things the Kazakh SSR apparently needs to specially consider the matter of improving its work.

We can see that the problems of the Kazakh language, which outwardly appear simple and of a purely linguistic nature, are extremely complex. One cannot deal indifferently with the state language. It is important for the oblast, city and rayon party committees, the Kazakh Council of Trade Unions and the Kazakh Komsomol CC to be rigidly demanding when it comes to shortcomings in this matter, because a law or a government decree alone is not enough to truly establish a state language. It is the civic duty of everyone to whom the restructuring and the renewal process are dear to enable it to develop thoroughly and make it the possession of all the people.

The party organizations can do a great deal in this respect. As a check on the implementation of directives issued by the party and the government on languages it would be a very good time to hear reports at sessions of the party committees and meetings of the Communists from those responsible for their practical implementation and to make a critical study of the performance of various groups and courses. It is time to understand that no legislative enactments, even good ones, will produce the desired results if they are not solidly surrounded with

the party's influence and daily organizational work. If we want to avoid all sorts of ethnic conflicts and any manifestations thereof in the work and daily life today, the greater the responsibility we must exhibit in setting to work to resolve all the language problems as rapidly as possible. By resolving them the party organizations will be helping to accomplish one of the key political tasks, that of contributing to the mutual respect of peoples and the enrichment of their cultures.

Kazakh Anti-Nuclear Paper Published

18320031B Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh
9 Mar 90 p 7

[Editorial: "'AMANAT'-IZBIRATEL,' A Newspaper For Us All"]

[Text]The first issue to 'AMANAT'-IZBIRATEL' has reached the hands of readers. This publication is issued by the "Semipalatinsk-Nevada" Society movement well known to us all.

The paper 'AMANAT'-IZBIRATEL,' to be issued twice a month, takes as its fundamental goal the consolidation of all forces struggling for stopping nuclear testing on the planet and for protection of the environment. The paper will be printed in the Russian and Kazakh languages. It is planned also to issue the paper in English in the future and to make it available not only in our country, but abroad, in the countries of Europe, and in other Western countries.

The first issue of the paper contains an appeal by Olzhas Suleymenov, chairman of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement," an interview conducted with A. Sakharov before his death, and other interesting material. The press organ is devoting a great deal of attention to preparing for a world congress of world voters to be held in Alma-Ata this spring.

Political Oppression of PRC Kazakhs Continues

18320031A

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh carries on 23 March 1990 on pages 11-12 and 14 a 3000-word article by Qabdeshe Zhumadilov entitled: "After Many Years, Report on a Journey." In the article Zhumadilov provides his impressions of changes in Xinjiang in the 28 years since his previous visit to the area. Although noting the many favorable changes affecting the area, changes, he notes, still continuing in spite of the unwillingness of foreign capital to invest so widely in China after the Tiananmen disturbances, Zhumadilov also stresses the fact that, in his view, political change has clearly not kept pace with economic change.

Thus, for example, although conditions are much improved in comparison to the difficult days of the Cultural Revolution, oppression of PRC Xinjiang Kazakhs continues above all in the form of a pervading

literary and cultural censorship that is severely damaging, he stresses, the national spirit of an otherwise flourishing Kazakh nationality in the region. As examples of the problem, he notes imprisonment of noted PRC Kazakh writer Qazhghumar Shabanduly, strict limitation of the availability of USSR Kazakh publications and books in the PRC (although, he makes clear, they are far more available than ever before), and outright total censorship or suppression of some key works of USSR Kazakhs in which there is great interest in the PRC.

Zhumadilov also criticizes Chinese family planning efforts as they apply to Kazakhs and Chinese government efforts to break up traditional Kazakh political authority. He calls for truth and freedom for PRC Kazakhs and for USSR Kazakh writers to break the official USSR "silence" on the subject of PRC Turkic minorities and to press for change, for the political reform so urgently needed as economic reforms go forward to the benefit of all.

Language Institute Meets On Orthography Changes

90US0669B

[Editorial Report] Frunze SOVETNIK KYRGYZSTAN in Kirghiz on 14 January 1990 carries on page 4 a 600 word special correspondent's report headlined "Let Our Language Have Support" on a meeting of the Language and Literature Institute of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences at which the topic arose of "reexamining the orthography of the Kirghiz literary language" in light of the question: "Can orthography play a role in both preserving national characteristics for generations to come and strengthening the deep, heartfelt friendship between peoples." It was then decided that "major additions" to Kirghiz orthography be made. They also discussed the state language law and the great efforts needed to implement it. Participants at the meeting, which included teachers, linguists and representatives from the media, urged that a "mother tongue society" be established which would be similar to those "in neighboring republics."

Talas Gorispolkom Demands Bilingual Signs

90US0669a

[Editorial Report] Frunze SOVETNIK KYRGYZSTAN in Kirghiz on 10 January 1990 carries on page 2 a 100 word unsigned article headlined "They Will Be Written In Both Languages" announcing that as the result of a complaint by two SOVETNIK KYRGYZSTAN journalists that "most place names in Talas Oblast are written only in Russian," there has been an official response. K. Bekturganova, first secretary of the Talas City Soviet of Peoples Deputies Ispolkom, stated that with regard to Talas City, "in the future all street names, signs on stores and place names will be written in both languages."

Origins of Dushanbe Informal Group 'Rastokhez' Explored

90US0686A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TAJIKISTANA in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 1

[TadzhikTA report: "Ask and We Answer: What Does the Word 'Rastokhez' Mean?"]

[Text] These days, many residents of Tajikistan are asking this question, and, incidentally, another: Have there previously been organizations with a similar name. This is not a coincidence, and it is linked with the creation in the republic of the "Rastokhez" informal association.

In order to find the answer to this question, we turn for help to the Persian-Russian dictionary prepared in 1970 by the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute. We read: "rastokhez." This word has several interpretations. The first is rebirth, ascension. In the religious sense, it denotes the resurrection from the dead; in the compound work "ruzi rastokhez"—"judgement day." The dictionary gives one more concept, which is rarely used in the sense of disorder, alarm, turmoil (to raise turmoil, to set up disorder).

As far as the second part of the question is concerned, in flipping through more than a dozen pages of books and periodicals, material concerning the "Rastokhez" organization was found. Thus, in 1982-1986, in a number of Afghan provinces bordering on Iran (Herat, Farrakh), and in the city of Kabul, there was noted the activity of an anti-government, pro-Maoist organization by the name of "Rastokhez." Its status was illegal until 1984. Its numbers were small. It consisted of representatives of the intelligentsia and the literate part of the population. In its activity, this organization utilized Islamic slogans, methods of diversion, terror, dissemination of anti-soviet, anti-government leaflets.

Moreover, there has existed in Iran since 1975 a certain party "Rastakhiz—E mellat—E Iran" (party of the national rebirth of Iran). It was created on an order by Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlevi. (A. Khoveyda), at that time leader of the "Iran Novin" party, was appointed general secretary of "Rastakhiz" for a term of 2 years. All other parties and political organizations were prohibited. In late August 1978, the (Sharif-imami) government proclaimed freedom of party activity. The stormy process of the emergence of new and the renewal of legal and semi-legal activity of old parties began in the country. By 29 August of that year, 14 political parties and organizations announced their intention to begin legal activity. By the day of the official dissolution of the Shah's "Rastakhiz" party (2 October 1978), the number of parties in Iran had grown to 90. These data are taken from the brochure "Iran: The Time of Changes," prepared by the Znaniye publishing house in Moscow in 1981, and the book, "The Iranian Revolution, 1978-1989," Nauka publishing house, 1989.

As far as the goals and tasks of the "Rastokhez" association, unregistered in Dushanbe, are concerned, the TadzhikTA correspondent asked Kh. Khamidov, deputy chairman of the board of that organization to comment.

"The main goal of our organization is to lead the republic out of the existing state of crisis that it is in now. To promote that which will increase the level of living of the republic's peoples, so that the law on social justice actually be fulfilled, and the Tajik language and national Tajik culture, as well as the best traditions of the past be reborn. In doing this," he emphasized, "The achievement of these goals will be made only by peaceful means, without violence. Our program notes that every ethnic group (residing in the republic), regardless of numbers, has the right to live, to resolve matters of its social-cultural development.

Turkmen CP CC Discusses Language Issues

90US0686B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by M. Aydogdyev, sector head, interethnic relations, state and legal department, Turkmen CP Central Committee: "In the Language of Mutual Understanding"]

[Text] The prospects for the development of national languages under the conditions of a federated state are being broadly discussed throughout the country in the climate of perestroika, glasnost, and the democratization of Soviet society. Conceptual approaches to language policy are expounded in the CPSU platform and in M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the September Plenum, "On the party's national policy under modern conditions," and in other party documents.

The principle position of the Bolsheviks in the issue of the development of nations and nationalities was defined back in the 1st party program, adopted at the 2nd RSDRP [Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party] Congress in 1903. And the "Declaration of the rights of the peoples of Russia," adopted by the Soviet Government 15 November 1917 proclaimed not only equality in the sovereignty of the country's peoples, but also the free development of all national minorities and their languages. The Soviet state, especially after the creation of the Union of SSRs, has been actively realizing these statutes.

Before the revolution, the Turkmen language served only as the language of everyday communication, of folkloric works, of classical literature, and rare documents. During the Soviet period, it came to be applied in such areas of social life as business correspondence, public education, science, belletristic literature, the press, theater, radio, television, and the cinema. A new alphabet was developed, corresponding to the phonetic demands of the Turkmen language; a scholarly grammar was developed. All types of speech and dialects were studied, and the Turkmen literary language was formulated on

this basis. Dissertations were defended, and fundamental works in the various problems of the Turkmen language were prepared. One of the first scientific research institutes created in the republic was the institute of language and literature, which made a significant contribution to the matter of the establishment and development of Turkmen culture.

Thus, the language which over the course of many centuries had, in the pointed expression of Sheydan, one of the classics of Turkmen poetry, "been decaying under the Koran," experienced a second birth and development after October. Owing to this, today it is capable of relating the most complex concepts of the science and technology revolution, all the subtleties of the humanitarian trends. The Turkmen reader can read in his native language the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, and masterpieces of world literature. A large quantity of academic, scientific, and belletristic literature is published in the Turkmen language. The total press runs of the periodicals published (53 newspapers, 13 magazines) in the Turkmen language exceed 1.2 million copies annually.

Owing to a number of social-historical and other objective causes, Russian has become the language of interethnic communication in our country. First of all, it is the native tongue of the country's most numerous people. Speakers of two closely related languages, Ukrainian and Belorussian, do not experience particular difficulties while studying it. Moreover, before the revolution, a certain portion of the non-Russian population of the entire country had mastered it. Finally, a rich political, scientific and technological, and belletristic literature has been created in this language.

Under the conditions of a union republic in the body of a multi-national federated state, knowledge of the Russian language is becoming a consistent necessity. P.A. Azimov, one of the major specialists in the field of linguistics, writes about this with complete justification: "Without knowing Russian, it is impossible to know that priceless treasure house of wealth developed over the centuries-long history of mankind; it is impossible to become a genuinely educated and cultured person, a highly qualified specialist."

In connection with the use of Russian as the language of interethnic communication among the country's non-Russian population, various types of national language-Russian bilingualism have been formed and are expanding. According to 1979 data, the proportion of individuals having Russian as a second language was 52.3 percent among Kazakhs; 29.6 percent among Tajiks; 29.5 percent among Azerbaijanis; 29.4 percent among Kirghiz, and 25.4 percent among Turkmen. According to approximate data, at the present time, 61.3 million of the representatives of the country's non-Russian nationalities know Russian as a second language.

Without at all deprecating its significance in the life of each resident of our country, it should, however, be noted that recently the question of the development of bilateral national language-Russian and Russian-national language bilingualism has been placed on the agenda seriously. The reason for this is the emergence of the command administrative system's one-sided concepts of the problem-free state of national language relations under the conditions of socialism. As a result of this, the tendency to narrow the sphere of application of the national languages in state, public, and cultural life has become more noticeable, which negatively affects the development of national cultures.

Such a situation has been created in our republic: In rural locations, the population uses primarily the Turkmen language, and in the cities, predominantly Russian. Study of the Turkmen language in educational institutions does not correspond to modern demands. The level of its study by representatives of other nationalities is extremely low. Steps are being taken in the defense of national languages. Laws are being adopted guaranteeing the status of the state language of the people who gave their name to the republic are being adopted. Yet along with the positive factors in these laws, moot aspects are sometimes encountered as well. For example, the tendency to place the language of one nation over another, or to use the state language as a factor in pressuring another national population of the republic is completely unacceptable.

In general, the language situation should not be overdramatized, as certain representatives of the creative intelligentsia attempt to do. It should be kept in mind that any language always develops and functions in close contact with others, and it is mutually enriched on this basis. At various times, right up until recently, in certain countries of the East, movements for the "purification" of native languages of words of foreign origin have emerged under the influence of nationalistic tendencies. They did not, however, yield the desired results, since the objective processes in the life of the language of an entire people developed outside of the will of the "initiators" of these movements. In their works, they made fun of the well-known Iranian writers S. Khedayat, and the Turkish satirist Eziz Nesin, and others.

Recently, the republic Supreme Soviet considered the Turkmen SSR draft Law on language. This was preceded by the commission's great and painstaking work for its preparation. Along with scientists and specialists, the commission comprised representatives of the many nationalities living in the republic. After examination in the committees and commission of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, the deputies approved the draft in its first reading, and it was introduced for public discussion. In addition to other measures aimed at the harmonious management of the language situation in the republic, it also considers the issue of conferring the status of state language upon the Turkmen language.

Along with the Turkmen language, Russian is consolidated as having the legal status of the language of interethnic communication, and all conditions must be created for its execution of this function. The Turkmen SSR must also render a legal guarantee for full support of the study, teaching, and free application of native languages by representatives of certain other nationalities clustered within the territory of the republic.

The establishment of equal rights of bilingualism means that in all spheres of the republic's social life, any language may be utilized in parallel form.

Optimal bilingualism responds to the interests of all the republic's residents. Even now, signs, windows, slogans, texts of announcements, forms, and street names have begun to be written in two languages; meetings and other mass measures are conducted in one or two languages, as desired by the participants.

In this regard, the example of the conduct of the last session of the republic Supreme Soviet was remarkable; each of the deputies spoke in the language convenient for him, and the participants found mutual understanding. It seems that this is that optimal version of harmonization of linguistic communication, which will be improved in the future.

One of the trends of the work of the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Public Education at present is an inventory of the national-cultural demands in the field of education, and their realization. Starting with the 1988-1989 academic year, there began a transition to bilingual instruction (lectures, seminars, and practical classes in the Turkmen and Russian languages) in higher and secondary specialized educational institutions. A review of academic plans and programs is being conducted, and translation into Turkmen of all textbooks on the social science disciplines and other subjects is being done; lectures are being developed in the Turkmen language.

Entrance exams for the republic's academic institutions are organized to take bilingualism into account. The Turkmen language has been introduced into all VUZs, and the academic plans of secondary specialized educational institutions, the course, the "language and literature of the republic"; in the TGPI [Turkmen State Pedagogical Institute], Turkmen popular works, Turkmen music; in APIRYaL [Ashkhabad Pedagogical Institute of Russian Language and Literature], the history of the culture and literature of Turkmenistan, and a number of other academic disciplines associated with the particulars of the republic and the profile of the VUZ. New programs in the Turkmen language are being created for the secondary specialized educational institutions, the professional-technical institutions, and schools with instruction in Russian; a contest has been announced for the creation of new, more modern textbooks. Work has begun in creating "Turkmen Self-Taught" for all those wishing to study the language independently.

A program and methodological recommendations for the instruction of the Turkmen language in children's preschool institutions have been developed. Starting this academic year, instruction will be done in the Turkmen language in 35 groups of the kindergartens of the city of Ashkhabad, and on an experimental basis, its teaching from the first grade is being introduced in schools numbers 39 and 47, and in preschool facilities numbers 18 and 22 in Ashkhabad.

During the course of the restructuring of the general education schools, the number of Turkmen language lessons in schools where Russian is the language of instruction will increase, analogous to the procedure for studying Russian in Turkmen schools. Such academic plans have already been confirmed. Orders for textbooks in the Uzbek and Kazakh languages have been increased, and it is planned that the range of languages be expanded annually, as will the number of participants in 10-day linguistic knowledge (Turkmen, Russian, Kazakh, Uzbek, Baluchi, Kurdish, and other languages) olympiads on the oblast, zonal, and republic levels.

Instruction is held in four languages (Russian, Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh) in a number of general education schools. Starting in 1989, in certain Iolotanskiy Rayon schools, the Baluchi language has been introduced into the program of the primary grades on an experimental basis; an experimental textbook has been compiled, and optional instruction in the senior grades is being planned for the future. Work on the creation of a Kurdish primer is under way.

Certain work has also been conducted in the plan for the further improvement of the study of Russian: New textbooks and programs for optional courses and circles have been prepared.

The intensified attention to language factors in the republic also requires the training of the appropriate pedagogical personnel. The expansion of teacher training in new linguistic specialties at the APIRYaL under its transformation into a pedagogical institute of language and literature is planned. New specialties will be introduced here for training teachers in the Turkmen, Russian, Persian, Arabic, and Baluchi languages. Turkmen language teacher training for schools with Russian as the language of instruction has begun at TGU [Turkmen State University] imeni A.M. Gorkiy, and TGPI imeni V.I. Lenin in the city of Chirchikou.

All the measures enumerated are only the beginning of major work in the area of harmonizing linguistic communication in the republic. It will acquire a more planned and systematic nature when the Law on language comes into effect.

Here I would like to pause on two other issues. In connection with the rebirth of the practice of teaching in the Turkmen language in the higher educational institutions, the fear arises for many of the probable reduction of the overall level of culture and education of such graduates. Indeed, without a knowledge of the Russian

language, the chance to be up to date on the achievements in world science and practices in one's chosen field are limited, and consequently, one cannot be a comprehensive specialist. It therefore seems advisable to organize in such groups an intensive and systematic study of Russian over the entire period of instruction, with examinations at the end of study. Study of the Turkmen language by students of the Russian language group is also envisaged. The student himself chooses the language of instruction on a purely voluntary basis.

In light of the discussion of the language question in the press, a proposal has recently been aired on a transition of the Turkmen alphabet from Cyrillic to Arabic, since, as they say, prior to the revolution, over the course of centuries, the Turkmen used this script and a multitude of works of the people's cultural heritage was created in it.

It seems that these arguments cannot be taken seriously. In the first place, Arabic characters are not the ancient Turkmen characters. The Turkmen people used them after the Arabs' violent conquest of our territory. Moreover, it does not respond to the phonetic norms of the Turkmen language because of the lack of complete correspondence of the phonetic structures of the Arabic and Turkmen languages. Yet at the same time, we cannot deny the need to study the numerous manuscripts in Eastern languages preserved in the TuSSR Academy of Sciences manuscripts archive. This invaluable legacy, which has come down to us over the centuries, still awaits its researchers. Until the present time, their preservation and study have left much to be desired, although certain strides have been made in this direction. In particular, after a prolonged interruption, the Persian language department has re-opened at Turkmen State University. Courses have been set up and are in operation for those who wish to study Persian and Arabic, and the Old Turkmen written language. The introduction of Eastern languages as foreign languages into school programs is planned for the future.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the linguistic policy and legal status of all languages is determined in the final analysis by the nature and structure of our multinational country. Only within the body of a socialist federated state is it possible to realize the Leninist principles of genuine people power and democracy. And we must concern ourselves with the free development of all languages. In doing so, the main language must be that of intelligence, wisdom, and mutual understanding.

Uzbek Commission Report on Results of 15 Apr Election

90US0901A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 21 Apr 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "In the Central Election Commission"]

[Text] The Central Election Commission held its regular meeting on the elections of people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR. It was chaired by N.V. Yefimov, deputy commission chairman.

The Central Election Commission reviewed the results of repeat elections of people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR held on 15 April 1990. They were held in 37 electoral districts in complete conformity with articles 48 and 53 of the Law on Elections. People's deputies were elected in 14 districts.

In accordance with Article 52 of the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of the Uzbek SSR, repeat elections will be held in 23 districts, in each of which more than two candidates ran for office but none of them was elected.

After reviewing the record of the proceedings from the district electoral commissions, the Central Election Commission registered all the elected people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR for 14 electoral districts in accordance with Article 49 of the Law on elections (the list is being made public).

The Central Election Commission reviewed letters and statements received from citizens during the interval between meetings, and other matters.

Researcher Analyzes Composition of First Uzbek Parliament

90US0901B Tashkent KOMSOMOLET
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 5 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by Alisher Ikhamov, candidate of philosophy and senior scientific associate with the Laboratory of Sociological Studies at Tashkent State University: "Veritas! Veritas? Veritas... Uzbekistan's First Parliament: A Social Portrait"]

[Text] So now we have a republic parliament set up and functioning. Perhaps it would be of interest to the electors to try to see what the future holds. After all, the hopes of many are linked to this new step toward a law-governed state. Naturally, the hopes of some are justified, while others are not. This will depend upon which social groups' interests the parliament and its various factions champion.

Ideally, of course, we would achieve full social consensus, particularly now, when there is a polarization of forces in the political arena, which threatens to disrupt civic life. The working out of differences and, sometimes, opposing social interests is the main indication of political professionalism. For this kind of professionalism, however, we must first have basic proficiency in such areas as jurisprudence, economics and sociology.

The first All-Union parliament has shown that real professionalism is achieved most readily by deputies from among the legal experts (A. Lukyanov, S. Stankevich, V. Lubchenko, A. Sobchak...), economists (P. Bunich, G. Popov, G. Filshin...), sociologists and political scientists (F. Burlatskiy, M. Lauristin, I. Gryazin...). It is apparent from the list of names that far from everyone manages to become a real professional.

The most successful ones come out of the scientific intelligentsia, and this is not intended to offend deputies from among the workers.

The latter are frequently capable of making brilliant emotional speeches. But do we have a dearth of emotionalism in the parliament? Obviously, it is not a matter of this but of the level of competence and logical consistency in the resolution of matters of state importance, which requires not so much an emotional outpouring as judiciousness and dispassionate reasoning (and most important, inner freedom from hardened stereotypes of the mass awareness, which, as we know, have become deeply rooted in our socially squalid reality). There are, of course, analytical minds among the deputies from among the workers. N. Travkin, for example.

One can be as irritated as one wants at the fact that the same faces keep appearing on the speaker's platform in the parliament. But they obviously have something to present, something to say. There is a reason why people listen to the speeches of precisely these parliamentarians with the greatest interest and why they evoke the greatest public response. The only regret is that there are no worthy alternatives to these political figures in the deputy corps (the speeches of some evoke only yawns or indulgent smiles). And we must admit that the irritation at those whose faces are so familiar ordinarily comes from those who prefer "drowning-out" or "foot-stomping" for speakers not to their liking to all other forms of self-expression.

The differences in the deputy corps probably have to do primarily with their political sophistication, which, in turn, has to do with their social and professional affiliation. This accounts for the extraordinary interest in having the proper composition of newly elected deputies of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet. Since the 1st Congress of People's Deputies our laboratory has followed the processes occurring in the parliament. The reader will recall that last year we provided an analysis of the composition of the congress and of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We shall not alter our traditions now.

Following are a number of data describing the ratio of representatives of various social groups in the parliament and thoughts about the trends they reveal.

First let us take a look at the national composition of the republic's highest legislative body. It is important because this body will have to keep an eye on international relations as one of the main problems. If we lump certain groups according to language, for example (without contrasting them in any way, of course), people of Uzbek nationality make up 91.2 per cent of the republic's Supreme Soviet. And this is in general normal when one takes into account the interests of the native population. One cannot groundlessly assert that this ratio in

the parliament will with certainty lead to infringements of the interests of the Russian-speaking population.

At the same time, in the interest of national consensus and in order for people of nonnative ethnic groups to have full confidence in their future (considering the realities, a good future for the republic is inconceivable without their participation) it would be desirable to increase their representation in our parliament. The formation of the existing ratio was obviously affected by the weak political activeness of the Russian-speaking population, who understand that without a knowledge of the state language their deputies could find themselves in isolation and therefore ineffective.

There is also the urgent matter of the representation in the legislative body of the party and state apparatus. The data gathered show that the party apparatus, for example, is even more fully represented in it than in the Union parliament (19.6 per cent; 20.04 per cent when we add those relieved of their positions as secretaries of primary organizations). At the same time it does not include a single representative of economic science (not from among the leading workers). But take a look at the following data.

Ratio of representatives of certain social-professional groups in the UzSSR Supreme Soviet: upper- and mid-level party, soviet and other administrative workers, 59 per cent, and lower-level administrative workers, 12.6 per cent (total, 71.6 per cent; workers performing mental work (not including leading workers), 7.3 per cent; scientific and creative intelligentsia (including leaders of scientific and cultural organizations and their subdivisions), 13.6 per cent; total blue-collar and kolkhoz workers, 20.5 per cent; total workers outside of the administrative structures, 28.3 per cent.

The data show that leading workers from all levels predominate in the parliament. This apportionment, although far from adequately reflecting the national and professional structure of the society, still reflects the distribution of forces which has developed in the political arena. It must be admitted that groups integrated into the party-state structures demonstrate the greatest activeness and have correspondingly greater influence. Therefore, considering the fact that the party and soviet workers have a certain discipline, we can conclude that the parliament will unfailingly pursue a specific line. And this, in our opinion, fully conforms to the traditions and way of life which have developed under the historical social conditions which have developed here.

We need to understand that we simply cannot have Western-style democracy for two reasons. The first is that democracy, not just as power of the people but also as a system of political pluralism, is only admissible in a situation of economic pluralism—in other words, when there is entrepreneurial freedom and a complete market mechanism. Otherwise, political freedoms can result in arbitrary mob rule, the exacerbation of international relations and coercion.

This in no way means that we do not need political freedoms. We suffocate without them. Individual rights have real meaning, however, only in an environment of the essential and adequate material well-being. The latter can be achieved if we convert to a market economy. The market does more than just feed the people, however, thereby alleviating social tensions. It is also a great teacher, since it produces the independent thinking and personal responsibility without which political sophistication—and therefore democracy—is impossible.

In the existing situation only a powerful authoritative force, controlled to some degree by a parliament (remember that many European nations arrived at today's democracy by a long route, through a stage of constitutional monarchy), can effect an escape from the chains of the bureaucratic administrative system to a market economy. Whether the "first person" has the will for this is another matter.

The second reason involves the specific characteristics of Eastern political culture, which, it seems to us, is based on greater respect for and faith in the authorities than in the West. There is no servility in this respect. It is another matter that our faith in the authorities has always been combined with expectations of wise and enlightened government based on intellect and not on an exclusively bureaucratic apparatus.

Wise government today is the art and the ability to coordinate (not to suppress or avoid decision-making) diverse social interests (national, class and others), while at the same time looking ahead and being guided by the right concept. This kind of government is impossible without relying on the intelligentsia, without assigning it appropriate importance in the society. In this respect greater representation for it in the legislative bodies could only be beneficial.

Despite all the difficulties of the transitional period, the formation of the first Uzbek parliament is unquestionably a step toward independence for the republic, and one would like to believe, toward a real renaissance.

From the editors: For two reasons, this article could not be published earlier. In the first place, repeat elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet were held in 36 districts in March. The results of these elections were needed for a complete picture. We therefore did not rush to publish this review before the results of the repeat elections were in.

In the second place, workers on the editorial board and in the laboratory were waiting for a response from the Central Election Commission to questions raised in the column "Where the Streetcar Is Headed Is a Big Secret" (*Komsomolets Uzbekistana*, 28 February 1990).

This information was also of interest from the standpoint of the parliament's composition. The deadline of 1 month set for receiving a reply has passed, however, and we have not received it. What could we do? We are publishing the article without the information on which we had counted.

To the analysis undertaken by Alisher Ilkhamov we would like to add the fact that, in our view, these elections were not favorable for Uzbekistan's Komsomol. Many candidates nominated by the youth for the Supreme Soviet were not given deputy mandates. Why?

The first factor was a lack of experience in political battle on the part of the Komsomol members. The second was a difference in "weight factors" between the youth's and the "adults'" candidates. A third was open pressure on the youth's candidates from the apparatus. The result was a low percentage of the youth's candidates elected to the republic's agencies of soviet power.

We can only hope that the results of the 1990 elections will have left their mark on the republic's Komsomol and will serve as a lesson for the future.

New Party Discusses Uzbekistan Sovereignty

905P0034A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 2 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] A constituent congress of a new party, created by right wing activists of the people's movement "Birlik" is taking place on June 2-3. According to a report of the agency "Post Faktum", at the meeting the draft of the program and rules which will specify the request for political and economic sovereignty of Uzbekistan will be discussed.

Historian Rejects Comparison of 1917 Events, Current Situation

90US0780A Moscow POISK in Russian
No 10, 8-14 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Doctor of historical sciences Vitaliy Startsev: "1917—February Alternatives"]

[Text] The regular anniversary of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia has caused more than a few comparisons of those events long ago with the current political situation. How justified are such analogies? Doctor of historical sciences Vitaliy Startsev reflects upon this.

I will say straight away that I would refute any attempts to compare today's perestroika with the February revolution of 1917. To see any sort of analogy here is to fail to understand the essence of the events of 70 years ago. Incidentally, there is an analogy. But only outside of our country. Recent events in Romania are strikingly reminiscent of 1917.

The spontaneous explosion of the dissatisfaction of the masses, the transient nature of the events, the violent skirmishes in one or two cities, the attempt to use the army against its people, and the troops' resulting cross over to the side of the people in Bucharest (and in Transylvania's small capital, Timisoara). The revolution in Romania repeated the entire external sketch of the February 1917 revolution. Yet it would already be a contrived undertaking to try to detect features of internal similarities of the situation in Romania with that in tsarist Russia preceding these spontaneous explosions. Although, of course, there is a similarity in some of the substance. Ceausescu rejected the perestroika begun here. Even when events in Czechoslovakia and the GDR began to lay bare their threatening and in many ways spontaneous nature, the Romanian dictator refused to make concessions; he held his demonstrative congress. At it, they shouted, "Ceausescu—communism!", and a month later the communist party was declared outlawed.

The Russian tsar Nicholas II also rejected any compromises, and at first fell into imprisonment, and later, just as Ceausescu, came under fire. But let us leave Romania for the time being and look more intently upon Russia around the fourth week of February 1917.

It is there the key lies for resolving the issue that resounds all the more frequently today: Was the October revolution inevitable? Yes, at a certain stage, October became inevitable. And specifically because February had come before it. And yet was the February revolution unavoidable?

We remind you that Russia had then already begun to transform itself into a bourgeois monarchy after three dramatic years of the first Russian revolution. Legislative institutions had been created: the State Duma, and the State Council. Incidentally, our publicists have not yet gotten down to the fact that the statute on the

elections of USSR people's deputies was copied almost verbatim from a number of analogous documents from late 1905-early 1906, including the famous "party hundreds," only then it was called the 100 members of the State Council, directly appointed by the sovereign emperor. Legislative rights were transferred to the new organs, but not control over the government. The appointment of ministers remained the emperor's prerogative. The 17 October 1905 manifesto laid the basis for civil freedoms, however, the parties permitted proved to be deprived of access to government power. Only the "17 October League" (the Octobrist party) underwent registration with the mandatory sworn oath not to change the existing structure. Even the bourgeois cadet party was, from the point of view of the law, illegal, not to mention the parties of the revolutionaries!

The rights granted the workers were very meager; the peasants remained de facto a class without rights; they were crushed by the lack of land included in the 1861 reform on purpose. It is a widespread delusion that the February revolution began because of hunger. The first demonstrators shouted, "Bread!". Indeed, as the result of the mid-February snow drifts, flour had not been delivered to the capital for about a week, but the tsarist government had already solved this problem by 21 February. No, it was not a matter of hunger. It was above all a matter of the lack of freedom. It cannot be said that the monarchy was doomed. It probably could exist in our country even today, and be democratic and humane. After all, after World War II, monarchs returned to Belgium, Spain, and Greece. It was not a matter of a monarch as such, but of the internal regime.

The tsar missed the moment at which he could have reached a compromise with society, with the people's elected representatives in the first State Duma. It was necessary to share power with representatives of the public, of the newly created parties. But since olden days, Russian rulers had been accustomed to not loosening their iron grip. At any rate, not until someone had them by the throat. Had there not been the general strike in October 1905, nor the 17 October manifesto on rights, if the Duma had not received legislative rights, and the people, universal suffrage!

By the summer of 1906, the wave of the first revolution had already subsided somewhat. The leadership thought, perhaps this will pass? Perhaps no more may be conceded? And they made no concessions, and even took some of them back; they changed the frequency of the election law. They dealt a blow to the annoying intellectuals and revolutionaries, reducing their representation in the third State Duma of June 1907 by half. And the blessed time of the "stagnation" had arrived. The peace and quiet lasted for a full 8 years.

A new social movement began only in the summer of 1915, under the conditions of the war that had already been going on for a year. For the first time since the first Duma, they managed in the State Duma to create a single political bloc uniting over half the deputies. The

voice of the people resounded once more from the tribune of the Duma, for the first time since 1906. And this voice demanded: "Sovereign! Change the government, call in those who enjoy the trust of the people."

But the tsar again refused. He dissolved the Duma for vacation, and brushed aside the demands of its progressive bloc. That was when they also conspired over the possibility of forcibly removing the emperor from the throne. A year had passed since the beginning of the war. Yet no end was in sight.

"Competent organs" placed report after report upon the tsar's desk: Tension in society is growing, everything is starting to look like 1905. And again, Nicholas II brushed it aside, postponed, deferred... And in the meantime, Octoberist A. Guchkov, chairman of the central military-industrial committee [TsVPK] (there was such an "informal organization," which had been created by the vile Russian bourgeoisie in order to help the homeland win the war), N. Nekrasov, a left cadet and deputy chairman of the 4th State Duma, and M. Tereshchenko, a millionaire without party affiliation, Guchkov's deputy in the TsVPK, put together a plan for a military coup. The goal was to force Nicholas II to renounce the throne, to turn over the crown to his 11-year-old heir Aleksey Nikolayevich, and to appoint as regent until the former reached his majority the tsar's younger brother, grand duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich, who would swear to be faithful to a constitution.

To the joy of certain of our contemporaries, we add that all three were pure Russian-blooded, and the Ukrainian belonged to the Masonic order, "the Great Orient of the Peoples of Russia," whose task was the unification of all the country's opposition and revolutionary forces for a joint struggle against autocracy.

In addition, there was another Masonic cell functioning in Tiflis [Tbilisi] headed by local city leader A. Khatsov, who attempted to involve in the conspiracy against the tsar and tsaritsa the emperor's uncle, grand duke Nikolay Nikolayevich, and the cell succeeded in doing so! But the conspirators delayed. If either Guchkov or Khatsov had been quicker, the change in the regime might have been bloodless, and the same tricolor flag would have fluttered over a renewed Russia as before, and the two-headed eagle would still be crowning the Kremlin towers. But they were left behind.

Another conspiracy, at the head of which stood a representative of the aristocracy, prince F. Yusupov-Sumarokav-Elston, was crowned with success. With the assistance of one of the leaders of the black hundreds (which had "pinkened" during these critical days), V. Purishkevich, and young grand duke Dmitriy Pavlovich, they lured G. Rasputin to the Yusupov palace on the Moyka canal... Rasputin's murder forced the tsar to return home, to Tsarskoye Selo.

Only on 22 February did he leave for General Headquarters for the first time since late December. And the events of the February revolution already began on the

23rd. Yet how many events were encompassed in these 2 months, how many missed opportunities to avoid revolution! On 7 January, the tsar received M. Rodzyanko, chairman of the 4th Duma. The Duma itself was dissolved on 14 February. Rodzyanko's wife wrote in a letter to a friend: "Misha was in Tsarskoye Selo today. He laid out the entire picture of the ruin of the government, the criminal appointment of unworthy individuals, the hourly insult of the entire people from top to bottom, the complete arbitrariness and impunity of the dark forces that continue to influence Russia's fate through the empress... The agitation grows every day, and unless early measures are taken, unavoidable danger threatens the state."

Rodzyanko then implored the tsar not to force the people to choose between the sovereign and the good of the homeland.

But representatives of rightist forces persuaded the tsar not to give power to leaders of the political parties, or the State Duma, and appealed for an intensification of the repression, for the closing of the Duma and an end to the war. The rightist press trampled down the military-industrial committee as a nest of an anti-government conspiracy.

The tsar's last meeting with M. Rodzyanko took place on 10 February. The Duma chairman was frank: A revolution would start within less than 2 weeks. That is how it turned out.

True, on 21 February, the tsar suddenly dumbfounded the chairman of the Council of Ministers with the words that on the next day, he intended to announce the institution of a "responsible ministry," but instead reported on the morning of the 22nd that he was leaving that day for General Headquarters. And he left. Thus was lost one of the chief alternatives to revolution: a voluntary concession of executive power by Nicholas II himself, the formation of a constitutional government from the representatives of the political parties holding the majority in the State Duma.

The strikes on the capital's Vyborg side began on 23 February. They laid the foundation for the process, which already led to an armed revolt by the 4th day. The attempts made by the authorities on February 23-25 to quell the disturbance in Petrograd without resorting to arms were unsuccessful. The Petrograd strike in fact became a general strike. And on Sunday, 26 February, at the order of supreme commander Nicholas II, the troops fired upon the people. One more bloody Sunday was written into the country's history. On the following day, a portion of the garrison—and there were up to 300,000 in the capital and its environs—went over to the side of the people. The revolution had won.

The chief lesson of February 1917 is this: A refusal to make the concessions dictated by a country's political development, and a lack of dialogue with political forces moving toward the replacement of an existing regime

unavoidably lead to a popular explosion in which an old, seemingly stable system will perish.

'Anarchist' Bakunin's Criticism of Marxist Theory Reexamined

90US0708B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 12, 24-30 Mar 90 pp 5-6

[Article by A. Isayev: "Blank Spots of History: M. Bakunin's 'Communist Anti-Utopia'"]

[Text] In recent years, the names of many historical figures have reemerged from oblivion, including that of M.A. Bakunin (1814-1876), one of the chief opponents of K. Marx.

On the level of ordinary consciousness, our concepts of Bakunin are primarily associated with anarchism, which many, in turn, associate with chaos.

In the meantime, the anarchists set as their main goal man's liberation from violence of any power, political, economic, or spiritual.

And M. Bakunin's socialist concept differed substantially from that of Marx. Moreover, starting in 1868, the ideology of the "state socialism of Mr. Marx" becomes Bakunin's main object of criticism, even though he himself does not deny the possibility of building socialism. What was it that prompted Bakunin to reject the idea of the socialist state?

Forecasts and Reality

Above all, Bakunin viewed freedom as a goal, and a means of progress simultaneously. According to Bakunin, freedom could not be reached in the future by infringing upon it today. And thus the state (the apparatus of violence), and even more so, the dictatorship of the proletariat, standing for it, cannot be the means for achieving freedom. That is why Bakunin particularly regarded Marx's idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat negatively.

But after all, according to Marx, the dictatorship of the proletariat had to be of a temporary, transitional nature, and finally wither away. Bakunin regarded this idea with skepticism:

"The Marxists offer comfort with the thought that this dictatorship will be temporary, brief," he writes in "Statehood and Anarchy," yet "No dictatorship can have any goal other than to perpetuate itself," since any functioning apparatus aspires to self-preservation rather than self-destruction. Moreover, "The dictatorship is capable of generating only slavery among the people," and the habit of subordinating on orders from the central authorities, which will hardly be conducive to the withering away of the state, either.

Bakunin considered the very term dictatorship of the proletariat suspicious: "If the entire proletariat is to be the ruling class, then whom is it going to rule?" In his

opinion, the peasantry, which did not enjoy the "good will of the Marxists," must be in the role of the class-jumper [izгой] of the proletarian dictatorship. The theoretician of anarchism considered the workers' aspiration to impose their political ideal upon the peasants who did not desire it to be "impudent, unjust, and destructive."

The Marxists asserted that the proletariat must rule the peasantry by virtue of its greater organization and better education. Bakunin responded that "By this principle, any conquest can be legitimized, any oppression sanctified," particularly, the rule of bourgeoisie over the working class. After all, the bourgeoisie is more civilized and organized than the working class.

Anticipating the possible actions of the socialist-statists, Bakunin wrote: "They would try to bind the peasants with communism; they would raise and arm the entire peasant masses, and in order to crush the peasant uprising, they would be forced to resort to colossal armed force, well disciplined and well organized. They would give the army reaction and would generate military reactionaries, ambitious generals within their own milieu. With the assistance of this solid state machine, they would soon achieve a state driver, a dictator, an emperor." Incidentally, as the experience of war communism showed, this was exactly how certain Russian Marxists viewed the dictatorship of the proletariat, as violence not only against the bourgeoisie, but the petty bourgeois peasantry as well.

And here is how Bakunin described scenes from the future collectivization in "Anarchy According to Proudhon": the communist state puts itself in the place of the free agricultural associations and will concern itself with the centrally administered labor of the farmers. This state will "order its bureaucracy to manage the cultivation of the land and to pay a salary to the peasants, which will lead to the most terrible disorder, to lamentable plunder, and the most oppressive despotism."

Finally, Bakunin considered the most substantive argument against the dictatorship of the proletariat to be its impracticability. He wrote that the entire working class cannot simultaneously be a dictator. "It is obviously impossible for a few hundred, or even a few tens of thousands of people to really implement this authority. By necessity, they will be forced to implement it through their proxies, that is, they will be forced to trust another group of people selected by them as representatives and rulers." Consequently, that which is called the "dictatorship of the proletariat" will actually be the power of a "small group of the privileged elected ones, or even unelected ones." "But this minority, say the Marxists, will comprise workers. Yes, perhaps former workers, but as soon as they are made representatives or rulers of the people, they cease to be workers and come to look upon the entire hard working world from the height of statehood; they will no longer represent the people, but themselves and their pretensions to the "rule of the people."

The "Authoritarian Communism" Society

According to Bakunin, all this must inevitably lead to the regeneration of the proletarian state. Such a rebirth must take place rapidly, since the Marxists understand the socialist revolution to be the concentration of the means of production in the hands of the state, and this will inevitably require centralization and the concentration of power. Bakunin writes about this in the scientifically ironic tone typical of him: "This revolution will consist of the expropriation...of the existing property holders and capitalists and the appropriation of all capital and land by the state, which, in order to manage its great economic mission, must necessarily be powerful and concentrated to a high degree."

Thus, on the basis of his analysis, Bakunin came to the conclusion that attempts to realize in practice the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat will inevitably lead to the rebirth of social inequality and exploitation. Bakunin called the social system that could emerge as the result of such an experiment "authoritarian communism" or "state communism."

In the work "Statehood and Anarchy," Bakunin describes in detail the picture of the regeneration of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the class society: "According to Marx, the the people must not only not destroy it [the government], but on the contrary, must strengthen and fortify it and in this form transfer its benefactor and teachers—the chiefs of the Communist Party—to its complete disposal—in a word, to Mr. Marx and his friends, who will begin to liberate the people in their own way. They will concentrate the reins of government in a strong hand, because the ignorant people require extremely strong guardianship; they will create a single state bank, having concentrated all trade, industrial, agricultural, and even scientific production, and the masses of the people will be divided into two armies: the industrial and the agricultural, under the direct command of state bureaucrats, who will comprise the new privileged class."

Bakunin viewed the property of the socialist state to the means of production as the economic foundation of the rule of the class of the "red bureaucracy." We read in "Anarchy According to Proudhon," "Authoritarian communism, the chief representative of which is the school of K. Marx, thus monopolizes property not for the use of the bourgeoisie, but for the use of a fiction, an abstraction, of a state, an imagined being, yet for the people, this fiction is embodied in the all too concrete representatives, the state people, the bureaucrats, who will allocate social capital by arbitrary will. The workers of the association, not having direct use of this capital, will be forced to ask the government's permission to use it through the intermediaries of the bureaucrats, so that the latter are made the managers of the social condition."

The only method of ruling such a society, according to Bakunin, could be centralism, only the super-concentration of the economic, political, and ideological dictatorship, the "unification of socialism and absolutism." As the great anarchist predicted, this in turn would lead to the moral and intellectual degradation of the citizens of the socialist state. We read in Bakunin: "Such a society would be a society not of people, but of cattle. This would be the second edition of the unfortunate Paraguayan Republic, which allowed the Jesuit order to rule it for a long period. Such a society would not fail to soon descend to the very lowest level of idiocy."

Bakunin was convinced that the "state socialist" ideology is artificially introduced to the people by a certain social stratum, the portion of the bourgeois intelligentsia prepared to play the role of the "red bureaucracy" in the future. "The very best among them, obedient to the iron law according to which the position is always stronger than the person serve the cause of reaction with words of the people's benefit on their tongues, usually not understanding this themselves, of course." Yet, as the great rebel assumed there were among the deluded, there were also completely conscious candidates for "Corsicans." "They are only enemies to the real authorities," Bakunin wrote of them. "Because they want to take their place," "to control the popular movement and direct it for their personal use."

Bakunin's Socialist Model

Bakunin also criticized Marx because the latter considered his theory singularly scientific and proposed remaking society in accordance to the plan he had worked out.

Marx asserts that thought precedes life, and theory, practice, wrote Bakunin. This is a false thesis. Yet since Marx proceeds from it, he unavoidably comes to the conclusion that "since thought, theory, and science constitute the property of very few, these few must be the leaders of public life..."

Nor can Bakunin's political feel and understanding of social psychology be denied here. The experience of the 20th century has given us more than a few examples of how the supporters of revolutionary power started with discussion of the nation-wide nature of their dictatorship, to later come to the conclusion that power is really contained in the hands of the "thinnest stratum" that understands the entire profundity of the great doctrine.

Thus, according to Bakunin, the socialism of Marx was constructed upon false philosophical foundations—belief in the transformation of society according to a pre-conceived plan and the belief that this society would become the only "plan organized" and centralized mechanism. This conclusion forced Bakunin to reject scientific socialism and to seek paths for constructing society on other principles.

What does Bakunin offer in place of the destroyed mechanism of state administration? First and foremost,

he is not rejecting administration as such, but central administration, concentrated in certain hands, running "from the top on down." In its place, he proposes a federated free organization "from the bottom up"—workers' associations, groups, communities, volosts, oblasts, and peoples.

According to Bakunin, a free society is one in which the principle of the people's self-management has been realized.

It would be basically incorrect to view Bakunin's criticism of state socialism as merely a close caricature of Stalin that appeared a good deal earlier than Stalinism itself. Bakunin predicted the shortcomings of the socialist state not as a writer, but as a scholar-sociologist analyzing phenomena such as state property, the bureaucracy, etc.

Marx's "state socialism" as criticized by Bakunin helps us understand the essence of socialism and those bureaucratic distortions to which it has been subjected.

'Cult of Lenin', Democracy Called 'Incompatible'

90UN1666A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by O. Velikanova: "When We Say—Lenin, Do We Mean—the Party?"]

[Text] I shall start with two characteristic episodes which, in my view, depict very clearly Lenin's attitude toward the sensationalism surrounding his name.

In April 1920 Lenin categorically rejected the planned celebration in honor of his 50th birthday. Occupied with business matters, he arrived late at an evening gathering of communists at the Moscow party committee, which was still in session; he thanked them that they had "relieved him of having to listen to congratulatory speeches," and used the occasion for a speech on current party tasks.

A second episode is connected with the activity of Istpart (as the Special Commission for Study of the History of the Great October Revolution and the Party was then called). On 20 October 1920 the Istpart Collegium adopted an appeal to party members, calling upon them to gather and preserve everything "in which the personality of Comrade Lenin is manifested in the party, in the life of the state, and in his relationships in our midst. Therefore the Commission has resolved to set about gathering materials now, and to organize a Lenin Museum."

Vladimir Ilich was categorically opposed to the idea of organizing such a museum. Istpart Chairman M.S. Olminskiy recalls that when he told Vladimir Ilich about establishing the museum, Lenin became highly agitated and started to say that this was highly "improper" and must be stopped. He was literally steaming; he did not want to hear of any kind of museum in his name; and he

told Olminskiy with chagrin, "You cannot imagine how unpleasant this constant promotion of my personality is for me."

In short, during his life as head of the Soviet state, he himself opposed in every way any attempts to extol his own personality. Judging from several of Lenin's statements, he clearly understood the danger of the rise of a leadership cult in a peasant country like Russia, with its centuries of monarchical traditions and mass religious consciousness.

Then just when did this process start? At least during Lenin's illness, which took him away from active political life. And that is when the living leader was immortalized.

In 1923, an historical-revolutionary museum was opened in Simbirsk, in the house in which Volodya Ulyanov spent his childhood. Part of the museum was the Lenin Department. In Moscow in August 1923, at the All-Union Agricultural Exhibit, a "Lenin Corner" was opened in which the actual materials collected by Istpart were displayed. As early as December 1922 the settlement of Sablino in Leningrad Oblast, where Lenin stayed with his sisters A.I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova and M.I. Ulyanova in 1905-1906, was renamed Ulyanovka (His address in the 1920's was: the settlement of Ulyanovka, Ulyanovskaya Volost, Trotskiy Uyezd, Petrograd Guberniya). In November 1923, a memorial plaque was fixed to the house on Shirokaya Ulitsa in Petrograd where Lenin lived during the spring and summer of 1917, and the street was renamed Lenin St.

But in 1923 all these were single instances. The grandiose campaign to perpetuate the memory of V.I. Lenin began after his death. It was as if two streams converged in this process: one was the spontaneous wave of national grief; the other, a systematic and conscious process directed by the party "higher-ups" to create a new Soviet cult. Whereas the first naturally declined with the passage of time, the second gradually began to prevail (Fertile soil for this was found in the low cultural level of most of the population, and the receptiveness and religiosity of the peasantry). Moreover, one must bear in mind that it was precisely in these years that the anti-religious campaign, which employed the most barbaric methods, had begun and was gaining strength. And so, the "sacred place" of the censured and persecuted cult (in the place of God and the Tsar), was taken by a new one—a Soviet and even "communist" cult.

Let us call a spade a spade: the party leadership canonized Lenin in order to "sanctify" their own right to rule. They took advantage of his name for their own political ends: by creating a cult of leadership they strengthened the emotional ties between themselves and the broad masses, ensuring the devotion of the people to the party. It is hard to love a party—it is too broad a concept; but it is easy and natural to love the smiling, kind grandfather looking down from the many, many portraits. The Communist Party personified itself in the image of

Lenin. How can one not recall the famous saying here: **When we say—Lenin, we mean—the Party; and when we say—the Party, we mean—Lenin.**

Meanwhile, until very recently we have entertained no doubts about the principles of "usefulness," and "revolutionary expediency." Thus, in the name of the highest purposes of introducing communist ideology to the consciousness of an unenlightened nation, it was altogether acceptable to disregard "insignificant" ethical considerations, and even disregard the will of the deceased and his principled position on this question.

Thus, at the beginning of 1924, measures were discussed in the government and in the press to perpetuate the memory of Lenin. Such sensible and necessary measures as research and extensive publication of the works of the revolutionary philosopher, scholarly elaboration of his biography, establishing an archive, setting up museum exhibits—all these measures were accompanied by purely external forms of reverence: erection of statues, renaming things, and annual funeral processions. Moreover, these forms were often taken to extremes.

The decision on mummification and preservation of Lenin's body was taken at the 2nd All-Union Congress of Soviets, "for the purpose of offering to anyone who wishes, who was unable to be in Moscow on the day of his funeral, an opportunity to bid farewell to their beloved leader." During the discussion of the mausoleum project the thought was expressed that it would overshadow Mecca and Jerusalem and like them, would become a place of pilgrimage.

Historians have not yet disclosed any documents on how Lenin's relatives felt about this, or whether their opinions were even taken into consideration. Only in the memoirs of A.M. Larina (wife of N.I. Bukharin) is it recalled that the family was opposed, and in any case N.K. Krupskaya visited the mausoleum very rarely. During the mourning campaign [sic] of 1924, such demonstrations took place that Nadezhda Konstantinovna was evidently jarred, and was forced to appeal to the workers and peasants via PRAVDA: "I have a great request to make of you: Do not let your grief for Ilich turn into the actual worship of his personality. Do not set up monuments or palaces in his name, and do not organize magnificent celebrations in his memory and so on; while he was alive he attributed little significance to these, and found them all oppressive. Remember how much poverty and want there is in our country. If you want to show respect to the name of Vladimir Ilich—build nurseries, kindergartens, houses, schools, libraries, clinics, hospitals, sanatoria and so on; and most important—let us all live according to his precepts."

In early 1924 the newspapers were full of reports about the creation and activity of the Lenin Fund for aiding homeless children, and about opening reading rooms and clubs in Lenin's memory in villages. And at the same time, proposals such as "to establish a new Lenin Chronicle which would begin with the October Revolution." A

proposal to replace the angel (Guardian of Peace) atop the Aleksandrovskiy Column with the figure of V.I. Lenin (or a Red Army soldier or a worker) was seriously considered at sessions of the gubernia ispolkom.

Erection of monuments was literally put on an assembly-line basis in those years. The first monument to V.I. Lenin in the country is believed to be a sculpture set up in the Moscow suburb of Noginsk (formerly Bogorodsk) on 22 January 1924. The monument was erected by the workers of the Glukhovskaya Textile Mill in memory of their visit with the ailing Lenin in Gorkiy in the fall of 1923. A solemn unveiling ceremony was planned for 22 January 1924; and on that very day the sad news of Lenin's death arrived from Gorkiy.

This was, I repeat, the first monument. But afterward monuments were produced at an altogether fantastic rate. In early 1924 the following announcement appeared in the newspapers: "Plaster, patina-covered, bronze, or marble busts of V.I. Lenin...from the original work by sculptor S.D. Merkulov, with permission for reproduction and distribution by the Commission for Perpetuating the Memory of Lenin, are offered by the State Publishing House..." It was symbolic that the pedestals for the new monuments were occasionally the old ones, such as, for example, in Kostroma where a pedestal for a monument in honor of the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty became the pedestal for the figure of Lenin.

Nothing more need be explained to the reader here, for he has long become accustomed to sculptures and portraits of Lenin as an indispensable attribute of any institution, train station, school and official office. At any kiosk we can see rows of table busts and figures for any taste, although 60 years ago Mayakovsky had already written, "We insist: Do not make Lenin into a cliché... Do not bronze Lenin... We need him as a living figure and not a dead one. Therefore—learn from Lenin, but do not canonize him. Do not set up a cult around the name of a man who all his life had fought against all kinds of cults. And to not trade in articles of this cult. Do not trade in Lenin!"

But this warning-request was not heeded. The new "deification" continued. I have already spoken of one of the first "Lenin Corners," at the Agricultural Exhibit in Moscow. This was an exposition, based on materials available then, and was on the whole true. In Petrograd there is a detached house where in the spring of 1917 the Bolsheviks used to work, and which was made a "house of education" in 1923. A "Lenin Corner" was set up in the room in which Lenin had worked, and a 1917 atmosphere was recreated there.

During the days of mourning in January 1924, "Lenin Corners" were opened as departments in the museums of the revolution in Leningrad and Moscow. Thus, the first "Lenin Corners" were set up as museum exhibits with the use of genuine materials. But in the course of deploying the massive campaign to perpetuate Lenin's

memory, instructions were given to set up such "corners" not only in the provincial museums, but also in every library, at enterprises, in schools and at military units. Materials were basically photographs, and excerpts from newspapers and magazines. Glavpolitprosvet [Main Political Education Administration] gave instructions for the precise layout and sequence for displaying the materials. Similar to the "krasnyy ugol" [place of honor] (in a peasant hut), they can still be seen in certain military units, and at factories and plants.

The religious nature of the cult of Lenin of the 1920's was displayed most clearly in Russian and Eastern folklore. In tales and legends and in the eastern songs, Lenin appears as the defender of all the unfortunates, and possesses not only all the positive human qualities, but also superhuman, even godlike qualities. The theme of many a song reflects the popular interpretation of the fact of the preservation of Lenin's body in the Mausoleum—as proof that he is not completely dead, and no doubt will rise again. I will permit myself to quote excerpts from the Vyatka Tale of 1925:

"Once upon a time Lenin was sitting in a room at home after dinner, and was reading various books and newspapers. Only no matter which newspaper he looks at, or which book he opens, everything is about himself... Lenin marveled at this... He summoned a doctor and said:

"Can you make it so that I'm dead, only not completely, but just to appear so?"

"I can, Vladimir Ilich, but why?"

"In order that," he says, "I could find out how things will go on without me. Somehow they dump everything on me, but in any case I am being fenced off."

"Nothing to it," says the doctor, "That's possible. We will not put you into a tomb, but in a spacious room; and for appearances we will enclose you in glass, so that no one can touch you, or they might poke you."

"Just one thing, doctor. Let this be a great secret between us. You will know, and I, and let's tell Nadezhda Konstantinovna too."

"And soon they announced to the entire nation that Lenin had died. The people began to groan and moan; even communists could not keep from tears... They placed Lenin in a little storehouse called a mausoleum, and set a guard at the doors..."

The story goes on to say that at night Lenin wakes up and goes into the Kremlin, to a plant or a village, and talks to the people to find out how things are going. All is in order. "He lays peacefully in the mausoleum. Now he will probably awake soon. Oh what a joy it will be."

It is characteristic that in the popular conception Lenin was often in opposition to the official powers, as the defender of the people and a higher being. For example, during the terrible famine in the countryside brought

about by collectivization, in 1932, there were rumors among the peasants "that Lenin had risen from the dead and would soon come to smash the bolsheviks."

In the 1930's the name of Stalin was attached to the revered and illustrious name of Lenin. The phenomenon of Lenin museums is an excellent confirmation of the thesis of the dual "Lenin-Stalin" cult.

In the 1920's the organization of museum exhibits dedicated to Lenin was within the framework of historical-revolutionary museums where they existed as departments. The Lenin memorial museums created then were affiliates of the museums of the revolution. But the decision to create an independent V.I. Lenin Museum was not made at the peak of the Lenin cult in 1924-25, but in 1936 when the Stalin cult was gaining strength, and he no longer feared "competition" on Lenin's part; on the contrary, the name of Lenin overshadowed the name of the living leader.

The Central Lenin Museum and its branches, which were established in the late 1930's, were principally different from the first Lenin memorial museums of the 1920's in terms of their purpose. The purposes of the Leningrad Museum of the Revolution, which opened in 1927, and the museums on Shirokaya St. and on Smolnyy, were "to assemble and preserve historical revolutionary memorials, study significant materials, and display their collections." But the mission of the Lenin museums of the 1930's was propaganda and ideological education. It was then that a "system of Lenin-Stalin museums was set up, which became centers of propaganda of Stalin's conception of the history of the party." The content of the expositions of the Central Lenin Museum and its branches (and they differed only in insignificant details, for deviations from the plan were not allowed) reflected the conception of two leaders in the revolution. The story of the life and revolutionary struggle of Lenin was obscured by the display of the prominent role of Stalin at all stages of the revolution and socialist construction.

After Stalin's death the cult of Lenin was reborn with new force. Under Khrushchev the bright, unsullied image of Lenin was contrasted with the dark, evil deeds of Stalin and was used to dethrone him. The culmination of the renewed cult was the celebration of Lenin's 100th birthday, which was marked by the erection of the pompous Ulyanovsk Memorial, the temple-museum in Tashkent, and the opening of a number of other museums in which only copied materials were displayed.

Many readers remember well the atmosphere of this celebration. Its distinguishing feature was that the campaign was imposed from above, and a movement from below in response, like in the 1920's, was lacking. The straightforward methods of ideological influence on the people's consciousness permitted in the 1920's, which were brought over to the 1960's, led to psychological rejection, cynicism and exasperation. This was also reflected in the city folklore of the 1960's and 70's—the numerous jokes. New and costly monumental complexes

of Lenin museums in the 1980's—in Kazan, Krasnoyarsk, Frunze and Kiev—were elements of the ostentatious propagandistic facade of our state in the epoch of stagnation.

The "frontal" ideological attacks of that period, the crude propaganda methods, which often went beyond the bounds of common sense, have their legacy in certain negative manifestations in the present-day attitude toward Lenin. After decades of unconditional worship the pendulum swung in the other direction. The people's strong desire to delve into their own history and get rid of the fetishes—is their indisputable right. But one must not forget, we are operating under our previously-fetishized consciousness.

Thus, primitive tribes, when their lives were going well, worship their idol, decorate it, and offer sacrifices to it; but when the hunt did not go well, they would abuse it, and might even smash it. And now already, certain of our fellow citizens, finding the "guilty party" at last, are burning portraits of Lenin and defacing the monuments and historic markers. It was our society that gave birth to these people, did them out of their beauty, culture and sense of proportion; and did not give them the opportunity to learn to think and make choices. Iconoclasm, as everyone knows, is simply the other side of idol-worship.

Incidentally, the striving to cast off the scabs of cult thinking is more likely only beginning. Its roots are too deep in our social consciousness. Even today many are still intimidated by unexpected quotations from the Collected Works of V.I. Lenin, and meticulous commentators are accused of attacking our foundation, our

sacred heritage. The decanonization of Lenin, and an unbiased analysis of his role in our history, are still dangerous topics.

At the same time, such a sober, objective analysis is especially needed now. For too long our historical science has proceeded from the principle of "whatever you wish," and has been in the service of politics and not the truth. Therefore the carefully directed view does not permit us today to see this gigantic figure of our history in all its depth and diversity.

I am convinced that the pendulum will eventually stop and will take up a position of equilibrium. The point of equilibrium, the moment of truth, free from political marketeering, will be found. There is no doubt about it.

And so, having permitted ourselves to utter the words "Cult of Lenin," and acknowledging its existence, we, after giving thought, will arrive at the conclusion that the extolling and worship of the person of the leader (regardless of the name) in our country is—I think—a characteristic feature of our social consciousness.

One can argue about the origins, about whether this is a national peculiarity of Russian people; or that the structure of our party itself which by will of fate has stood at the head of the state, constantly produces leader-worship—but one thing cannot be refuted: cult-thinking and democracy are incompatible. However, even now we cannot dismiss the possibility of the rise of a new cult.

We must continually bear this danger in mind. Let us, at last, derive lessons from our history.

Sea of Azov Pollution Study Findings Summarized

90WN0051A Krasnodar SELSKIYE ZORI in Russian
No 2, Feb 90 pp 21-23

[Interview with Vladimir Yakovlevich Nagalevskiy, dean of the Kuban State University School of Biology, by T. Ovsyankina: "The Azov...Our Sorrow and Anxiety"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The Sea of Azov.... Everybody learned about it in school. The ancient Greeks called it Maiotis. It was famous for its fish. It is no wonder it was also called the Beluga Sea. The first Russian settlers who came here in the 10th century called it the Surozhskoye Sea. The present name came down to us from the Ottoman Turks.

The Sea of Azov does not cover a large area—around 38,000 square kilometers—and most of it is only 9-13 meters deep, but as the saying goes, good things come in small packages. The good thing about this package is its fish—pike, bream, gray mullet, herring, sturgeon, sevruga, anchovy, and sardelle. There used to be dace and bleak too. The supply seemed inexhaustible—take as much as you want, there is enough for everyone. Time, however, proved that this was not true. People began saying that the sea was getting shallow and salty, that there were fewer fish, that the shell rock was gone, that some types of flora and fauna were disappearing, that the water was polluted.... This alarmed the public of the Kuban, the Don, and other regions.

An expedition organized by TASS and the editors of SOVETSKAYA KUBAN in Krasnodar Kray was supposed to judge the validity of people's worries about the future of the sea. The members of the expedition listened to what many inhabitants of coastal communities had to say and spoke with fishermen, trappers, hunters, rice growers, and reclamation experts. After meeting with the public, party and soviet personnel, and economic managers and after completing their own studies and observations, the members of the expedition made a report and suggested some specific ways of improving the state of the ecology in the Azov basin.

The expedition and its findings were discussed at public lectures in Temryuk. The speakers included scientists, party and soviet personnel, and representatives of conservation organizations in the Kuban, Don, and Ukraine. Our special correspondent T. Ovsyankina spoke with V.Ya. Nagalevskiy, scientific administrator of the expedition and dean of the School of Biology at Kuban State University, about the results of the expedition and the future plans of its members.

[Ovsyankina] Vladimir Yakovlevich, tell us something about the joint public-scientific expedition, starting with a few words about those who participated directly in the project.

[Nagalevskiy] The decision on this kind of expedition was first made by a session of the kray soviet of people's deputies. The initiators were TASS, the editors of

SOVETSKAYA KUBAN, our School of Biology, and the Krasnodar Kray Council of the All-Russian Environmental Protection Society. The participants were scientists and specialists from our university's School of Geography, AzNIIRKh [Azov Scientific Research Institute of Fisheries], KrasNIIRKh [Krasnodar Scientific Research Institute of Fisheries], VNIIRis [All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Rice Growing], Kubanrybvod [Main Administration for the Protection and Reproduction of Fish Reserves and the Regulation of Fishing in the Kuban Zone], Azovrybvod [Main Administration for the Protection and Reproduction of Fish Reserves and the Regulation of Fishing in the Sea of Azov], the Kuban Agricultural Institute, the Biosphere Preserve of the Caucasus, and the Krasnodar State Museum and Preserve. The most immediate and active participants were TASS correspondent V.Ye. Zhilyakov, SOVETSKAYA KUBAN assistant editor V.S. Smeyukha, Docent G.K. Plotnikov from the Zoology Department in our School of Biology, instructor in the same department M.Kh. Yemtyl, instructor in the Botany Department D.P. Kassanelli, Docent V.N. Lesnykh from the CPSU History Department of the Kuban Agricultural Institute, KrasNIIRKh department head M.S. Chebanov, chief of the Ichthyological Service of the Kubanrybvod Administration K.K. Chesnokov, head of the VNIIRis Environmental Protection Laboratory Yu.V. Shilenko, AzNIIRKh laboratory heads L.G. Balandina and T.S. Kishkinova, and chief of the Fish Conservation Department of the Azovrybvod Administration I.M. Nikulshin. The expedition also received considerable assistance from party and soviet organizations in Temryukskiy, Slavyanskiy, Primorsko-Akhtarskiy, and Yeyskiy rayons in the kray.

The purpose of our expedition was to determine the present ecological state of the Sea of Azov and the organically connected Eastern Cis-Azov Zone and plan specific ways of protecting and using the resources of these regions. We also hoped to do the following:

Study the flora and fauna of the estuaries, flood plains, sand bars, and salt-ridden soils of the Eastern Cis-Azov Zone;

Conduct hydrological, hydrochemical, and toxicological analyses of the soils and rivers flowing into the Sea of Azov and the waters of the sea itself;

Compile an economic-geographic summary of the cis-Azov territorial production complex within the boundaries of our kray.

[Ovsyankina] What did the expedition learn? Tell us about the ecological crisis of the Sea of Azov.

[Nagalevskiy] Unfortunately, this is not just a crisis of the Sea of Azov. It is a crisis of the entire cis-Azov zone and it will certainly extend to the territories of the RSFSR and Ukraine near the Azov. The crisis includes the loss of the sea's commercial value as a source of bleak, dace, pike, and sea-roach and the reduction of the quantity of sturgeon and other food fish. It includes the

higher salt content of the sea due to the reduced intake of fresh water. It includes the impermissible pollution of the Azov with industrial and household sewage and toxic chemicals. It includes the depletion of the flora and fauna of the cis-Azov zone. It also includes the soil erosion on the Azov coast and the disappearance and destruction of shell rock on the sand bars.

In the opinion of expedition members, the main cause of the ecological crisis is the severe pollution of the sea by industrial and household sewage. I will give you a few examples. The Kuban River has become one of the sources of pollution. Toxic substances are dumped into the river by Nevinomyssk enterprises—the Azot Association and the chemical combine, the Kropotkin Chemical Plant, the largest enterprises in Krasnodar, and the port of Temryuk. The Azov is being polluted with untreated sewage by enterprises in Yeysk and Primorsko-Akhtarsk. Expedition members also went to Taganrog, Mariupol, Berdyansk, and Kerch. This is what they saw.

Each year 160,000 cubic meters of sewage is dumped into the Gulf of Taganrog. The industrial sewage representing 41 percent of the total poses a serious threat to the gulf because it contains a broad range of substances—from iron, cadmium, copper and nickel to phenol and petroleum products. Furthermore, the gulf is not being polluted only by industrial enterprises. The waters of the Mius carry petroleum products, iron, and zinc from the Donbass. Rostov has become the chief polluter of the lower reaches of the Don. The Temernik River alone carries up to 70,000 cubic meters of untreated sewage each day. The Northern Donets carries the phenols and dyes of the enterprises built on its banks, equipped with primitive purification facilities, to the Don River.

The Azovstal Combine in Mariupol ranks highest among the sea's polluters. The dam built here, which took 90 hectares away from the sea, has become a veritable accumulator of toxic waste.

The situation is no better in one of the oldest health resorts of the Sea of Azov—the city of Berdyansk. A giant industrial oil plant stands next to the therapeutic mud baths here. It produces the lubricants the national economy needs so much, but violations of technological regulations and the absence or unsatisfactory performance of sewage treatment equipment have filled Berdyansk Bay with poisons. The threat of closure is looming over the mud baths.

[Ovsyankina] I have to interrupt your list of charges, Vladimir Yakovlevich, to say that these statistics are absolutely shocking. It is amazing that anything could still be alive in the sea....

[Nagalevskiy] But I have not told you everything yet. In all, the industrial sewage of 1,360 enterprises is dumped into the Sea of Azov. It is the repository of 12,500 tons of petroleum products, around 2,000 tons of synthetic

surfactants, and more than 200 tons of phenol compounds each year. Every day 18.4 million cubic meters of household sewage—5.5 million of them untreated—is dumped into the sea.

According to expert estimates, the damage caused just by the loss of fish in the sea and other bodies of water in the Azov basin within the territory of the RSFSR and Ukraine amounts to 9.8 billion rubles.

The damming and flow-regulation of the Kuban and Don rivers and the construction of channels in some estuaries of the Eastern Cis-Azov Zone increased the salt content, and bodies of water here began to dry up and lose their fish reserves. For the bleak, dace, beluga, and bullhead, these poorly planned human activities were a genuine disaster. The dams built on the Don and Kuban blocked the age-old routes to their spawning grounds.

The rivers of the cis-Azov zone used to pour more than 40 cubic kilometers of water into the sea, but now the figure is under 30. The high salt content of the water brought the crested jellyfish, the predatory enemy of the anchovy, here from the Black Sea. It deprives the anchovy of the main staple of its diet—plankton. The high salt content also lowered the freezing point of the water. Now it does not always have an ice cover when the temperature falls below zero, and this kills the cartilaginous fish on the bottom.

The Tikhovskiy Water Divider Assembly on the Kuban River has also aroused considerable public anxiety in the kray. It will cause the further reduction of river run-off into the Sea of Azov, undermine commercial reserves of valuable fish, and raise the salt content even higher. More than 80 million rubles was invested in the construction of this assembly. Its operation will cost the fishing industry 30 million rubles in losses. The price of our mismanagement seems inordinately high. We have suggested that all construction work be stopped and that the incomplete facility be treated as a monument to careless human interference with nature, a monument to ecological atrocities.

In our opinion, ecological questions should be given top priority from now on in the approval of construction projects for dams or reservoirs on rivers.

[Ovsyankina] You have said almost nothing about the toxic chemicals that seem so frightening to anyone with the slightest knowledge of the ecological state of the water and land.

[Nagalevskiy] Yes, this is another aspect of the ecological crisis. The unique estuaries of the Eastern Cis-Azov Zone are being destroyed by their oversaturation with toxic chemicals and with organic and mineral fertilizers. They are getting shallow and they are full of algae. Chemicals and careless economic activity have reduced the productivity of mollusks and have wiped them out in some places, and this eventually causes the erosion of the coastline. In Primorsko-Akhtarskiy Rayon, for example, the sea claims 7 meters of farmland a year. The Dolgaya,

Achuyevskaya, Berdyanskaya, and Yasenskaya wetlands, with their famous bird colonies, are in a pitiful state.

Scientists have calculated that around 140 different kinds of pesticides are now being used in the Azov basin. Furthermore, the use of only 20 is regulated.

I have to say something about rice growing. Mixtures of around 10 highly toxic pesticides are used in the rice fields. The average hectare is treated with up to 9 kilograms of pesticides, but in some locations (Slavyanskiy Rayon, for example) the figure can be as high as 15. Rice-growing areas in the kray are responsible for more than 1.045 billion cubic meters of polluted run-off into reservoirs. Expedition members discovered that the run-off from the Petrovsko-Anastasyevskaya and Chernoyevskaya irrigation systems had a propanide content more than 760 times the permissible maximum, and an ordram content 80 times the maximum.

I must say, however, that rice growers are not the only ones to blame for pesticide pollution. Grapes, wheat, sunflowers, corn, and sugar beets require just as many toxic chemicals. Whereas rice requires just over 2,000 tons of pesticides a year, for example, other crops might need around 25,000 tons. Incidentally, Temryukskiy Rayon ranks highest in the Kuban in this respect. A hectare of farmland here is treated with around 32 kilograms of pesticides, and this is also the amount used per capita (including children) in the rayon. The per capita average throughout the country, just as in the United States, is 2 kilograms of toxic chemicals.

I must stress that although some of the chemicals used in rice growing are regulated by the kray environmental protection council, the majority have not even been registered by specialists and we do not know anything about their possible effects.

Judging by all indications, the steady pollution of the Sea of Azov has been recorded not only in our kray, but also in Rostov Oblast. More than 15,000 tons of 128 different toxic chemicals are used here each year.

I must admit that there has been a slight improvement in the situation on the rice fields and the fields sown to other agricultural crops. Whereas 36,000 tons of pesticides were used in the kray in 1974 and the figures in 1985 and 1986 were 42,000 and 41,000, the amount used in 1987 was much smaller—33,000 tons, and in 1988 only 28,700 tons were used. In view of the high toxicity of saturnol and the length of the detoxification period, VNIIris plans to stop all purchases of this compound from Japan and to ban its use on farms.

Human economic activity and the predatory exploitation of natural resources have transformed the flora and fauna of the cis-Azov zone beyond recognition. The song of the lark is no longer heard in the fields and the goldfinch and siskin are never seen in gardens. The bustards and cranes have disappeared. Tomtits are rare.

The foxes which had once controlled the mouse population, and the wildcats which had kept the flood plains clean are few in number now. In just the last few years the names of more than 50 animals and plants have been recorded in the Red Books of the USSR, RSFSR, and Ukrainian SSR.

[Ovsyankina] What solutions to the ecological crisis can expedition members suggest?

[Nagalevskiy] First of all, the continued depletion of the water in the Azov basin has to be stopped. The locations of water dividers and dams on large and small rivers have to be reviewed and reassessed with a view to ecological and economic effectiveness. All fisheries must be remodeled to expand their capacities. Engineering and technical work will be essential in the irrigation systems of the Don and Kuban to lower the level of subsoil waters in river deltas. During the years of the 13th Five-Year Plan the intake works will have to be equipped with fish protection systems. All of this will take time—probably the whole 5 years.

[Ovsyankina] But what can we do today? After all, we cannot put off the protection of this valuable basin until some time in the distant future, because the stakes are too high—human health and human lives, and the future existence of the sea and its reserves and of the flora and fauna of the cis-Azov zone.

[Nagalevskiy] We think the first thing that should be done in the next few months is the incorporation of an economic mechanism to encourage the conservation efforts of branches and enterprises. Taxes should be levied right away on the import, storage, and use of pesticides in order to encourage farms to use them more prudently and efficiently. Plowing must be prohibited on the banks of rivers, estuaries, and other bodies of water.

The members of the expedition agreed unanimously that the 50-percent rotation plan should be instituted this year on rice fields and that the areas of rice cultivation without herbicides should be increased in order to improve the ecological situation. The farming techniques developed by VNIIris and the Kuban Agricultural Institute for herbicide-free cultivation should become the main trump card in the reduction of pollution. Paradoxically, however, although the Kuban was already capable of producing 90,000-100,000 tons of hulled rice last year, the kray received requisitions for only 34,400 tons. The state pays 1,200 rubles for a ton of this rice, but the entire remainder is sold at the regular price of 400 rubles. This cannot encourage farms to incorporate new technology, because herbicide-free cultivation will necessitate substantial material expenditures and efforts.

I also want to discuss another aspect of herbicide-free technology. The rice fields cannot be leveled without good equipment, and it is non-existent. Strains capable of surviving lengthy periods of flooding are also non-existent. Another major complication is the need for experienced and conscientious irrigators. They should

work on the rice fields and not be available for other jobs, but many farms cannot afford this.

Industrial enterprises owe a huge debt to the Sea of Azov. Back in 1985 the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers published a decree on the complete cessation of the dumping of polluted industrial waste and on the reduction of water use by 20 percent. We saw on our expedition that few of these requirements are being met. We feel that violators of the party and government decree should be held accountable.

To enhance the effectiveness of conservation measures, we propose investigations to learn exactly which enterprises are harming the Sea of Azov and cis-Azov zone so that they can be monitored closely by conservation agencies. The storage of the waste from the Azovstal Combine outside the waters and coastal zone of the Azov must be organized without delay. Exploratory drilling in the northwestern and southern parts of the basin should be restricted, and it should be completely stopped in the locations of the reproduction of valuable food fish. The protection of the flora and fauna of the Eastern Cis-Azov Zone and its unique sand bars calls for an immediate inventory of endangered species of plants and animals. The Kuban Red Book could be of considerable assistance in this work. This book, containing the findings of more than 20 scientists and specialists in the kray, has already been written, but it has been held up for some reason in our publishing house. The delay is inexcusable because this collective work is being awaited impatiently by those who care about the fate of endangered animals, birds, and plants.

The network of preserves and sanctuaries needs to be reviewed. We feel that the Yeyskaya, Dolgaya, and Belosarayskaya sand bars should become sanctuaries and that the Achuyevskaya sand bar and the Akhtarsko-Grivenskiy estuaries and flood plains should be turned into natural preserves.

[Ovsyankina] Vladimir Yakovlevich, as you already said, the problems of the Sea of Azov are affecting not only the Kuban, but also Rostov, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, Kherson, and other oblasts. Are there any plans to unite the efforts of the public in these areas for the protection of the Sea of Azov?

[Nagalevskiy] At the end of last year a permanent regional ecological expedition with its own bank account was established in the editorial offices of SOVETSKAYA KUBAN.

A conference on the Sea of Azov was held at the end of January. It was the culminating point of the public-scientific expedition. It was attended by scientists, specialists, and representatives of the ecologically aware public of Krasnodar and Stavropol krais, the Kalmyk ASSR, and Rostov and Crimean oblasts. A lengthy resolution passed at the conference stipulated the measures that had to be taken to restore the ecosystem of the Azov. It also contained an urgent request that any governmental decision on this matter be preceded by the

nationwide discussion and extensive press coverage of the draft government decree on the recovery of the Sea of Azov and adjacent territories. In our opinion, this will meet the requirements of fairness and glasnost and will convey the spirit of today's changes.

Today the famous ecological statement that the protection of natural resources can only be secured by their intelligent use is being voiced in tones of admonition and hope.

I should also mention the journalistic expedition of the Sea of Azov that was organized in Rostov. It was a study of the Lower Don, Northern Donetsk, Mius, and Rostov's smallest river—the Temernik. Public committees have been set up in several Ukrainian cities, including Mariupol and Kerch, to save the unique fish reserves of the Sea of Azov and its waters. We realize that concerted effort on the oblast and kray levels will be essential. After all, even the most intelligent ukase of a superior agency is not enough if concerted action cannot be organized efficiently on the local level. Coordination is needed because it will be impossible to breathe life into the Sea of Azov if, for instance, the Don and Kuban should completely lose their potential as rivers feeding the sea.

At the suggestion of our readers, SELSKIYE ZORI is joining the public movement in defense of the Sea of Azov. We are awaiting your reports on the work being done in the cis-Azov zone to improve the ecological situation. COPYRIGHT: "Selskiye zori", 1990

Aquifer Exploitation Seen As Central Asian Water Crisis Solution

90W/N0060B Moscow POISK in Russian
No 11, 15-21 Mar 90 pp 4-5

[Article by Stanislav Fioletov: "A Farewell to the Aral Sea"]

[Text] If we lose the Aral Sea, and everything is leading toward this, it will be a huge catastrophe. But it will be even more frightening if we end up with several seas in Central Asia instead of one - where today orchards rustle in the breeze, where there are cities and villages... And such a prospect is quite realistic. Because of a rise in the water table, such large cities as Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, Gulistan and many others are currently in a more critical situation from the point of view of seismic vulnerability than they were 20 years ago. One hundred percent of the territory of the Bukharskaya oblast, more than half of the territory of the Fergana Valley, the Golodnaya steppe and the Kashkadaryinskaya oblast has been flooded. They say there's no water. In reality there's even too much...

There's no shortage of drafts but...

Today all scientists, writers and journalists write about the Aral Sea catastrophe. Emotions are running high. In the second issue of the journal KOMMUNIST is another report from Karakalpakiya. Again threatening figures on

the number of sick are cited; they talk about a catastrophe of "planet scale," about the necessity of taking emergency measures to improve the situation in the region, the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers regarding the Aral Sea is criticized. But what is offered in place of that, where is the alternative?

At first glance there are quite a few plans to save the sea. As a matter of fact, they can be divided into two groups. One group consists of those plans which propose to bring water into the Aral Sea from outside. The second group consists of those plans which attempt to resolve the problem at the expense of the internal resources of Central Asia. Let's take a look at each plan without emotions, oohs and ahhs, strictly on a documentary basis.

In 1987 the government commission on the Aral Sea proposed a plan to bring in water from Caspian Sea to the Aral Sea. Its implementation would have required raising water from the Caspian Sea 80 meters and pumping it 500 kilometers through the desert. In addition, the pumping stations would have to pump 80-100 cubic kilometers per year continuously for 18-20 years. It's clear even to a nonspecialist how much that would cost the government. I'm not even talking about technical difficulties.

Another group of scientists has proposed inducing artificial precipitation at the headwaters of the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers to increase the flow of the rivers to 10-25 cubic kilometers per year. Technically, this is entirely feasible but... According to data of the same authors, this would cost the country from 40 to 100 million rubles per year. Besides that, the number of sunny days would decline drastically and the erosion of fertile soil would begin in the mountainous and foothill regions. And the main thing is that by obtaining moisture here, we will remove it from another place. Nature does not give anything away free. Nobody wants to say what kind of consequences this could lead to.

The diversion of a portion of the flow of the Siberian rivers. Much has been written and said about these projects in detail. It seems that these ideas were criticized and rejected for good. However, in Uzbekistan they are about to return to the projects, forgetting that in principle the plan is not even designed to resolve the Aral Sea problem. For example, its first stream of water was meant to help develop the new lands tracts in Central Asia in Kazakhstan. It would not be useful to ignore another fact either. The transfer of the republic to economic accountability and self-financing, the strengthening of its sovereignty, and its acquisition of complete independence will require that such a project receive the support not only and not so much of the center as the support of the general public, as well as scientists and specialists of the region from which we intend to remove it. And for the time being support cannot be anticipated from that quarter.

This means that ways to resolve the Aral problem must be sought locally at the expense of our own water resources. What, then, is being proposed in this regard?

Some scientists propose to divert drainage water into the Aral Sea, others - water from the Sarakamysh, Sultandag, Arnasay and other lakes. Still others propose to utilize the moisture which will be saved through an increase in the efficiency of irrigation and land improvement systems, an improvement in sprinkler technology and the territorial reallocation of water resources. Maybe, that will work?

Let's take drainage water. The entire amount is 18 cubic kilometers per year. Nine go to lakes and low-lying areas. Nine are recycled. Let's imagine that we direct the first nine into the Aral Sea. That will not save it but all the waste lakes will disappear. Toxic dust and salt will be carried away from their dried-up bottoms. It's not hard to guess where that will lead.

For the same reason it is impossible now to dump all the water which currently has accumulated in them (approximately 50 cubic kilometers). Additionally, the majority of these lakes are located in depressions of the earth's crust and located far from the Aral Sea. That means that pumping stations are needed as well as pipelines, purification facilities- the mineralization in these lakes has exceeded allowable levels for a long time. Regarding the water which would be saved in the future, it is simply hard to say anything definite. Large-scale research and calculations are needed. But time is of the essence. It turns that there is no way out. A dead-end?

No, there is a way out. Nature itself suggests it. This conclusion was reached by scientists of the Uzbek branch of the "Priroda" State Scientific-Research and Production Center. But before we tell about their project in more detail, we need to return once more to an analysis of the causes of the Aral Sea catastrophe.

Why Is It Drying Up?

This question, as a rule, is answered unambiguously - because of the thoughtless, voluntaristic interference of man in the affairs of nature. And convincing arguments are cited. At first glance that's how it is. The total volume of surface water resources of the Aral Sea basin is estimated at 126.6 cubic meters. Of this amount more than 116 cubic meters are removed. To where? First of all, for irrigation. In Uzbekistan alone from 1970 to 1986 unreplenishable water consumption in the republic almost doubled. Since 1950 all natural surface water resources of the region have been regulated by 89 reservoirs.

There are 10.4 cubic kilometers which remain in reserve. However, they do not reach the Aral Sea because they are intercepted by irrigation canals below the gauge gates. In other words, the resources of the Amudarya and Syrdarya are completely exhausted.

You didn't need to prove that, the reader will say. Man and only man is the cause of the Aral tragedy. But then how do you explain these facts: during its history, which is not very long from a geological point of view, the Aral Sea has often receded, changed its form and finally completely dried up. And that is utterly impossible to associate with man's activities. Then with what?

With tectonic movements of the earth's crust, say the scientists from the Uzbek branch of the "Priroda" state center. This extremely important fact was never analyzed by anyone in regard to the Aral catastrophe. In order to determine whether a link exists between tectonic processes and changes in the level of the sea, repeat leveling data for 50 years was analyzed as well as a huge amount of space research information obtained by the center since 1972. The data convincingly supports the scientists' proposals.

Thus, the Fergana Valley is sinking at the rate of four millimeters per year. The northern Priuralye region, 0.3 - 0.8 millimeters, the Kosbulag depression at a rate of seven millimeters, the Amudarya depression at a rate of three, etc.

Along with areas in the Aral Sea basin which are sinking, there are places which are rapidly rising. For example, the eastern Priuralye region is rising at a rate of four millimeters per year, the area along the Karakumskiy canal at 2.6 millimeters, the Zaravshan range at more than eight millimeters, the Golodnaya steppe at two to four millimeters per year. These processes have not been going on for just a year or two but for a lengthy geological period.

But the most interesting thing is what is happening under the sea. The earth's crust here is five to seven kilometers thinner than in other areas. The Aral itself is located at the junction of several tectonic plates which have different characteristics and speed of movements. In particular, the western portion of the sea is located on the Northern-Ustyurt middle plate which is rising. True, not all areas are rising at the same speed. For example, the Kosbulag depression is even sinking.

The southern portion of the sea basin is located at the union of the Central Ustyurt and the Southern Tyanshan plicate system. Once a depression, today it is rising in a southwest direction and rather rapidly.

The northern portion is located at the southern extreme of the Ural plicate system; the eastern portion is located on the Syrdarya middle plate.

Photographs from space have shown: certain areas of the Ustyurt plateau have become very wet. This leads scientists to the thought that the sea possibly is flowing toward the Kosbulag depression. For the time being this is only a supposition. Just as the other one is. Since the Ural-Omanskiy fault, which intersects the sea, is under tension today, it is quite possible that a portion of the water from the Aral Sea is being sucked into it.

Now let's take a look at what is happening in other zones of the region. In the Fergana Valley ground water levels are rising rapidly because of the continuing sinking and rising of the Akchok, Akbel and Supetau mountains. An analogous situation can be observed in the Amudarya Valley.

The situation in the Golodnaya steppe is somewhat different. Despite the fact that the entire depression today is rising, there is no decrease in ground and surface water. Moreover, the water is increasing. The cause is the flow from the rising structure of the Dzhausumkum and Chardarya reservoirs. There are many such examples.

In this way, current tectonic processes completely control the surface and ground flow of the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers. It is precisely these processes which first led to a restructuring of the configuration of the earth's crust in the region: to an intensive manifestation of geodynamic processes; to a worsening of seismic conditions (I mentioned this at the beginning); to a rise in ground water levels and - as a consequence - to flooding, bogging, and to the salting of huge areas. Finally, to a natural reallocation of the surface and ground flow within the Amudarya and Syrdarya basins, to a drying up of the delta and a lowering of the level of the Aral Sea.

In other words we are witnesses of a natural regression of the sea which occurs on the average of once in a thousand years and happened to occur in our lifetime.

Of course, this process could be longer and not as catastrophic if it weren't for other factors, among which is climatic change. For example, beginning in the 1960's the temperature in the sea's basin gradually increased by 0.5 - 1 degrees C., which entailed a decrease of precipitation at the source of our main rivers.

And, of course, the interference of man. Especially during the last 20- 25 years. This has doubled the rate of drying of the sea. And if we don't take urgent measures, we not only will lose the Aral Sea, but what is even more frightening, we will end up with several seas in different locations where people live today, where cities are standing and orchards rustling in the breeze.

Water Will Flow Into The Riverbeds

The project of the scientists from the Uzbek branch of the "Priroda" center is attractive first of all because it not only solves the Aral problem but also allows for the recuperation of the ecological situation in the whole region. What is the essence of the project? Water must be taken from natural underground reservoirs. On the basis of geographical divisions specialists from the center have identified 15 independent hydrodynamic basins of the Aral Sea region and have determined their reserves. For example, the Fergana basin currently has approximately 16 thousand cubic kilometers of ground water and water under weak pressure. The Syrdarya has almost eight thousand. The Chuyskiy has more than 9 thousand. The Murgab has approximately 10 thousand cubic kilometers...

The total volume of centuries-old reserves of only the largest depressions is estimated at 100 thousand cubic kilometers. Only 1-2 percent of this is sufficient for restoring the Aral Sea. But, what is no less important, this will allow to a certain degree for the lowering of the water table, an improvement in the engineer-geological and seismic conditions of the region and in the conditions of the land, the return to agricultural use of the flooded, bogged and salted areas. On the whole it will allow for a recuperation of the ecological situation of the entire Aral Sea basin.

The problem could be resolved in two stages. First of all, the stabilization of the level of the sea. For this purpose it has been proposed that 30-35 cubic kilometers of water be pumped with the help of tapered or linear water barriers. That means, that about 10-12 thousand drilled wells are needed with a depth of 500-1500 meters. However, we can get by without new ones: there are more than 12 thousand already existing wells in the republic which are not operational. Resources are needed only for their reconstruction, repair and exploitation.

That may be true, but won't this route turn out to be just another project which is technically impractical? Is there any experience at all in the utilization of ground water on such a large scale? We had to dig in the specialized literature and information guides. And I ran across some data. The People's Republic of China, in turns out, occupies first place in the world in the area of land under irrigation and the utilization of ground water for these purposes. For example, as early as 1958 more than one thousand cubic meters of water per second were being removed in just seven provinces of the country. In only ten years (1949-1959) approximately 40 thousand wells were put into operation.

India turned out to have even more impressive experience in these matters. By 1964 the area under irrigation reached 31 million hectares. Approximately 30 percent of this land was irrigated with ground water from 30 thousand deep wells and about five million shallow wells.

In the USA in 1960 35 percent of the total volume of water used to irrigate 14.6 million hectares consisted of ground water. During ten years (1940-1950) in twenty states the number of operational drilled wells increased from 74,600 to more than 141 thousand. Currently in California, for example, ground water is used on more than 50 percent of the land under irrigation and in Texas in the area around Lubbock ground water is used on all irrigated land.

Such countries as Iraq, Algeria, Greece, Turkey as well as others have positive experience in utilizing ground water. Alas, in our country only about two percent of land under irrigation uses the resources of the underground hydrosphere.

Consequently, from this point of view the "Priroda" state center's project has been substantiated and is

completely feasible. But then another problem arises: how do you get the water to the Aral Sea? After all, we're not talking about five or twenty kilometers! The scientists propose to pump it into river beds. But, in the first place, because of tectonic processes surface water resources have become unbalanced. In the second place, the rivers which have been regulated by reservoirs have been exhausted by the "economic" activities of man.

The scientists parried my doubts and replied that we must clean up the natural river beds, deepen them in some places, construct by-pass canals through Tuyamuyunskoye, Kayrakumskoye, and Chardarya reservoirs.

For a complete restoration of the sea an additional 50 thousand deep wells with a capacity of 100 liters per second would have to be drilled in the region. Then each year they would be able to pump up to 150 cubic kilometers of water into the Aral Sea. At such a rate it would be possible to replenish the sea in six to seven years. After that you would use only a portion to maintain the sea's balance and the rest would be used for irrigation purposes. In the future waste, flood, and return water, as well as the water which will be saved as a result of increasing the KPD of irrigation systems, will be added to this amount.

Scientists estimate total expenditures for restoring the sea at 3-5 billion rubles. This is several times lower than the cost stipulated by the resolution on the Aral Sea of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers or the cost of those project which I mentioned earlier. But these expenditures would pay for themselves just by reducing the resources which each year go for local land-reclamation projects. The yield per irrigated hectare and of pasture lands would increase. The seismic stability of above-ground construction would improve.

Of course, viewing ground water as a natural resource, we must not forget that it is a part of nature in which everything is interconnected. The removal of such a large amount of water could lead to various negative phenomena. For example, to the degradation of the vegetation cover due to a lowering of the water table, to a lowering of the earth's surface, to the formation of sink holes, etc.

Well, the designers of this concept have thought about this as well. Their calculations show that this will not occur. During the removal of water for stabilizing the sea the water table will be lowered by one and a half to two meters. For our conditions this is a drop in the bucket. Only when the water level is lowered by five or six meters, will we be able to drastically improve the region's ecological situation. And so that sink holes do not form, it is necessary to pump out the water evenly using the layered method throughout the entire territory of the basin.

And so, one more concept has been proposed for saving the Aral Sea. I was drawn to it by the systems analysis of the cause-effect relationships of the drying up of the Aral

Sea and the worsening of the ecological situation of the region. Methods have been proposed not only for resolving the Aral problem but also for the recuperation of the ecological situation of the entire region. And not at the expense of bordering lands but on the basis of the nontraditional rational use of internal water resources which are more than adequate. And this is encouraging.

Of course, only scientists and a competent commission can issue a final verdict about its strong and weak points. It would be good if colleagues from the USSR Academy of Sciences express their opinion.

Georgian Goskompriroda Deputy On Republic's Atmospheric Pollution

90WN0060A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
27 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview with Georgian SSR State Committee on Environmental Protection and Forestry Guram Kutateladze: "The Air Is Getting Cleaner, But..."]

[Text] Almost five years ago in April 1985 the republic Council of Ministers approved the resolution, "On Additional Measures to Prevent Atmospheric Pollution in Cities, Other Populated Areas and Industrial Centers." Recently the Council of Ministers again returned to the problem and reviewed the fruits of the work in this direction. The answer to the question - has the air we breathe become cleaner? - is impossible to view as absolutely positive. Moreover, in some places the problem has become exacerbated. The Council of Ministers approved another resolution. We asked Deputy Chairman of the Georgian SSR State Committee on Environmental Protection and Forestry Guram Kutateladze to explain this document.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] Guram Aleksandrovich, the necessity for the republic Council of Ministers to review the issue is obvious. Despite that, could you name the main reasons for concern. What is the situation today in general?

[KUTATELADZE] The resolution which we approved once again provides for a program of action comprised by measures, which were not forced upon us from above, but proposed by the enterprises themselves and their ministries for the 1985-1990 period. In summing up these promising outlines, we can define the main goal - emissions of hazardous substances into the atmosphere from stationary sources must be reduced to the minimum allowable level.

Today, figuratively speaking, half of the path has been covered. We had to stop and take a look at whether we have taken the correct route. Will we obtain the desired result by 1995? A deep analysis has been conducted of processes which have hindered our progress and the role of personnel factors in the resolution of ecological problems.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] What did the analysis show?

[KUTATELADZE] First of all, data from the Georgian SSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] were analyzed which showed that during the period 1986-1989 an overall tendency towards a reduction in emissions was observed as a result of conducting air quality protection measures.

So, if in 1986 532 thousand tons of hazardous substances were dumped into the atmosphere from stationary sources of air pollution, then already in 1989 they comprised 418 thousand tons, that is to say, during four years of the five year plan emissions of hazardous substances into the atmosphere by industrial enterprises were reduced by 21.4 percent in comparison to the level when the resolution went into effect.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] But that is in the republic as a whole...and in particular cases?

[KUTATELADZE] And if we take a look at concrete cases, then the picture becomes clearer who "pushed" this work forward and who created obstacles. The reduction of emissions was achieved largely by carrying out large-scale measures. For example, at the Rustavi metallurgical plant the complex reconstruction of a coking plant was completed, the old, worn-out coking plant was taken out of operation, the plan for agglomerate production was reduced, the construction of a gas and particle filtering system in the tube-rolling and tube-drawing shops was completed as well as other projects. Of course, all these undertakings cost money and quite a bit. But as a result of these undertakings the plant was able to reduce emissions of polluting substances into the atmosphere by 18.5 thousand tons per year. Now the Rustavi metallurgical plant annually dumps 56.3 thousand tons of hazardous substances into the air. And that is still too much, especially if you take into account the maximum allowable emissions level (PDV) for the plant is only approximately 7 thousand. It is clear what a huge amount of work we still need to do.

At the Zestafoni ferroalloy plant a modern gas scrubber was built for four ore furnaces. In the near future five more furnaces will be equipped with gas scrubbers. For more than 10 years this shop worked with no gas scrubbers at all. Now, as we see, the problem is being resolved.

At the Rustavi cement plant during the period in question modern equipment was installed and put into operation which will allow particle emissions into the atmosphere to be reduced by more than 6 thousand tons per year. However, to meet PDV requirements by 1995 the plant will have to complete the reconstruction of a number of shops. Currently the plant dumps more than 40 thousand tons of polluting substances into the atmosphere each year but by 1995 this figure cannot exceed 17 thousand.

We could cite other similar examples as well. The main conclusion that I want to draw is that currently the

overwhelming majority of the leaders of republic industrial enterprises have begun to face the problem of protecting the atmosphere.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] This regards the issue of "positive tendencies." But today they are not the only thing which determines the situation. A clear effort to hinder the pace of improving air quality is evident. That means that there are those leaders and officials, who, as you expressed it, are not trying very hard to "push" the work in the necessary direction.

[KUTATELADZE] My answer would not be complete if I didn't say that progress on reducing emissions into the atmosphere by republic industrial enterprises is behind established levels approximately by 100 thousand tons per year.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] The figures you cited above sort of pale in comparison with that figure.

[KUTATELADZE] Who was it that mainly slowed down this progress? The lion's share of responsibility is carried by the "Kaspitsemment" production association headed by General Director N.G. Vashadze. Essentially not one of the requirements of the 1985 resolutions was met here. The measures undertaken by the association have not been effective and have not produced palpable results. Apparently, the necessity has arisen for us to take radical measures such as issuing a resolution to close down the enterprise until shortcomings are eliminated or turning over the case to the procuracy office. Frankly speaking, I would rather not have to go to such an extreme, taking into account the huge demand in the republic for cement (after all, more than 700 thousand tons per year), but the health of current and future generations is more important.

Currently the "Kaspitsemment" association dumps 82 thousand tons of hazardous substances into the atmosphere while the established PDV level for this enterprise is not more than 19 thousand.

At the Tbilisi "Elektroizolit" plant (director - T.I. Tkavadze) also not one measure stipulated by that same resolution has been completed. To reach the PDV levels the plant needs to reduce hazardous emissions nine and a half times by 1995 but as of yet there have been no significant changes.

Among enterprises in a critical ecological situation are: the Kutais lithopone and Batumi oil refining plants, the Avchalskiy sheet silicate materials plant, the Khashuri and Borzhomi glass plants and a number of others. I say this so the public in the corresponding regions knows where the most serious danger is coming from. We are categorically against "brazen" industrial production - production at any cost. Our committee has taken the path of strengthening demands toward violators of clean air legislation.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] In government documents of recent years, both at the union and republic levels, a policy of utilizing market mechanisms for a solution to ecological deadlocks has been followed. The implementation of environmental protection measures often requires huge resources. The crux of the matter lies not so much in the old-style psychology of the economic manager (although that, of course, does exist) as in his financial helplessness.

[KUTATELADZE] That's true. Large capital investments are needed in nature preservation efforts. First of all, it's high time to put an end to the no-cost utilization of natural resources. The enterprise must pay for using water and for the inevitable emissions into the atmosphere. Additionally, if an established standard is exceeded then payment skyrockets geometrically. These sanctions will begin to be applied next year; they should fit in harmoniously in the context of the economic reform. In conditions of economic accountability it will become profitable for the enterprise to be ecologically disciplined.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] That concerns current ecological policy. But in many cases the "train already left." We need to resurrect what they've already managed to destroy.

[KUTATELADZE] An environmental protection fund must be created at the union, republic, city and rayon level. We have already submitted a draft for the republic fund. In the very near future the republic government will review it. Resources will come into the fund through three main channels: fines for ecological violations, resources which parties guilty of these violations will be forced to pay as compensation for inflicting damage, and payment for the utilization of resources which I already mentioned.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] What sum can the fund count on initially?

[KUTATELADZE] The draft talks about 5-6 million per year.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] A little thin.

[KUTATELADZE] I wouldn't say that. You have to start somewhere. If we just had one million right now, the problem in Kaspi would be resolved. We should not be idealists - it is impossible to solve all the ecological charades and riddles overnight. We need to purposefully spend resources, "extinguishing" the hotbeds of tension one after another but unswervingly.

[ZARYA VOSTOKA] And what directions are defined in the Council of Ministers' new resolution?

[KUTATELADZE] First of all, an upgrading of the role and responsibility of the local soviets. It is precisely they who must become the primary interested party, especially now that fundamental political changes are underway in society. Then the strict monitoring of how the ministries and departments are carrying out their obligations. The resolution pays special attention to the

timetables for the introduction into operation of new environmental protection facilities. In addition, the issue of "ecological adult education" is still crucial. Many of our economic managers in that sense are shockingly illiterate. But that is another entire stratum of

problems associated with the training of personnel for the environmental protection services among other reasons. On the whole I believe that carrying out this resolution will allow us in the next few years to noticeably clean up the air.

Split in RSFSR Komsomol Viewed

90UN1561A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Ulyanov, Vsevolozhsk Komsomol Gorkom secretary and 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress delegate: "Who Needs This Divorce?: Viewpoint of a Congress Delegate"]

[Text] *Today we are continuing a discussion begun in the article "A Different Point of View," written by A. Bek, V. Grayvoronskiy and P. Romanov (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 April 1990). This article by Vladimir Ulyanov was submitted to our editorial offices prior to the 21st Komsomol Congress. We hope that the congress will put an end to this debate.*

What happened at the congress of the RSFSR Komsomol organization? One group of delegates proclaimed an RSFSR Komsomol. Another, as if for spite, formed a Russian Democratic Socialist Association and declared their right to a portion of the All-Union Komsomol's property, its apparatus, etc. A schism occurred. Sensational? Yet this "exceptional event" went unnoticed by the public. What was the reason for that?

Let us begin by saying that this fact is apparently of little concern to either of the two opposing sides. The Komsomol has long since ceased to exist as a many millions-strong community of young people linked by something more than raykom membership cards. Yet at the same time there exists a Komsomol apparatus which is attempting "in the old way" or "in the new way" to build its policy on this very unsolid ground, the mythical 30 million members of the organization.

But is a small circle of enthusiasts and political leaders perhaps waging an implacable ideological struggle for the future of our society, striving to bring real improvement to people's lives and to get the younger generation involved in this, against a backdrop of young people's overall political passivity and indifference? In that case, why all the dissension?

Let us turn to "A Different Point of View," the authors of which, they claim, differ from the RSFSR Komsomol in that they "do not suffer from the lack of a clear political platform and objectives and do not need any 'stimuli' to form them." Unfortunately there are no well-defined political objectives to be found in their document, either. Unless it might be the following: "The Russian Democratic Socialist Association (RDSA) is hereby established for the purpose of aiding our country's peaceful, parliamentary transition to a humane, democratic, rule-of-law state based on a civil society with a dignified standard of living." Well, that is a splendid goal. But are there any politicians who would not proclaim something along those same lines?

In what way do the RDSA's goals differ from the positions taken by the RSFSR Komsomol and the All-Union Komsomol? Not at all. It is not in contrast to the

the Russian Komsomol and All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, but rather in unison with them (see the All-Union Komsomol's Program Objectives issued prior to the congress) that the RDSA, instead of formulating political goals, speculates in layman fashion about some sort of society without contradictions, all the while manipulating the same old slogans.

Perhaps the sole "innovation" in which the RDSA can take pride is the slogan "the minority is not subordinate to the majority." The authors of the document stubbornly defend the "democratic nature" of this principle, yet they appeal to the majority at the 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress. And, we are led to believe, they expect some kind of decision from that majority. Let us assume that they win such a majority, which in view of the present disarray is quite possible. What right will our "democrats" grant to the minority who hold other views? There can be only one answer to this question: the rights of the minority are determined by the majority. And in case of disagreement the minority has two choices: either submit or leave.

I could understand the authors of "A Different Point of View" if they had convened immediately after the congress and withdrawn from the Komsomol. That would be the honest thing to do. But... It is on this "but" that everything hinges. And specifically, on the issue of Komsomol property. It is that property and nothing else which worries the authors of "A Different Point of View." Whereas the greater portion of the congress delegates, after declaring the new republic organization and throwing their support behind it, went home satisfied, the minority was shut out and is now demanding its due. It is this interest which underlies the political friction and the high-flown phrases on both sides.

At the 21st Congress we should act on the objective situation in which the Komsomol presently finds itself. That is, we should begin to form an essentially new organization or several organizations essentially from the ground up. What can serve as the basis for this?

Any community of individuals arises out of common goals, out of ideological affinity. And that means that the first thing must be to bring up the question of a program—both theoretically and practically well-founded—in which there will be no place for general phrases like "rule-of-law state," "civil society" and other such abstractions. There should be a description of the society toward which the members of the new organization aspire, along with a definition of ways to move in its direction. Only on this basis can there occur consolidation of some and a parting of ways with others. Only thus can we begin. All the rest will be just sorting things out from top to bottom, as we have grown accustomed to do and are capable of doing.

Most likely the upcoming All-Union Komsomol congress will not prove capable of resolving this fundamental question. We are too well prepared for debates

about structures, property and organizational principles. Yet we have forgotten that we are going to be composing essentially new policy.

Therefore there is only one question which still puzzles me after reading "A Different Point of View." How great must be the irresponsibility (or at best the carelessness) of our Komsomol leaders for them to permit themselves this sort of political games at this time, games which cost us dearly in a material sense and also cause immense moral harm to every young person. Because in the final analysis these games create a lack of confidence in any political activity and in any political organization. This also nullifies the efforts of that (completely unnoticed) minority which is attempting to make the Komsomol into a truly viable political youth organization.

Speeches from 21st Komsomol Congress Debate

Belorussia's Kudlash

90US0812A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 p 2

[Speech by Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Vladimir Kudlash]

[Text] Comrades, I would nevertheless like to ask an opportunity to speak out within the framework of the regulations.

Every one of us bears responsibility for the fate of the Komsomol. We are faced with a choice on what our league will be like, and what path it will follow in the future. It is my profound conviction that at the congress we must continue the dialog on the reform of our league, and on the future Komsomol [VLKSM]. And I stress, the VLKSM as a youth organization, and not some kind of new structure or new organization set up on its base. At our own republic conference, held on the eve of our congress, the majority of Belorussian Komsomol members spoke out for the preservation of a unified youth league, with mandatory broad independence of republic organizations in resolving all questions; that is, for a reformed Komsomol on federative principles. In our view, turning the Komsomol into a depolitized youth movement, and the orientation toward eroding its organizational structure—are not a way out of the crisis, but merely an imitation of serious intentions and a secret attempt to break up the Komsomol as a political organization. In a number of places this has, by the way, already been successfully done.

We see the Komsomol's main goal as uniting the young people in support of radical reform and humanization of society, establishing total popular rule, and defending the rights and interests of its members above all. Our opponents accuse us of the fact that the organization lacks a purposeful, progressive idea with which to unite the young people. That is not true! In my view there is such an ideal—and that is the ideal of the reformation of socialist society.

I am disturbed by the fact that recently informal groups from the Komsomol have become the fashion. The newly-emergent Komsomol reformers, and these are basically former Komsomol workers, are attracted by political slogans, declarations, and ostentatious demonstrations of their own ultra-intellectual and revolutionary positions. Many of their ideas are gleaned from populist aspirations, which are divorced from the realities of today. I think there is no less danger to Komsomol reform from the desire to keep everything as it was, than from the thoughtless, purely emotional desire to run far out in front, regardless of the direction.

For example, the USSR Law on Parties and Social Organizations is still in the drafting stage, and before we even know what kind of law it will be, we are already making statements on the necessity for eliminating Komsomol organizations in the Armed Forces and law-enforcement organs, and appeals are heard to withdraw from manufacturing and academic institutions. Without even mentioning the basis for such statements, one must above all think about what this will do for a young person; what benefit will members of our league receive from this step; and how will we then protect their interests and rights? In the haze of polemics we can lose sight of the person, for the sake of whom the fundamental reform of the youth league is necessary.

For some reason the ideological aspects are left behind in the disputes and discussions about the future Komsomol. Moreover, in many of the pseudo-revolutionary proposals one can see rejection of the communist orientation of the league.

Today, of course, it is hard for a young person to judge the significance and value of Marxist-Leninist theory. Many of the ideals which lie at the basis of the conception of socialism have not been assimilated; for years they were consciously distorted and silenced; or they were interpreted narrowly, and remain unrealized. At the same time attempts have appeared to foist upon the young people the idea of the futility of Marxist-Leninist teachings themselves.

In my opinion one of the main tasks of the Komsomol must be to propagate and explain communist ideology to the young people and to help them understand it. Study of our Marxist-Leninist heritage will help them gain a deeper understanding of the true socialist values, eliminate that which distorts the revolutionary theory and appearance of socialism, and purge it of extraneous features and distortions. Only thus will we be able to look into the future and depict the basic parameters, the main feature of which is the democratic and humane aspect of socialism, to which Soviet society is heading via perestroika. In carrying out this task, we need the concrete assistance of the CPSU. Restructuring the relationships between the party and the Komsomol is in my view a most important aspect of party reform. But many party committees have forgotten about their reserve, and do not think about the future of the party. A process of alienation of young people from the CPSU has begun.

Whereas two or three years ago 70-plus percent of the new people coming into the party were young people, today it is less by half. The party must fight for the young people and not ignore the restructuring of the Komsomol, but assist in its reform; moreover, not only on a theoretical plane but in the organizational and financial aspects as well, and must support it in practical work. In determining the future of the Komsomol we are obliged to undertake thorough analysis of whether the interests of the Komsomol and the state coincide. I believe that in the extremely tense socio-economic situation that has come to pass in the country, the most important tasks of Komsomol organizations must be to inculcate in the young men and women a conscientious attitude toward labor. We must openly admit that today, the Komsomol is not greatly disturbed by these questions. While some things have been done to open funds for young people; for Komsomol organizations to take part in the work of the soviets of working collectives and for setting up youth sections for collective contracts; for creating MZhK [Youth Housing Complexes] and NTTM [Scientific-Technical Creativity for Young People] systems; and for developing cost-accounting youth associations, joint enterprises and cooperatives—we have completely forgotten about the role of the Komsomol in production. We have the right to demand that the government improve the situation of the young people. But on the other hand, we ourselves are obligated to first of all direct all our means and efforts toward defending the interests of the young people, and to improve their situation in society.

Today I cannot avoid speaking about the problem associated with the Chernobyl disaster and eliminating its consequences. A great deal is being done in the republic, but the tragedy is so great that our own efforts do not suffice. This is a national disaster.

The Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee Bureau recently appealed to the nation's Supreme Soviet and to Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev personally, to proclaim 21 April an All-Union Communist Subbotnik in support of a fund to help the victims of Chernobyl. I would like to call upon the delegates at the congress to support our proposal to hold a Subbotnik, and propose adopting a special resolution on questions of eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, which we are ready to submit. I think the delegates would agree with me on the fact that the realization of much of what we are working on will depend upon the membership of the Central Committee which we are electing, and upon its Bureau and Secretariat.

During the period of preparation for the congress a wide variety of positions and points of view on the restructuring of our youth league have appeared. Without going into detail, I would say that no one has seriously undertaken to work out a conception of perestroika in the Komsomol. Nor is there any clarity in tactical questions. We have declared that the Komsomol is a socio-political organization, but to a great extent the politics have gone in one direction, and the Komsomol in another.

Comrade delegates! We are in a very difficult situation. The spectrum of opinions is so wide, that many of them must be considered wild, while others demand serious collective analysis. Let us then, together, approach every opinion in a responsible manner in order to select the most promising path, worthy of Lenin's Komsomol, so that none of us is ashamed of the consequences before those who come after us.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Editor Fronin

90US0812B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 p2

[Speech by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Chief Editor Vladislav Fronin]

[Text] Comrades! Let us recall how many times the youth press has been drubbed for its boldness and audacity, for having its own opinion and a maximalist position. And nevertheless we must agree that it has become not only a mirror image, but also a catalyst of the democratic processes in society and in the Komsomol.

It is another question, whether the printed word or the reality of life has brought the people out onto the squares, and has politicized our life to the extreme. I do not think that any of us would assert that "the press is to blame for everything." The press cannot be better than life. Along with all other citizens, journalists sense their own responsibility for what is taking place in the country.

Nor are journalists free from subjectivism or mistakes, and at times make superficial judgments on serious things. And we interpret comradely criticism of such mistakes as a desire to help affirm freedom of speech, and responsibility for the spoken word. But we are opposed to using criticism of individual mistakes for accusations of political unreliability.

For decades we have all been bringing up consumers of idealism and have been serving up ready-made philosophies, and a normal person must endure this. Unfortunately, even today, some—expect, and others—demand from propaganda, ready-made truths.

A storm of reaction descended on the editors from juveniles and young people after the recent publication of the article, "The Political Child." They were offended by the act of 17-year-old Eduard Chaltsev, who had decided to change the system for the better with a bottle of flammable liquid.

In publishing the materials, we anticipated reaction of the type, "Just look at what your press has led young people to do," or "What an example you serve up, defending a terrorist." And there were also phone calls. I would like to read today some material from the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article, "Brothers, to Whom Have You Sold Out?" I think that this article will serve to answer such questions.

We proceed from the fact that we have something to do with the moral tragedies of such "political children" of the first generation whose conception of the world was formed under conditions of glasnost and the unvarnished and sometimes torturous truth about the state of affairs in the country—in a period of re-examination of all values and guidelines, as well as the aggressive struggle of one with another, for all of which young people are not in the mood.

We at KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA perceive the principal needs of the kids as follows: first of all, to close ranks, to have a sense of community as a generation, and not broken up as individuals; secondly, to learn. To learn politics. And what "to learn politics" means, we shall try to determine together in the course of the work of the "Political Lyceum," the opening of which was announced in the pages of the newspaper. Our task is an educational and academic one—in the mainstream of the programmed goals, which were declared from this rostrum. We are striving to provide the lads maximum opportunities for genuine, individual choice of one political view or another on the basis of complete, personal self-determination. But we shall remember that early, strict politization in any ideology, without a foundation or in-depth knowledge and culture, will only harm the development of an individual and give birth to political hacks, functionaries and demagogues of various hues. Which, it seems, has happened to us now.

We must not act contrary to the objective processes taking place. If we stand for the old, orthodox interpretation of socialist ideals, our youth league will hardly appear attractive to the young people.

Let us take a look at the events taking place from this point of view. We are saying that the social forces, including the youth, are not divided into national quarters. If this is an objective process, and it is just that, then admonitions will hardly be of help here. The pendulum has swung to one side, waiting for the moment of truth. Common human values must grow, and they will inevitably grow from national values. The young people, crudely speaking, having "devoured an internationalism" prepared from unnatural products of official propaganda, have developed an allergy to it. And they have unwittingly resorted to popular medicine. The time must come when the allergy passes. But this does not, of course, mean waiting passively. It is necessary to act. But how?

If we continue to flavor our newspaper articles and speeches with high-flown appeals to friendship among the nations, losing our contact with life, we would only be adding salt to the wound, and accelerating the centrifugal trends. A Lithuanian must feel like a Lithuanian, a Russian like a Russian, and a Tatar like a Tatar, before they grow and change into the kind of people who consciously and sincerely profess common human values. Only then will they possess a sufficient sense of common human culture.

Here too KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is not taking up the role of the principal youth newspaper as it had for many long years. There are now many respectable youth newspapers in the country, which are the "principal" ones for their readers. We understand realistically that the process of decentralization makes itself known in the information market as well. It's a fact. We are prepared to fight for our readers throughout the country by means of our professional work. For example, with the support of the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee the editors of YOSH LENINCHI publish KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA every month in the Uzbek language. This is the beginning of the new future for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA as a nationwide youth newspaper, which must come to its readers in their native language too.

The program goals of our youth league proclaim: Not, man—for the organization; but the organization—for the man! With respect to a newspaper, that signifies that a newspaper is—first of all, for its readers. Thus the question arises of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA as the nationwide youth newspaper.

Without getting into a theoretical dispute, I would like to bring to your attention our conception of the differences between the Central Committee organ, and the socio-political newspaper of the Komsomol or the Komsomol (Central Soviet, FDS (depending upon what the congress decides)).

To a large extent KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA no longer simply reflects the line of the central committee. But through the expression of the widest spectrum of opinions, it participates in the formulation of that line. This—is the first reality.

The Komsomol has rejected a monopoly on young people. There must exist feedback between our organization and the "non-league youth." And this—is the second reality. The Komsomol does not have the right to turn down the opportunity to influence, by newspaper, the youth milieu as a whole, and public opinion in the interest of young people and the Komsomol. Thus, the socio-political newspaper will not identify completely with the central committee, and will be open to the various points of view, conceptions and opinions which exist in the youth milieu and in society. Only under these conditions can the newspaper be a bridge between the central committee and society, and between the central committee and the broad masses of young people.

We are speaking of civic concord in society, on the need for dialogue and uniting the democratic forces. Formation of public opinion via the newspaper in these conditions cannot lead to merely propagating the view of the central committee. The organ of the central committee is deprived of this option. And if we are speaking of the genuine unification in practice of the entire democratic bloc, then I would reiterate: that one can gather the various interests and express them only via a mass newspaper read by all strata of the populace, and not

only by members of the organization. (Incidentally, no one is keeping us from making the magazine KOMSOMOLSKAYA ZHIZN a weekly for the intra-league information of the Komsomol Central Committee.)

It goes without saying, there is another way out—return to the strict supervision, and “screw on the supervision nut” more tightly. But these “nuts” are rusty, and later—the threads might be stripped. We must realize—this will harm the Komsomol Central Committee above all. It was not without the help of the popular mass newspaper that the Komsomol was able to deliver deputy mandates to its candidates. Only through a popular mass newspaper can the public be made aware of the proceedings of our congresses and plenums. Our participation in drawing up the state youth policy and putting it into effect will be sensed through the popular press. It is namely via the popular press that one can have an influence on the corps of deputies, on the party committees, and on the ministries and departments, while defending the interests of the young people and the Komsomol. And finally, a few tens of millions in profits will not hinder our youth organization. All of this—is in the hands of the founders of the socio-political newspaper; that is, the Komsomol and the Komsomol Central Committee.

Ever since there has been a Komsomol press, there have been continual disputes and conflicts between the editors and Komsomol committees, and threatening letters on the rights of Komsomol committees over the editors. And this misfortune proceeds, in my view, from the arbitrariness of the Komsomol committees themselves; for they are not the masters: they are not the readers of our newspaper.

The hasty and intemperate strivings to withdraw from the party newspaper publishing houses reminds one of the little boy who wanted to run away from home, without knowing where to run and with nothing in his hands. The Komsomol has neither the buildings, nor the printing plants, nor the newsprint, and correspondingly has neither the self-interest nor the power to resolve the problems of youth newspapers. This topic requires serious discussion, perhaps at a plenum of the future Komsomol Central Committee. But, in my view, it absolutely demands economic analysis, legal counsel and precision. Otherwise, the Komsomol committees, especially in the localities, might reject the rights of publishing; but without printing plants, without paper, and the editors of youth newspapers will receive only their freedom.

Quite recently Komsomol journalists received a salary increase. But today it is no secret to anyone that all the profits from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA are placed at the disposal of party and Komsomol organs. But the editors remain one-on-one with their problems. We believe that the old “procedure,” in which the profits, “to the last kernel,” were deposited in the granaries of the founders and publishers, who graciously allowed a little to be taken for writing paper, pens and telephone

calls—such a “procedure” must not be retained in the new conditions. Our proposal: for radically restoring the health of the newspaper, in order that the newspaper enters the epoch of economic reform with confidence, and does not fall apart or disappear in the rapidly-changing world—it is necessary to resort to economic reform in the newspaper's relationships with the founders and publishers.

In a little over a month, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA will be 65 years old. It has no intentions of changing its name for a more “contemporary, less-ideologically-sounding” name, as they like to say today. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA will remain the beloved “Komsomolka” for its millions of readers.

Kazakhstan's Tasmagambetov

90US0812C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 pp 2-3

[Speech by Kazakhstan Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Imangali Tasmagambetov]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades!

I will start with the main question, which directly or indirectly is heard not only from this rostrum—will there or will there not be a Komsomol? The conclusion of the delegates to the extraordinary 17th Kazakh Komsomol Congress was identical—We are for a reformed Komsomol that is genuinely democratic, and free of all fetters and dogmatism. And today's situation, that has come to pass in the Komsomol with all the radical changes of the last three years, vividly shows how irreversible is the “de-federalized” youth organization. I am confident that if we are more decisive and persistent in carrying out democratic transformations, we could truly succeed in these radical changes in political life. Why have things happened this way? Why were we, with our powerful intellectual support, unable to see a model for a young people's political organization of a new type? One cannot say there was no search, but it finally turned into a “search” for a safe position for the staff, while not entering and at the same time ignoring all the processes taking place in republic Komsomol organizations. Taking hasty and almost hysterical decisions right after the events had taken place became, unfortunately, the pitiful practice of the Komsomol Central Committee and its Bureau. I don't think there is any need to prove this with examples. The amorphous position of the Central Committee Bureau is confirmed by its attitude to the question of the Komsomol Regulations. Many people are attempting to make the concepts of unity and a uniform Regulation the same. There is undoubtedly such a point of view in our Komsomol organization too. But only a minority share it. I won't deny it; at times it involuntarily heats up: How can this happen, they say; if we break up the league by national “quarters” we destroy our unity. This, in my view, is a very dangerous, perfidious tendency. The essence of unity is based on equal partnership. The ideological community would be replaced

by a leveling of rights and opportunities, interests, and a kind of political leveling. Pardon me, but that is a conscious attempt to break up the league, to break it up into weak, puppet-like republic leagues, with a strong bureaucratic apparatus at the center. What is this if not the remnants of the totalitarian administrative-command approach? I anticipate the question, what is the position of the Kazakh Komsomol? Permit me in this connection, by authorization of the delegates, to familiarize you with the decision of our forum. The congress approved a policy aimed at Komsomol unity; we stand for unity of political views and uniform goals for republic leagues. The paths to achieving them may differ, and they must be defined in the regulations and programs in the localities. On a nationwide scale, it would seem expedient to work out a Komsomol Regulation or other document that defines the principal positions for consolidation of independent youth leagues, and general norms and principles for Komsomol membership.

And now to a painful question—the role of the center, that is the Komsomol Central Committee, which in its present form does not coincide with the ideas that life itself brings out. We favor a Central Committee with the rights of a soviet of republic youth leagues. Moreover, we must delegate the rights of the Central Committee, apparently, within the bounds of coordinating representation with a small staff; and incidentally, also made up according to our proposals. A strong federated league, based on an ideological platform and multiple paths to the common goal. Fictitious unity on the basis of unitarianism and rigid subordination to an imaginary center we do not need. Therefore, I stress once again, we must create a new, unconditionally strong organ, but strong not in authority, but strong in agreements among republics.

A few words in connection with the situation in our republic. Although the delegates believe that it is not worthwhile talking about regional problems, with which I am in complete agreement; nevertheless I want to tell about the development of a model youth organization. Are there are nationality problems "with the label of Kazakh nationalism" among the youth of Kazakhstan today? Undoubtedly there are. We are opposed to hasty conclusions, against groundless uproars in the press, when any social conflict that breaks out is considered inter-ethnic strife. We sense this in our multi-national republic. One gets the impression that someone in the center wants the fringes, which they consider us to this day, would continue to be provinces, and that their thoughts and actions would not find their voices and the right to solve their affairs themselves. For some reason they are also giving birth to half-hearted laws on genuine sovereignty, which are not satisfactory to the people, who are unhappy with the nuclear test ranges in Kazakhstan; in Uzbekistan—with the domination of monocultures; in the Baltic and in Siberia—with the chemical giants and so forth and so on.

The center has a ready answer—nationalism. But here, perhaps, the main thing is—departmental interests. Who if not we could put an end to this vicious circle? We have firmly stated that we support the intentions of our republic government, and in case the problems are drawn out, we shall unilaterally resolve the question of property and sovereignty.

Please understand me correctly: this is not a path to schism and exclusiveness; it is not a political pose, but common sense, based on the yearnings of mothers, whose children have not learned to walk, who have filled countless children's cemeteries on the banks of the now-deadly Aral Sea; for those who suffer from radiation poisoning; for our declassé peasants on the other side of the barbed wire from Semipalatinsk and Baykonur.

We stand firmly on the positions of internationalism and therefore declare: "Soviet multi-national Kazakhstan does not need crumbs in the form of the miserly deductions; for this is humiliating to all the nations, without exception, who live in the republic. The republic itself must dispose of that which belongs to it by right and no more." And the chief national interest of Kazakhstan today is political and economic sovereignty for the republic; the right to full property ownership, to all the riches and minerals in the earth, and to the national economic complex created by the labor of many generations. Thus, federalism in the state is closely connected with a federal system for our youth league. We are in favor of a strong country, based on republics with equal rights. And we shall not part from this concept.

The Komsomol of Kazakhstan is in favor of a progressive, monolithic organization; but also favors its strong and stable foundation—the republic, oblast, kray, city and primary organizations. We say frankly that we are in favor of a unified Komsomol, based on unity of goals; but on a variety of models of internal structure, and specific paths; that is, different regulations. We are for federalism—that is the first thing.

Secondly, we are namely in favor of a Leninist league. We completely support the conception of development of studies and formation of one's personality, expressed by Vladimir Ilich Lenin at the third RKSM [Russian Komsomol] Congress.

And third: We categorically speak out against attempts at ideological-political apostasy on the plane of misrepresenting the principles of communism. We are in favor of communist ideals and understand them not as dogma. And those for whom they have become unattractive—they are not with us.

And finally, on our inter-relationship with the party. We are for independence. I think that after the speech of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev there is no need to go into detail. I would only say that the time which the party is going through is a difficult one. And in this connection I would like to quote the words of Valentin Rasputin, a people's deputy, and incidentally a non-party member,

which he spoke at the First Congress of People's Deputies: "Being a party member was advantageous; therefore it has lost prestige. Now it is not advantageous to belong to the party; moreover, it is dangerous. And to abandon it at such a moment hardly takes courage, as it seems to unsophisticated people; it is the very same reasoning that used to bring people into the party."

History has no rough drafts. We have the same history, and have no right to reject it; and by helping the party today, the Komsomol determines its own fate.

Uzbekistan's NasYROV

90US0812D Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 p 3

[Speech by Uzbekistan Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Azis NasYROV]

[Text] Comrade delegates! In the name of the delegation from Uzbekistan I wish to say that we are not here in order to, emphasizing what came before, liquidate the Komsomol; and not in order to acknowledge our ideological-political weakness. I speak these words because I already sense that some people have already "wrung their hands," saying that the Congress will not decide anything anyway; others, on the other hand have begun to "draw the line" with pugnacious fervor under the history of the Komsomol. I am confident that our congress possesses sufficient intellectual and spiritual potential to reform the Komsomol. And we must implement it.

What disturbs me is the fact that the authors of the draft program documents for the youth league fear like fire the words, "communist" and "Leninist."

The proposed ideological platform is very much eroded. While giving due respect to the boldness and decisiveness of the drafts of the Declaration and the programmed goals, I would like to note the diplomacy of their drafters. Defining our organization as—a Federation for democratic socialism, they are essentially proposing the gradual elimination of the Communist Youth League.

Allow me to ask: is the Komsomol really not in favor of socialist choice, or will the change of signboards play the role of Aladdin's magic lamp?

However justified such an ideological turnabout is—after all, the draft Regulation proposed to the Congress speaks out for strengthening the Komsomol. Is it not too early to reject the classic approach? And we cannot understand why not a single document, including the variant Komsomol Programs proposed by the republic Komsomol and approved by a regional conference of delegates of the republics of Central Asia, has not been considered in the documents presented to the delegates. And this was the opinion of about 300 delegates to the congress. Among the young people in our republic there is a strong desire to equalize the chances for social

development, and to eliminate poverty and unemployment. Even in these conditions voluntary acceptance of communist moral values is possible, as well as readiness to help, share something, and even deprive oneself for the sake of others. If we do not help strengthen these national aspirations on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideals, the political consequences may be unpredictable.

We must recognize this truth: youth leagues of the various republics, by virtue of the uniqueness of each, are at different stages of the political movement. Even leaps and bounds, as we know from our own historic example, have their negative consequences. And this is why a socialist renaissance of national dignity and culture, and salvation from ecological and spiritual catastrophe, are for us top priority tasks.

The moral experience and mentality of the young people of the major industrial cities, scientific and student centers of the RSFSR or the Ukraine, and those of the towns and villages of the Central Asian republics are significantly different. But the idea of equality is attractive to everyone. But exporting views and meetings and confrontations with the CPSU may produce results opposite of what we desire. Having fully-defined ideological partners, the youth leagues of our regions are obliged to be realists in their estimates of the political maturity of the masses, and they must proceed from the real situation. Therefore, we are in favor of a federative system for the Komsomol, while preserving its ideological unity. And it would be democratic to propose that the union republic Komsomol organizations have their own program goals. Let it be within the framework of the Komsomol, and not only among part of the leaders, that the various approaches take shape and truly manifest themselves. I am confident that they are sufficiently close to the principal positions. This will permit forming an ideological and socio-political Komsomol platform within two or three years. Otherwise, once again, there will be a revolution from above.

In turn we would like to propose to our friends from the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, in order to develop our experience in working together, to adopt joint resolutions on setting up a coordinating council with a common institute on youth problems; and all this within the framework of a unified Komsomol.

Today the youthful rejection of everything and everyone unites both those who are 20 and those who are 50. They are also united in their striving to harshly condemn the tragic revolutionary past, and the life of Lenin and his ideals. I make no secret of it; I await with great trepidation the manner in which our respected KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and other authoritative publications react to the 120th birthday of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Indisputably, we must purge ourselves of falsely embellishing the name of the founder of the party and the Soviet state. But the Komsomol must remain Leninist.

Yes, young people have grown tired of waiting. As if a lot had been done on which to base the need for and

maintenance of a state youth policy. And at the very same time the Komsomol on the whole does not have its own, purposeful youth policy. Even experimental social programs like MZhK [Youth Housing Complexes], NTTM [Scientific-Technical Youth Creativity] and "young peoples' labor associations," provide yields to a very limited social stratum.

While we talk about politization, we are in fact losing political authority. Judge for yourselves: to a large extent the Committee on Youth Affairs at the USSR Supreme Soviet was established on the initiative of the Komsomol. It strives to energetically influence state policy, and has its own position. And the Komsomol? One cannot ascertain that our people's deputies are acting in concert, and purposefully. Just take the critical problem of unemployment. In connection with the fact that the USSR People's Deputies from the Komsomol have four more years to work, I shall introduce a proposal that the congress confirms their authority, and appoints from among our delegates a Commission for Drafting the Komsomol Youth Policy for the 13th Five-Year Plan.

If Komsomol organizations truly enjoy a great deal of prestige among the young people, they will be considered a real political force. But thus far the Komsomol has essentially been the loser in elections of people's deputies at the republic and local levels. Being a member of the Central Committee Bureau, I acknowledge my own responsibility for the political errors of the Komsomol in the past election campaigns. During that period the political bloc of the party and the Komsomol was not sufficiently supported. Apparently the CPSU Central Committee did not clearly explain to local party organizations its position of political support to the Komsomol in the elections. And the Komsomol Central Committee in general neglected this question. We, the communists who work in the Komsomol must give a great deal of thought to ensuring that the interests of the young people are represented at the forthcoming party congresses and conferences.

In consideration of the fact that the CPSU Central Committee Platform declares its readiness for comradely cooperation with the Komsomol and its readiness to invite the Komsomol to work out the political line of the party, we shall introduce a proposition to approve a special letter from our congress, addressed to the 28th CPSU Congress. Such a document could contain ideas for the resolution of a party congress on interaction with the Komsomol.

In conclusion, I shall state our vision of perestroika in the Komsomol: through politization and emancipation of spontaneous intra-Komsomol activity, to active innovation of all Komsomol leagues and organizations; to creating the conditions for the social development of young people and each individual. Thank you for your attention.

Mary Oblast's Kalinov

90US0812E Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 pp 3-4

[Speech by Mary Oblast Komsomol Obkom First Secretary Mikhail Kalinov]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies, I have been asked to say a few words about Comrade Mironenko's report which we heard yesterday. In our view the report did not designate all the problems facing the Komsomol today; and those which were named were basically done in a nominal manner, as if in passing, and neither gave rise to any discussion nor became a topic of conversation for those speaking at the debates.

On my attitude toward the Komsomol Regulations presented to the congress, I believe that it is a rather progressive document in many respects; however, upon discussion in Komsomol organizations, the opinion was expressed that this draft is a document from a series of documents for Moscow and Moscow Oblast. One frequently encounters the opinion with respect to this document, that the draft Regulations to a large extent envisage a mechanism for breaking up the Komsomol into tiny, quarreling factions, and not for its consolidation; and at the very same time, the draft Regulation stipulates, by means of the active work of the minority, fewer rights for the majority today than for the minority.

While mentioned too timidly in the program documents, in the Komsomol Regulations we come to such terms as, "communist ideology," "Leninism," and "devotion to the ideals of the party and work with the party." All of this is somehow obscured by general terms.

A few words and specific proposals for the draft Regulations. I believe that the preamble to the Komsomol Regulations, in addition to those tasks which are defined as goals of the Komsomol, should contain the following: "Komsomol participation in social and state youth policy." This phrase is not yet there. If we are truly the initiators for working out and implementing youth policy, then we should stipulate this for ourselves both in the regulations and in the program documents.

Secondly, I believe it necessary to note in the regulatory documents, that the Komsomol should have equal rights and opportunities in carrying out its own activity with all youth organizations and others, including the party and trade unions, and should independently decide its goals and tasks.

Third. Relationships with state and social organizations must be constructed strictly on constitutional and other legal bases. And most important—for limitations on Komsomol activity on ideological and other bases not to have the force of law, is considered unacceptable.

On finances. I believe that it should be recorded in the following manner: Membership dues shall be the property of the union republic Komsomols and shall be designated for carrying out the goals and tasks of the

Komsomol organization as a whole. Other kinds of income shall be the property of the primary, rayon, okrug, oblast or kray organization at which they are gathered.

Out of the multitude of problems and tasks before the congress today, I would like to turn to questions of implementing youth policy. A great many variations have been proposed today for implementing the given policy. I believe that this should become a principal sector of Komsomol activity. The conditions and factors which determine the movement of society and the movement of the Komsomol will change. However, no matter what kind of conceptions, theories and mechanisms we set up, they will never remove from the agenda the matter of youth problems in society. To whom is this addressed? Well, to those who have declared their voluntary rejection of monopoly with respect to young people; and we too are ready to reject, with an incredible feeling of relief, what has become a traditional responsibility of the Komsomol, for expressing and protecting the interests of that part of the young people who are today not in our ranks. While declaring in the Regulation and in the program documents of the Komsomol that our goal is to help the young person, we have forgotten to record that which I was speaking about, namely the necessity of taking part in implementing youth policy.

The draft law, "On the General Principles of State Youth Policy in the USSR," was adopted at the first reading. This provides the basis for saying that the ice has been broken in our society with respect to youth problems. The principal shortcoming of the given draft law consists of the fact that its action will be directed basically toward resolving youth problems of society and the state; and at the very same time it very nearly does not stipulate any mechanism for the young people themselves and their organization to solve their own problems in the present society and in the present state. Meanwhile it is namely in this case that the goal, position and role of the Komsomol is most clearly depicted, as an organization which brings young people together not just to take part in the creation of a democratic socialist society, but above all to resolve the problems of young people in concrete conditions and at specific levels of social development. You see, such a goal for the organization would be closer to the conception of each young person and would significantly bolster his sense of the vital activity of our organizations. This, in essence, is the only long-term task and program of the Komsomol: active participation in the formulation and implementation of youth policy; moreover, not as a petitioner and a parasite of the state, but as an active subject of this policy.

As long as a society exists there will be young people, and there will be problems in society and problems of young people in the given society; and that, in other words, is the goal, the task and the essence of the Komsomol's activities. The nature, severity and substance of the problems will change; the nature of the substance of Komsomol activity will change, and so will those youth organizations who orient their work on expressing and

defending certain of the socially-significant interests of the young person. Thus, questions of youth policy can and must become the sole platform which consolidates all possible youth organizations, associations and movements, since they are based on one and the same social base—the young people, taking into consideration the multitude and diversity of interests of its separate categories.

And now a few words about the regional aspect of the formulation and implementation of youth policy. In consideration of the increasing role of local self-administration, and the specific nature and level of development of the regions of our country, one of the key problems and factors which determines the most complete realization of the basic aspects of youth policy is the lack of a unified, scientifically-based methodology for working out and implementing regional programs for youth development as a fundamental instrument for realizing the youth policy. As the work experience of our sociological laboratory shows, serious and thorough work is also needed at the present level; or else the law, if it is passed, will not provide the desired effect without the appropriate mechanisms, and will lack specific instruments for implementing it. In this connection there is a proposal for the future membership of the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau, on the necessity for immediately organizing the study of available experience of scientific research and elaborations on the methodology for formulating and implementing a regional youth policy. It is also necessary to form a creative collective. We would be able to share our experience, and perhaps other regions could as well. The moreso, since according to the numerous appeals to us at the Komsomol Obkom, I am aware that there is a need for this in many regions.

And once again on a problem which also has a serious effect today on the capability of completely reaching the goals and tasks of our youth policy—the unpreparedness of the state administrative structure at all levels to implement a uniform state youth policy for the present day. The structure of the legislative and executive authorities, which has evolved over the latest decades, requires serious re-examination at all levels. One of the reasons for posing the question this way is that this structure to a large extent was set up on the branch principle: industry, construction, transport, agriculture and so on. This is the principle by which Soviets at all levels, which are officially called People's, are elected, whereas in practice I would call them branch deputies, since they represent first of all the interests of their branches. In this instance, as historical practice shows, absolute priority is given, naturally, to solving problems of the branches, and not those of the people, their electors, in all their variety and socio-demographic peculiarities, with their specific interests, needs and wants. And the entire mechanism of executive authority operates in the very same way. Therefore, such concepts as the human factor and the social priority of state policy remain pretentious slogans, which are not backed up

with a concrete mechanism for implementing them, and which are not put into practice. Perhaps this is one of the serious problems which hinder the harmonious development of society, and which give rise to so much dissatisfaction among the people, and especially the young. What are our proposals on this plane? We believe that without purposeful organizational-structural support for a youth policy, it is impossible to put it into practice. Therefore, it is proposed that: In addition to the Committee on Youth Affairs at the USSR Supreme Soviet, a department of youth affairs should be set up in the structure of the USSR Council of Ministers, the person in charge of which would be appointed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Also, to ensure the integrity of the system of organizational support for youth policy measures, it is necessary to create a corresponding youth service in ministries and departments, as has been done in Goskomtrud USSR. And a department of the Council of Ministers could coordinate the activity of the youth subdivisions of the ministries and departments.

I propose that a corresponding structure be set up at all levels of legislative and executive authority, right down to the people's deputies' executive committees at the rayon and city level. It is also necessary to clarify and supplement the Law on People's Control, in order to introduce youth subdivisions to the system of people's control, which would control the realization of youth policy, to which all the departments and ministries would be answerable on these matters. Thank you for your attention.

More Speeches From 21st Komsomol Congress Debates

Azerbaijan's Alekperov

90US0832A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 2

[Speech by Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Sakhib Alekperov]

[Text] Respected comrades! Recognizing the impossibility of the further existence of the komsomol in its present form, the Azerbaijan delegation believes that at our congress we should lay the groundwork for an essentially new union, built on the foundation of authentic democracy, in which the independence of all groups, including republic komsomol organizations, is guaranteed not in words, as was done previously, but in deeds. This will allow us to maintain the unity of our union, something which will not be guaranteed by organizational methods; an ideological unity in which the commonality of ideas and goals will prevail over administrative tools of persuasion. I am talking about this because placing our hopes on the organizational mechanism means a return to totalitarianism, to those rigid structures which have brought the komsomol to its present condition. We see the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Youth Communist League] as a voluntary federation of republic komsomol organizations and an

organization of the Armed Forces based on collectively elaborated ideological and organizational principles of joint activity. Membership in the union should be mutually beneficial and the expression of the interests of each individual should be guaranteed. Along with that we believe that the komsomol must become a political organization and not an amorphous grouping of associations based on mutual interests, something which would lead to its ruin. Undoubtedly, each VLKSM member has the right to realize his potential and interests in various associations and groups, something which is stipulated in the draft statutes. However, they, I mean the associations, must not insist on the same rights enjoyed by the entities of the federation mentioned above. Under conditions of a federative structure of the komsomol, as we have heard many times during the course of the pre-congress discussions and during our congress, the question about property naturally arises. We believe that it is useless and very dangerous to talk about dividing already existing property. This would provoke a tremendous number of unnecessary questions, a clash of interests, and could lead to the break up of the organization. However, we do not doubt the fact that each republic komsomol organization must have the guaranteed right to dispose of a certain portion of its property. Nor do we doubt that all komsomol organizations "must not carry out the rights of a property owner regarding that portion of VLKSM property which is formed at their level," as it written in the draft statutes, but instead be full and equal property owners.

In the future model of the VLKSM the creation of maximum rights for the lower echelon, the primary organization, has been proposed. Undoubtedly, that is necessary. After all, the roots of many of our troubles are hidden in the primary organization's lack of rights, on the one hand, and in the authoritarian attitude of the higher organs, on the other hand. However, an expansion of the rights of primary organizations, in our view, should not be accompanied by a reduction in the importance of the role of the rayon and city groupings. The experience of the East European countries illustrates that a weakening of party and youth entities occurred after just such a breakdown of the city and rayon echelons. Although currently a wide variety of approaches to this question have been discussed, we believe that it is necessary to strengthen both primary and rayon and city echelons. The extreme conditions in which we have had to work during the last two years give me justification to raise this question today at the congress.

If we are going to talk about the situation which has developed in our regions, first of all we should mention that it is impossible to view it as an isolated case without taking into consideration the complex and contradictory interlacing of causes and consequences which have led to the crisis. Respected comrades, in my speech I will not touch upon that part of the issue which pertains to the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. That is not likely to promote the normalization of these relations. (Applause.)

Despite all the disagreements, we firmly believe that sooner or later good neighborly relations will definitely be restored between our peoples and we will assist this process. (Applause.) We are ready to discuss any problem with our neighbors which is connected with the situation in the region. However, recognizing the inappropriateness and inopportuneness of similar discussions, especially at a plenary session of the komsomol, we will refrain from going further. At the same time, sharing the concern which was voiced in the summary report, I would like to briefly touch upon several aspects of relations among nationalities which have developed in our regions. Since 1988 the region has turned into a testing ground of sorts, in which the most refined and destructive models possible for a multinational country have developed. Recent events have vividly demonstrated that the issue involves not only the objective complexities which were inherited from the past but also an activation of antisocialist, extremist and separatist forces, their cynical and dangerous attempt to play the card of nationalist hostility in order to achieve their narrow and egoistical goals and to push the country towards the precipice of permanent conflict among nationalities. In the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast we encountered the unprecedented situation in which a plan for the forcible secession of part of the territory of our republic essentially began to be carried out under the cover of slogans about national self-determination. It was namely here that the phenomenon of organized separatism, including among members of the komsomol organization, first appeared. The VLKSM Central Committee, however, which was obliged to supervise adherence to the statutes, unfortunately, did not even dare to express its position regarding this issue.

The free propaganda of nationalist ideas throughout the whole country and the unpunished, I emphasize, comrades, this word, unpunished, anticonstitutional and illegal actions of certain forces finally blinded thousands of young people, brought them to a state of mass hysteria and turned them into "cannon fodder" for political adventurers. Concessions to nationalism, indecisiveness in undertaking necessary measures to stop the actions of extremists groups which would have been characteristic of any democratic, legal state, essentially provoked new hotbeds of tension in the situation which had evolved. You know about the events which took place on the borders of our two republics where blood continues to flow. However, once again, unfortunately, there is silence from the central authorities, to whom we delegated the right to defend the sovereignty of our republic. All of this has contributed to a certain degree to the fact that a significant part of the population, including the youth, have lost faith in justice. Under the influence of an often subjective, one-sided portrayal of events which have taken place in our regions, they have developed the firm conviction that there is a real blockade of information and that the public has an image of an "aggressive Azerbaijan." These circumstances must be taken into account when evaluating the actions of the young people, who with a desire to defend the honor and sovereignty of

the republic that tragic January night of this year, resisted the army which was carrying out orders. Today we are trying to understand what happened. While strongly condemning the actions of irresponsible forces which provoked the pogroms and the destabilization of the situation in the city of Baku, we must also mention the fact that the introduction of a state of emergency and the introduction of troops into the city were carried out without prior notification of the population, which along with unprofessional actions of military personnel, especially the reservists who suddenly were called up, led to numerous innocent casualties. An absence of objective information about the Baku tragedy gave rise to many rumors and conjectures, including rumors about the huge number of refugees from among the Russian-speaking population. And two days ago in this same hall, with reference to LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, the President of the country was asked a question about the alleged 600 thousand Russian refugees from Transcaucasia.

As you remember, respected comrades, Mikhail Sergeyevich gave an exhaustive answer to that particular question. But similar falsifications demonstrate once again that some people want very badly to cause our peoples to quarrel, and to build their dirty political plans on the result. The youth, children and a certain segment of the population already poisoned by nationalism suffer the most from this. The fight against these phenomena, in my view, must become one of the main directions of the activity of the komsomol and each person must struggle individually against nationalism without accusing others.

In conclusion I want to emphasize that separatism, whether it is in the state, party or komsomol, is a sign of a serious crisis and division. I do not think that this congress will choose this path for the future course of the komsomol. Because this path would be fatal. Only consolidation on the basis of the unity of ideas and goals can save our organizations and our multinational people as a whole. Regarding the documents of the congress, submitted by the VLKSM Central Committee plenum, I propose that they be approved.

Thank you for your attention. (Applause.)

Tajikistan's Yakubov

90US0832B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 2

[Speech by Tajikistan Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Adilzhan Yakubov]

[Text] Respected comrades, the Tajikistan komsomol delegation understands clearly its moral and political responsibility for the fate of the komsomol and has a mandate to speak out in favor of the preservation of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League. Under conditions when half the world is moving towards integration for the resolution of universal problems, manifestations of sentiments in favor of eliminating the

komsomol are extremely short-sighted. But at the same time we must not forcibly keep anyone in the VLKSM and must not create artificial obstacles to the formation of other youth unions. We are realists and while speaking out in favor of VLKSM unity, we understand that even the highest mountains cannot shield us from the winds of change. Therefore, we declare our readiness to collaborate on an equal footing with any newly formed organizations which are in favor of democratic socialism and which orient themselves with the interests of young people.

We, along with a number of other delegations which have expressed opinions here, see the future of the VLKSM as a voluntary union of independent communist youth organizations of the Soviet republics which, having joined forces on an equal basis, delegate a portion of their rights to the central electoral organs. In our view it makes sense to organize these organs on the principle of equal representation of the union republic's komsomol organizations including the executive apparatus. But this does not mean that we are closed to compromises and cannot accept logical proposals. Making the primary organization take precedence, is a more complex process than it seems. In our view, it makes sense to conduct the second phase of the congress or an all-union komsomol conference at the end of this year.

Comrades, we do not live in isolation from the rest of the world and the influence of the VLKSM on the development of the international youth movement is well-known. However, a fundamental reexamination is necessary here as well of the basic directions of the komsomol's international activities.

The all-encompassing nature and the efforts to convert many world youth organizations to our faith through constant financial injections and the allocations of various benefits, in our view, is no longer justified today.

We propose to direct the international activity of the komsomol first of all towards satisfying the demands of our own membership. We have many forms of getting things done in our arsenal which are well-developed. We need only to develop them taking into account the changing attitude of the world towards us and our attitude towards the world.

With all respect to our opponents, we call upon the congress not to be lead on a leash by those groups who see in the VLKSM a ready-made material and financial base for the creation of organizations to oppose the komsomol. We cannot support an effort to force the komsomol to pay for the creation of other unions, and we do not even have the right to do so. After all, everything the VLKSM has today was created by the labor of many generations of komsomol members and you and I do not have the authority to divvy it up.

We are deeply convinced that we need a central organ with common property if only for the realization of certain programs at the all-union level. Let us recall

several Central Committee decisions regarding the earthquakes in Armenia and Tajikistan, the tragedies in Chernobyl and the Aral Sea. The argument, probably, is rather convincing. If it were not for common property, it is unlikely that those decisions could have been made.

We are tired of being record holders and are tired of having the highest level of infant and female mortality, the lowest living standard, the highest unemployment level and many other firsts. The youth cannot tolerate such a situation. Internal tension is on the increase and social protest has manifested itself in a variety of forms.

We propose that the congress approve a resolution regarding unemployment among the youth which we are ready to submit on behalf of our delegation for the congress' review.

Two words about the party. We must not forget who initiated the progressive processes in our society. We associate the party of communists with future transformations as well. Regarding our organization, further qualitative changes cannot be achieved by "God, the tsar or a hero," as the hymn goes, but only by ourselves. And therefore we propose that the congress' draft declaration which was submitted on behalf of the conference of delegations be approved and that constructive and fruitful work begin. Thank you. (Applause.)

Latvia's Urbanovich

90US0832C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 3

[Speech by Latvia Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Yanis Urbanovich]

[Text] Respected delegates to the congress! Truly respected! And in order to prove that I respect you and your time, I will not repeat myself as many have done today and yesterday. I will only say that the position of the Latvian delegation coincides completely with the position of the Kazakh, Ukrainian and several other delegations which spoke later. (Applause.)

I only want to continue, or rather, return to the roots, to that on which we base our position and share some thoughts. This is the position of the Latvian delegation. You have the right not to accept it. As they say, being determines consciousness. For this reason the diversity of situations in which republic, rayon, oblast and kray organizations find themselves, is our being. That also determines what we say here from the tribune or into a dozen microphones. And to reject one proposal or another just because they seem unacceptable to us or are not presented in the form to which we have become accustomed at our meetings or in our lounges, indicates a lack of understanding of the fact that different kinds of situations exist. And if that is the situation, then precisely this diversity of situations must be reflected in our documents which are under discussion. More accurately,

not the diversity of situations, but the diversity of choices of each delegation which are based on objective and subjective conditions.

Now about the situation in Latvia. You know that two and a half months ago we convened our 24th congress and that no split took place. A united delegation with a united platform and united position arrived from Latvia. And this is because we found the ones guilty of our problems and we did not look for them based on national or some other similar principle. (Applause.)

We have already expressed our attitude towards the decisions regarding the youth economy which the "powers that be" made. We already are picketing and demonstrating and so on, and so forth. That is to say, we have already determined what to fight for and want to fight against. Therefore, today we have already found our identity, the identity of the organization. And independent of how the three communist parties act in the future (one of them already exists, the second will make its appearance next weekend and the third, we are certain, will also be formed), we will nonetheless defend our interests and find our clear identity. (Applause.)

So you understand, a ridiculous situation developed for us. We did not split over any issue at all. We came to agreement and proposed to the government the basic principles of state youth policy which it accepted; we were in its commission and so forth. On the whole we use parliamentary methods as much as we can. But now we have older comrades as well. I myself am a communist. And we have two communist parties exactly divided along the national issue and a third communist party will appear, "The Third Way."

I do not think that they will be able to agree in a week or in six months which of them is the most communist. It is even more difficult for us to determine which of them is more communist, which is less communist. Therefore, in foreseeing this, we were correct at our congress and then at the plenum before our departure for the 21st congress and before the first congress of one of the communist parties of Latvia, when we made the decision not to interfere in the affairs of the sovereign communist parties of Latvia. (Applause.) We proposed that they figure it out themselves. Regarding communists who are members of the republic komsomol organization, we have allowed (and we believe this is possible) each individual to work in one or in all of the communist parties of Latvia. But apparently, we will collaborate not with the party that speaks more eloquently and forcefully at meetings but with the party which supports our aspirations, our fight for the youth, and the state policy regarding young people. None of the three has yet to do this.

The situation in the republic also is complicated by the fact that the first session of the new convocation of the Supreme Soviet takes place on 3 May. As in other places in the country the party lost the elections, because it was unable to undertake any actions. Corresponding forces,

naturally, will make decisions which are more or less radical in nature. Today those who will be working at the sessions have already spoken about the impossibility of the organization engaging in legal activities, of extraterritorial subordination, as well as of VLKSM members with the status of an oblast organization of the union.

Today we are fighting against such a view, but this kind of situation could develop on its own. Therefore, I ask everyone to consider our proposals for the documents of the congress. I ask that this be done to enable us to act in our own republic in a corresponding manner. If the communist parties in the future continue to exacerbate their relations in this manner, we will even be forced to distance ourselves from the name to avoid bringing the fight inside our organization. We in the republic approved the congress' decisions. We have our statutes, our republic komsomol organization program. We will implement them after reviewing the results of the 21st congress. We were counting on the wisdom of the congress and so far have not been mistaken. However, comrades, I want very much to learn about the situation in other places as well. I do not want to have to walk from delegation to delegation and ask what the situation there is, as I have done for the past four days. I think that we all have this interest. But let us have a little patience and hear about the different situations. Let the speakers, at least from the 15 union republics, maybe even from the Far East and so on by territory, say what is on their minds. We must know about the situation. We have a pressing need to coordinate our activities at the national level in order to achieve corresponding decisions through our deputies and other ways here in Moscow. But we will never come to an agreement and never make any common decisions if we do not understand each other and do not perceive this diversity in situations. I would like to make an appeal to lower the intensity of emotions somewhat and not to talk about armored personnel carriers, about steam ships and other things. A few words about the center. Practice has shown, and the representatives of Russia and the Ukraine talked about this, that the center is obviously not capable of managing or even influencing the course of events. Therefore, the action of this mechanism must be turned around so that impulses from local areas are able to influence the activities of the center. Only the presence of an intelligent and flexible center can justify its existence.

On the whole we must recognize that the forms of constructing all-union public-political institutions should develop in parallel with the development of the forms and principles of building the state structure of the USSR.

This means that with the growing tendency to increase the independence of the republics, it is necessary to increase the rights of the youth organizations of those same republics.

So let us trust each other, taking into account regional, national and political differences. Let us define ourselves

by our own program and statutes, not contradicting the all-union documents but with our own symbolism and name.

Let us trust each other also in the choice of partners and brothers-in-arms. After all, only in this way can we preserve the indestructibility of our organization and truly become a union of like-minded members, a youth federation for democratic socialism! We must speak very constructively and establish an intellectual level in this hall which is very high. You understand this perfectly, probably each one of us thinks that about himself so let us respect one another. (Loud applause).

Kirgizia's Tabyldiyev

90US0832D Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA,
in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 3

[Speech by Kirgizia Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Tynychbek Tabyldiyev]

[Text] Comrade delegates! Our special, I would say extraordinary, komsomol congress is being held in an extremely crucial and tense time for our country. In this regard the questions about whether our organization is capable of uniting the youth to resolve the tasks of perestroyka sound quite logical. What kind of organization should we have; is it needed at all? Today we are forced to recognize that three years were lost in arguing about the division of power among the komsomol organizations and committees of various levels from the primary organization to the VLKSM Central Committee. It was as if we had forgotten that all those powers in the final analysis are needed for one thing, to resolve the problems of today's youth. I think that a renewal of the VLKSM is unlikely to be achieved by either purely cosmetic measures, such as changing its name, or by destroying it as an organization and changing it into some kind of conglomerate of heterogeneous youth organizations. The question arises; do we, today's generation of komsomol members, have the right to deal in this way with something that was created over a period of decades? Can it really be true that everything that was done during this period only deserves now to be considered a mistake and discarded, or in the best case pulled apart into different groups. I don't think so. We do not have the right to decide the fate of the komsomol in that manner. All its mistakes and failures and its illness are an exact reflection of everything that has existed on the whole in our society. The history of the komsomol is the history of our country, and history, as you know, is not chosen. It is precisely now, during the decisive stage of perestroyka in the country that the entire society and all of us need a renewed, unified and strong youth organization. In fighting for organizational changes, we cannot undermine the foundation of the democratic changes underway in the country at the same time. In this regard we are strongly opposed to the division of our organization along national and other lines. We support the broad independence of local republic organizations within the framework of a united VLKSM based on the

principles of a federation. We are for unity in carrying out the general political line of the VLKSM with the maximum independence possible of komsomol organizations in the choice of forms and methods of work. We believe that questions regarding the endeavors of the VLKSM must be decided with the participation of all komsomol members through an all-union referendum among other methods.

We need to determine our position based on the role and place of the central electoral organs in the life of our union. Now that the issue regarding the Russian LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League] have essentially been resolved, all republic youth unions find themselves in equal conditions. The proposed VLKSM draft statutes provide sufficient independence of the republic komsomol while leaving to the VLKSM Central Committee responsibility for resolving only general strategic tasks. At the same time this draft put all republic organizations in equal conditions. Previously, and this is not a secret for anyone, a decision regarding any issue was essentially made ahead of time by the RSFSR and Ukraine komsomol organizations. Therefore, I believe that it will be correct if all republic komsomol organizations have equal representation in the VLKSM Central Committee. Such a principle of representation will significantly raise the degree of participation in the work of the VLKSM Central Committee by representatives of all the union republics and make our komsomol all-union not only in name but in essence as well.

A reexamination of the functions and powers of komsomol committees, that persistent tendency to transfer rights to the primary organizations, forces us, in my view, to reexamine the advisability of the VLKSM monitoring commission. At least in the form in which it has been proposed. In addition, we must recognize that the allocation of the freed salaries from the monitoring commission chairmen did not improve the work of these commissions. In this regard I believe it is correct to transfer the monitoring function to the primary organizations and to the level of the komsomol obkom. This in turn will free us from the necessity of creating in the komsomol one more huge structure.

I believe it is necessary to explain my position in regard to the newspaper, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. I do not support the idea proposed by comrade Fronin in regard to granting the newspaper, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, the status of a social-political newspaper for the youth. I believe that in the conditions of a multi-party system and the corresponding diversity in the youth movement, a renunciation by the komsomol Central Committee of rights to its newspaper would be nothing other than "voluntary disarmament." How would it be possible to conduct propaganda work, compete with alternative organizations and gather our followers without our most powerful weapon, the press? A new newspaper for all young people is another matter, but under no circumstance should it be at the expense of renouncing our own newspaper. I think that it would also be advisable to confirm the members of the editorial

staff at the VLKSM Central Committee plenum. In conclusion I propose that the proposal of the draft declaration, and the VLKSM statutes be approved. Thank you for your attention.

Lithuania's Secretary Ovdienko

90US0832E Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 pp 3-4

[Speech by Latvia Komsomol Republic Center Secretary Vladimir Ovdienko]

[Text] I am here at the request of the delegation from the Latvian Communist Youth League, the Leninist Communist League, that republic komsomol which is in favor of a renewed VLKSM constructed on the principles of a federation. (Applause.)

Thank you. It is not a secret that after a session each delegation discusses what has happened at the congress, draws certain conclusions and prepares for further work at the congress. We also have drawn the conclusion for ourselves that in spite of the fact that we have so many different opinions, that a very tense struggle is underway, a clash of varying points of view, we believe that we have enough people who know how to decide correctly what form the komsomol is to take, if it is to exist at all, if it is to be Leninist and normal, and to draw the correct conclusions.

We are glad that the main issue at our congress has nonetheless been identified. We have arrived precisely at that issue. That is, to be or not to be. To disband the VLKSM or to renew it, qualitatively changing it and making it closer to people. We believe that in order for the discussion not to come to a dead end periodically, we propose that the delegates define their position on the following issue. It is clear for everyone that inside us, inside the VLKSM, the ideas, people and entire movements, which in principle are ready to become new organizations, have existed for a long time. Undoubtedly, this should be welcomed and we should be happy about it. But along with that, having renounced a monopoly on the youth, you and I, delegates and guests of the congress, again are trying to think for others. We talk a lot about giving the opportunity to them, giving the opportunity to others. Maybe we should not worry about that? Let us resolve the problems of the VLKSM and those forces who no longer fit into our framework and who want to address those problems in other ways, on another platform, believe us, if there is something behind the soul of the organization, it will find strength without our help and will always stand on its own. (Applause.)

Why do I speak with such assurance; this is the opinion of the entire delegation. We have already been in this situation and we survived quite nicely. Moreover, we have stabilized ourselves now, the numbers of applications into the VLKSM has stabilized. We are receiving applications from students who want to join the komsomol. And even though we do not have any media

resources, transportation or any kind of strong financial base or other attributes, we nevertheless got down to work, everyone started from the beginning, and everything is working out. That means that there obviously is something in the komsomol which brings people together and allows them to survive in a complex situation.

I also wanted to say this without fail. What is the secret which allows the komsomol to survive in a complex situation. The secret, probably, is that we are supported by you, the delegates and representatives of other delegations. And we are grateful. From this tribune I want to say this to the people from Kuybyshev, Leningrad, Estonia, Kaliningrad and Belorussia who came to us at the congress. We thought that they would just be guests but they have helped; they have sat up with us at night and worked on our documents, because nobody had experience in these matters, and they have worked together with us at the congress and helped us to things in such a manner that everything turned out well and so that we have a strong komsomol organization. (Applause.)

Next. What have we been up to at the congress? Here are a few ideas; changing the name of the komsomol, exchanging membership cards, reregistration, that is to say, in principle everything appears to be in correct form, but the substance, apparently, leads to one conclusion. We already have been through this. A change in labels led to the situation in which two organizations are present here; LKSM and KSM [Communist Youth League]. That means that an exchange of membership cards and registration causes confusion or hostility in people. We have seen the person who holds his red membership card and says that, no, friends, I don't want to, I have this card, I will stay in this organization and it's not for you to decide where I'm to go and what organization I should be in. That is reality. And we say that if we decide at the congress to change the name of the organization, we have no guarantee that in a week people won't get together, maybe in a slightly smaller hall, and announce that the VLKSM still exists and that they remain a united organization, while you and I at that time are building a new one. (Applause.)

Thank you. We don't think that the salt of the issue lies in coups within the apparatus, as people mentioned here in conversations about the primary party organization. The uniqueness of our situation in the republic komsomol is that we did anything we wanted, because there was nobody to do what was supposed to have been done. We did exactly what we were thinking about and for us the primary organization is paramount. We have concentrated all rights in it, all resources and only with its help do we act. This is the most important thing that we are talking about but we have created this mechanism by which the center coordinates the activities of its primary organizations with its ideas and its capability of concentrating forces and uniting them in one common cause. We must be useful to the primary organization. Then they will respond as well, will understand us and

we will do together what is necessary for the republic. I confess honestly right away, maybe that will provoke a negative reaction, that we are not against the apparatus. When we ended up without it and were in a parallel organization, we had a very difficult time. Therefore, an apparatus is necessary. What kind? It must be a working apparatus. People are needed who will work like horses and conversations about whether we have a large Central Committee or a small one.... It seems to me that we have to give it serious thought and get involved first of all in the day-to-day work. I'll go on. And everybody agrees that a center is necessary but for some reason things have not gone well at the congress. We think that in accusing the komsomol Central Committee, we mean the apparatus. But actually the komsomol Central Committee is made up, after all, of people who were elected at the local level. These are people who have been working here at our direction and they must dictate youth policy. We have to think how we can arrange things so that they can really dictate this policy. And not how to reorganize the Central Committee, because in principle the mechanism has been worked out rather well and functions effectively. Many people have spoken here and have criticized the center. But I haven't heard a single concrete thought about what the center is being accused of. Who are these people who are pressuring us from below? Who is in the way? Instructions. Who issued these instructions? This is what I didn't hear from the speakers. Therefore, if we are going to criticize the Central Committee, let's speak in concrete terms; which department, who, where did it come from. So we will know what to do. I am almost finished. I see that I don't have much time left. I would like to support the teacher who spoke yesterday. I wanted to find him and talk but unfortunately, I didn't catch his name. I want to say a few words about students. Students for us in Latvia are one of the main forces. They have become so active, in spite of our downtrodden school organization, that now it's as if they have taken heart. Probably the komsomol is in need of a good jolt. Then people would begin to think, then people would begin to act. I want to say that the most constructive presentations here have been made by students. They are involved all the time; they are young after all, much younger than we are, and they know what is happening in the country. They are the ones we need to listen to. Judge for yourselves: in the complex, unstable political situation that we have in Latvia, the students are not afraid of their parents or anyone, and in spite of everything come to us in the Leninist komsomol and work actively in the elections and at meetings. The work is conducted outside of offices and schools; there is no time to conduct meetings. In conclusion, I want to say that the position of our delegation in concrete terms regarding the congress, and we would like for you to understand this, will be as follows. We propose to construct mutual relations with other organizations based on truly democratic principles where the main criterion is the ideological-political union of independent organizations which delegate part of the functions of the V L K S M higher organs for coordinating activities, and which give the opportunity to participate more

purposefully and with more cohesion both in the political and public life of the country. Our appeal has been published in the materials of the congress. Please, take a look at it. We listened to other delegations. People, you are trying to reach what has already happened with us. And this experience is achieved only with difficulty. So let's go ahead and decide here that we must be a united organization in a united family. Thank you for your attention. (Applause.)

Moldavia's Bragish

90US0832F Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 4

[Speech by Moldavia Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary Dmitriy Bragish]

[Text] Respected delegates. This is already the third day of work and we are convinced that the importance of the current 21st V L K S M Congress has been determined not only by the fact that proposals have been made to dismantle much of what exists, but first of all by the fact that the decisions approved at the congress will become the foundation of a qualitatively new youth organization.

One of the main elements is deciding which idea to take as the point around which to unite. That is to say, which idea should become the foundation of our renewed organization. The reason for the existence of any party is political struggle. It seems to me that the reason for the existence of a youth organization is to protect and defend the interests of its members of those of a political party. For us today that is the CPSU and, for the time being, I think, there is no alternative. In subjecting the communist world outlook to criticism, we do not reject the idea of communism. But now we are convinced that communist ideals, in our previous understanding of them, cannot become a consolidating foundation. That is why I believe that we can unite only on one platform. That is the construction of a humane, socialist society, a free, legal state, based on universal human values. And probably at the top of this pyramid should be our young person with his needs, interests and his desire to develop as an individual. Therefore, I propose that we support the draft declaration. We have passed to the editorial commission concrete comments from our delegation.

There are two variations for the future development of the komsomol. One is the revolutionary option which implies the destruction of everything that now exists. And in this you and I have good experience. Then there is the evolutionary option which demands work, search, analysis and the implementation of new ideas, concepts, and making original, politically adjusted decisions. The second path seems more promising. Apparently, the elaboration of the future V L K S M model, which will be stable at least to some degree, will be a several-year effort. Today we say that it should be a federation of organizations with equal rights where the republic komsomol is united by a common goal, and at the same

time it is independent to the maximum degree possible within the body of the organization. Such a model requires design and organizational construction in accordance with these qualities, that is to say, the provision of equal opportunities for all of its organizations, something which was already mentioned. We are also talking about having equal representation in the union organs and not only in the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau.

Another issue. Is it even worth it to talk about equal representation in the body of the Central Committee? That, it seems to me, demands the mutual agreement of representatives of both large and small republic and regional organizations. Taking into account the proposed revolutionary development path, during the initial stage the guarantor of equal rights could be the institutionalized right to elect VLKSM Central Committee members at the level of republic organizations. Along with this the first secretary, the chairman of the central monitoring organ and VLKSM Central Committee secretaries must be elected not only by a majority of the plenum participants but also by a majority of the representatives of the union republics. This would allow both the majority and the minority to defend its interests and would not allow either side to dictate its will. To a large degree this would promote an improvement in the climate of local komsomol organizations. Simultaneously relations in the Central Committee itself would improve qualitatively. Let the victor be the one who is more erudite and better prepared and not the one who has more representatives. Leadership must be in the political and intellectual plan. Under no circumstance should it be in the nationalist plan or according to the principle, "there are more of us, listen to us."

We are also in favor of including in the VLKSM statutes or in a special resolution of the congress an article about having issues of paramount importance approved by a majority not only of Central Committee members but also union republic delegations which are part of the VLKSM Central Committee. These issues would include changes in the komsomol structure, the approval of any type of all-union organ, the review of financial issues and questions of international collaboration. All of this taken together with a view towards the next VLKSM congress, will bring us to a greater mutual understanding regarding equal representation in the VLKSM Central Committee. We want the equal rights provision contained in the draft statutes to be strengthened by concrete regulations.

If today we are in favor of a federative structure for the komsomol, we see the VLKSM Central Committee as the real coordinator and the consulting organ for all union komsomol organizations. In this regard a few words about the komsomol apparatus. The apparatus must be headed by the bureau and secretariat, something which, it seems to me, the previous VLKSM Central Committee was not always successful in managing. Taking into account increasing competition along with a significant reduction in komsomol staff workers (and this is inevitable), the necessity arises that the best of the best people remain there. Based on the situation which

has evolved in society, I would like to see more scientists, specialists, and political scientists in the VLKSM Central Committee apparatus who are capable at any time of giving qualified answers to the majority of questions that arise. And there's more. In the mutual relations between the VLKSM Central Committee and the union republic komsomols, in our view, the question regarding the delegation of rights to the center for the time being remains open. This issue has already been addressed and therefore I won't go into detail. We support the thesis that "before this question is resolved, it must be discussed at the local level," and in intermediate entities, either plenums, conferences or komsomol organization congresses, in full accordance with the new statutes. Now briefly about several other issues.

About relations between the komsomol and the Communist Party. Much has been said about this recently at VLKSM Central Committee plenums and in the press. But it seems to me that little of a constructive nature has been said until now. I would propose that union republic komsomol central committees and the VLKSM Central Committee, on the eve of corresponding union republic communist party congresses and the 28th CPSU Congress, elaborate resolutions or drafts entitled, "The Party and the Komsomol," and submit them for review by the congresses. Today there should be political collaboration between the komsomol and the party based on complete trust, friendly criticism and broad mutual support. We are for mutual respect, mutual influence and the joint activities of our organizations. And if we want to find more understanding in party organs and party organizations, we must give thought to who the members of the party are today. I say that because recently the number of young people whom we recommend for membership in the CPSU has been drastically reduced. And if we do not send our best people to protect our interests (in party organs and organizations), it is not likely that we will be able to achieve the mutual understanding which we seek.

One of the controversial questions at the congress, as you have already noted, is the question regarding VLKSM property. There exists a current material base; VLKSM property was formed over decades not only by current generations but also by past generations. This must not be forgotten when we talk about dividing VLKSM property among the new-fledged organizations and movements. I am not against providing assistance for them. However, VLKSM property does not only represent resources. It is its history, and history cannot be divided.

Lastly. Yesterday there was a lively discussion regarding the issue of taxing komsomol enterprises. The approval of the special document regarding this issue is one of the first achievements of our congress in the sense of a final decision, a decision which, we admit, was not an easy one. But this is not the issue. I remember that it was proposed that the delegates picket on Monday. If that's the case, I asked myself, will the USSR people's deputies from the VLKSM picket along with everyone else? It's hard for me to find an answer to that, since it hasn't even been five months since the issue of taxing komsomol

enterprises and entities was discussed at a session of the Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Committee, of which I am a member. And almost all VLKSM deputies. I ask you to note this, without hesitation voted in favor of taxing komsomol enterprises. I am not against an evolution of views but I would like to see more consistency in the actions of the deputy group. Today's issue of PRAVDA published material on the front page which talks about the steadfastness and persistence shown in the debates which took place in the Supreme Soviet regarding the law on the general principles of state and youth policy. The material notes that the deputies representing the youth have a quality which other politicians should be envious of. But then they add that what is required is not self-expression but the expression of the interests of those who gave you the authority to represent them in parliament. Much was said about the activity of certain deputies, their work in the Supreme Soviet committees and commissions. But we practically did not hear anything about what is most important; what the VLKSM deputy group did and what decisions the VLKSM deputy group made.

Read the continuation of the speeches given during the debates at the morning session of 13 April in the next issue.

More Speeches From 21st Komsomol Congress Debates

Chechen-Ingush Oblast's Bugayev

90US08334 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 p 3

[Speech by Chechen-Ingush VLKSM Obkom First Secretary Khizir Bugayev]

[Text] Respected VLKSM members! Respected comrades!

The eternal question voiced by delegate Bausov, "To be or not to be," faces not only the VLKSM. It faces the entire structure of our state power, the entire political structure of society. It also faces our country. The processes which are underway currently in our country demonstrate this convincingly. Therefore, I believe that it is impossible to view the situation in the komsomol and to determine its future out of the context of time and those processes which are currently underway in society.

Democratization and glasnost have brought to the surface of public life the kinds of problems which only a few people knew about; some guessed about the problems but the majority had no idea at all about them. The most crucial of them is the problem of relations among nationalities. Today in the most tragic way possible we are reaping the fruits of the cynical and cruel antinational, antipeople policy of the Stalin-Beria regime which brought entire peoples to the brink of destruction. I have in mind the Chechen, Ingush, Karachayev, Balkarets, Turok-Meskhetinets, Volga German, Crimean Tartar, and the Kalmyk nationalities.

Today the Chechen and Ingush people, as representatives of other peoples repressed during the Stalin years, view with gratitude the decision of our country's Supreme Soviet which approved the declaration condemning the Stalin repressions as illegal. And therefore, we representatives of the Chechen-Ingush komsomol at the 21st VLKSM Congress support completely the thought of the President of our country that "...it is vitally necessary that the principle of internationalism is preserved as a condition for the existence of this organization and moreover, as a condition for the preservation of our multinational state, under any organizational changes which the komsomol might undergo and no matter what decisions regarding its future structure and program are made." But we, comrades, are in favor of an internationalism which is not just expressed in mere slogans and which is transparent, but a true internationalism which provides not only for friendship among peoples but also for their equality. I think that this is one of the ideals of democratic, humane socialism. And what kind of equality can we talk about today when the inequality of peoples is institutionalized by the constitution in the form of the division of national-state entities into union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs. This hierarchical division of peoples must be eliminated if we want a real stabilization in relations among nationalities.

Along with that the relics of the obsolete system of economic management should disappear as well, first of all the enterprises of union and union-republic subordination. I want to explain my thought. The fact is that almost 80 percent of the industrial production of the Chechen-Ingush oblast is based on enterprises of union and union-republic subordination. That includes first of all enterprises of the petroleum extraction and petroleum refining industries. And what do we get from these enterprises? Up until this year the "Grozneftesintez" production association, which is one of the large enterprises in the country for gas and oil refining, allocated 1.2 percent of its profits to the republic budget. And at the same time more than 300 thousand tons of hazardous materials were deposited on our countrymen. But the Ministry of Petroleum and Gas Industry of our country for some reason does not ship these hazardous materials here to Moscow. It is impossible to solve the problem without making substantive changes. It is metaphysically, theoretically and practically ridiculous. What can the komsomol and in particular our congress do in this situation? It can recognize the VLKSM as the league of leagues which komsomol organizations of all national-state entities of our country can join on an equal basis. The delegates from the Chechen-Ingush oblast will vote for precisely this kind of a league. This is not an illegal claim and not a violation of anybody's rights. It is an attempt to be equals among equals. I would also like to say a few words regarding the formation of the electoral organs. I believe that the autonomous entities must be represented in the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau by one of its members.

Now about property. Comrades, the property of the VLKSM was not created in just one day and not just by the current generations of komsomol members. The property of the VLKSM was created by all generations of VLKSM members, and I believe it is illegal to talk today about the division of that property among organizations, between the VLKSM and that part of the VLKSM that wants to break away. The property of the VLKSM should belong to the Leninist komsomol and nobody else. If someone wants to take property from the VLKSM and then break away and create their own organization, let them leave the VLKSM and create their own organization, and just like the VLKSM created komsomol property and resources, let them create their own property over the course of decades. The komsomol members of the Chechen-Ingush oblast support the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League and it is precisely for this league that we will vote. Thank you for your attention. (Loud applause.)

Karelian Oblast's Ponomarev

90US0833B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 p 3

[Speech by Karelian VLKSM Obkom First Secretary Sergey Ponomarev]

[Text] Hello, comrades. I ask that Sasha Fomin be patient a little longer behind the tribune, as he called himself, the representative of the large contingent of greying and balding komsomol members. I will be brief.

It seems to me that we will not be able to give an answer to the question, what kind of organization is the komsomol to be, as long as the positions, views, and yearnings of those political forces which are active in the VLKSM are not obvious and defined and formulated to a sufficient degree. There are young people today in our organization with very different views, political convictions and, in my opinion, it is useless to try to consolidate them around a single political platform or program. The majority of people who today are members of the organization are in a state of confusion. I would call the state of the primary komsomol organizations today, "the calm before the storm." In our congress' decisions many people are hoping to find answers to the questions: Whose side is the komsomol on? What is it trying to achieve? What political forces does it support? In this regard the question about our program is of paramount importance. We can unite only around a clearly defined goal, perhaps, more than one. Right now our program goals which were submitted for the congress' discussion could only unite the working group which elaborated that draft. In the first place, it is still not clear why we are discussing the draft of the program goals and not of the program itself, not even the draft program for the transition period. If we are lacking in boldness, knowledge and the conviction necessary to elaborate and realize our own program, then we need to give the whole

thing up and not drive komsomol members crazy with program guidelines, program goals, announcements, declarations and so on.

Now about the content of the documents. In general, I would characterize this particular document, this draft as an attempt to simultaneously pay tribute to traditions, on the one hand; and on the other hand, to try not to lag behind the times and to one degree or another satisfy everyone. I don't think that it happens like that. Politics are only tolerant of compromises up to a certain limit. And in my view, precisely such a moment has arrived. Yes, we are not a political party, but we are a political youth organization and that means that we have to have clear political guidelines. However, in my opinion, it is difficult and too abstract to define as a goal the free development of the young person as an individual, just as the concept itself of freedom is abstract and relative. I think that first of all there should be clear answers in the program to those questions which I mentioned, that is to say, it is necessary to define the place and role of our organization in the political system, otherwise there will be political uncertainty and then disintegration in the full sense of the word. The program of a political organization should reflect its attitude toward the political forces of society. Yes, today it is complicated to do that since these forces are still not clearly defined. As far as we are concerned, the Communist Youth League must first of all declare its position in regard to the Communist Party and do it not somewhere in the middle of one line of text but at the beginning so that it becomes the point of departure for the elaboration of the program. Therefore, I believe that in the critical period which the komsomol is experiencing, when its gravediggers can't wait for the opportunity to squander the komsomol pie in favor of various political forces and openly talk about it, it is necessary to pose the question and talk about the creation of a CPSU youth organization in the form of a league of young communists. The main program focus of this organization would become: participation in the elaboration and realization of the policies of a CPSU in the process of renewal, participation in the creation of a democratic society, and the elaboration and realization of a state youth policy. I am sure that if the question is posed in this manner, many people will support us, in any case, no fewer than support the RDSA. And meanwhile, as I already said, we are countering the work of that democratic association with something very amorphous. The creation of a league of young communists does not at all mean a return to the previous system of relations between the party and komsomol; its restoration fortunately is no longer possible. Only complete organizational independence of the league along with the same political goals as the CPSU, the parallel search for ways to achieve them, a discussion and consideration of the special interests of each organization; that is how I see the relationship of the Communist Party and its youth organization. They tell us: the VLKSM has two options. The first is what I have been talking about; the creation of a CPSU youth organization and the second is the creation of a completely independent komsomol. I

would like somebody to explain to me what a completely independent political, I emphasize, political youth organization is. In my view if an organization has its own original and substantive program, then this is the basic criterion for the creation and existence of a political party. I respect all opinions and thoughts on this issue but, comrades, let's call things by their names and have each one of us determine who he is and who is to belong to what party and how to relate to the youth league. I think that there should be absolute clarity in this. It is possible, of course, to ask the question: "And what does the party itself think in this regard?" We had the opportunity to hear what the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary thinks, but in any case, I think that we can and should declare our readiness and desires especially since, if a negative answer follows, then we won't have to talk about the future of the Communist Party at all. Therefore, I propose to discuss the attempts to tear apart the komsomol from inside, to use its political experience, influence and strong material base for the creation and formation of other political youth organizations, and I also propose to reflect in the draft program the creation of a young communist league as the youth organization of a CPSU in the process of renewal and to consolidate ourselves on this basis. In order to unite we need to define our differences; recently we have been repeating these words frequently and, of course, not by coincidence. The main result of the VLKSM 21st Congress should be the process of defining our differences in an ideological and political sense which will create the prerequisites for a normal development of the youth movement in our country.

Estonia's Gogulan

90US0833C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 p 3

[Speech by Estonia LKSM Central Committee First Secretary Nikolay Gogulan]

[Text] Respected delegates! It is both easier and more complicated to explain the position of our delegation to you than it is to explain it to my first secretaries. More complicated because due to objective reasons we were excluded from the pre-congress all-union discussion and struggle, and not having stewed in the juices of the all-union komsomol, it is rather complicated to make a diagnosis and even more so to make any kind of recommendation. I am glad that the congress, nonetheless, agreed to hold the plenum sessions and, in this way, we had the opportunity to acquaint ourselves with the various points of view from the various regions of the country. But without knowing the complete background, it has sometimes been difficult to determine when a delegate's speech was dictated by sincere conviction or delusion, when it was dictated by tactics or group interests. But as they say, every cloud has a silver lining. It was easier because our position was elaborated during the course of an almost two-year, very difficult political struggle for the right of the organization to exist and for the renewal of the organization. And in that sense it is

possible to say that our position is free from the influence of the political situation.

Two documents lie in front of me. One of them is the program of the Leninist Communist Youth League of Estonia. This is the position of the komsomol of Estonia. Both documents have been approved. We live according to these documents. We use them to measure the activities of the organization. But you understand perfectly well that these documents were ratified in violation of each and every paragraph and point of the VLKSM statutes. We ratified and introduced them because the logic of the organization's development and the logic of the political life of the republic demanded it.

This logic was understood by the VLKSM Central Committee and the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau. I emphasize this because it is almost becoming fashionable at the congress and almost good form to take a swing with relish every once and a while at the Central Committee, at the Bureau, at the leadership of the organization and to attempt to demonstrate once again that if it were not for both the dominance and lack of dominance of the Central Committee, we would have been able to really accomplish something. First of all, water doesn't erode the hidden rock. Secondly, rights are not given, they are taken. And thirdly, let's look truth in the eyes and say that the organization's crisis is a consequence of the crisis of the country's political system. That is not our fault, that is our tragedy. But our task is to find a solution together to the crisis.

It is surprising how many completely different conclusions can be drawn from the same analysis of the situation in the organization.

I deeply respect Maksim Sotnikov and have to admit that in the process to renew the organization we have taken a great deal from the documents on the "Surgut alternative." We perceived the word, "alternative," as an alternative to a bureaucratic komsomol, as a program for the renewal of the organization. But I cannot agree with Maksim's position that for the time being we need to leave our multifaceted or, as he said, multicolored organization in its previous form, that we cannot destroy this organization. Yes, today this is the only organization in the country which has a real chance to consolidate the interests of the youth and take them to the state level and to influence state decisions. Today in what is essentially a one-party system that is true. But we must look into the future as well. Already our komsomol deputies have complained from this tribune that during the time they have been working the Central Committee has not gotten around to, and in my opinion, simply hasn't been able to define the political position of the organization. It was not able to do this because of the fact that due to its politically multifaceted nature, the organization does not have an identity. If we leave it in this state for any length of time, the organization will disintegrate by itself; it will collapse from below if it cannot be a player in the political life of the country. Therefore, I support those proposals which we have already heard from this tribune

about the necessity of ratifying the program at the congress. Not program declarations, not program goals, but the program itself in which the political identity of the organization is clear and precise. There is one more thing on which I don't agree with Maksim. He characterized Mironenko's position as squeezing other organizations out of the komsomol. Excuse me, in that case you would get only a miscarriage or a still-born child. At the present time the organization is politically multifaceted and it is necessary to provide for those parts of it, which have already taken shape and which are ready for an independent political voyage, ready to work independently, the opportunity for organizational self-determination. At least in our republic we acted in precisely that way. Moreover, we did not begin to cling to the property of the organization. This property is the property of all the members of the organization and we came to an agreement, found a mechanism and a method to provide material and financial resources to those who had decided to begin independent work within the framework of another youth organization. This kind of correct, wise parting, wise divorce, if you like, allows us to look honestly into each other's eyes the next day, to shake each other's hand and to work together on defending the rights and interests of the youth. The fact that such joint work is necessary was illustrated perfectly by yesterday's congress. In my view, even if no discussion had been scheduled in the Supreme Soviet regarding the draft law on taxation, we would have had to come up with the measure ourselves in order for us to feel the necessity for consolidation, the necessity for joint work on defending the interests and rights of the youth. I don't know how it is in other regions of the country, but back home we understand perfectly that when society is in bad shape and when confusion sometimes reigns in the state,

when various political interests clash, the most defenseless and helpless segments of the population are sacrificed first of all. The youth belongs to this group. You know that Estonia was one of the first republics of the union where people began talking about the necessity of a state youth policy. I can report to you that the government of the republic has decided to reschedule an examination of this to next year.

Much has been said about the necessity of a state youth policy. Today in the republic we have a public, I emphasize public, commission on youth affairs which was allocated a miserly sum. That kind of attitude of society and the state towards the youth unite us with other youth organizations of completely different political direction.

And there's one more thing. Having identified ourselves politically; and the organization needs to do that first of all; having agreed on the main issue, the program, and having agreed on the fundamental political elements, we will be able to come to agreement on the organizational structure. We are in favor of a federative structure of the komsomol. However, respected delegates, we just took a test on our allegiance to this idea during the voting; we took a test on our ability to have a federative structure in our organization. There was not a single delegation head on this tribune who did not speak about the necessity of the creation of a federation, confederation or about movement towards a federation. But by our vote we clearly and precisely demonstrated our ability to have this federation. As you see, it is a rather long way from words to action.

As far as the komsomol of Estonia is concerned, we have defined its path, have defined the political essence of our organization and elaborated the statutory organizational principles. And we will live and work. But we would like to do this together within the framework of a federation built by our joint efforts. (Applause.)

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

16 July 1990